JAMIE SEZ: Make your wife jealous - smile in your sleep.

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TACRP 127-1

Articles, accident briefs, and associated material in this magazine are non-directive in nature. All suggestions and recommendations are intended to remain within the scope of existing directives. Information used to brief accidents and incidents does not identify the persons, places, or units involved and may not be construed as incriminating under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Names, dates, and places used in conjunction with accident stories are fictitious. Air Force units are encouraged to republish the material contained herein; however, contents are not for public release. Written permission must be obtained from HQ TAC before material may be republished by other than Department of Defense organizations.

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The month of September annually brings about the return to school. For many families, it is a time of last minute panic to purchase clothing and school supplies and, on that eventful morning, a final state of confusion with "Mom" desperately trying to get the little ones fed and dressed, and off on the right bus. This pattern never changes from that first year to that much sought after last year of school. In other families, this scene is simply one of everyone doing what had been planned and quietly skipping off at the appointed time and place.

What has getting the kids back in school got to do with a military safety program? It's simple... it happens every year, just as regularly as the falling leaves of autumn announce the coming of the winter season and its associated severe weather patterns. In our family life we should plan for recurring events, in our safety business we MUST approach recurring problems in a somewhat more organized or professional manner. The thought I'm trying to convey is this - if, by the time this magazine reaches you, you haven't taken out your winter weather plans, dusted them off, and updated them for this year, you're already behind the power curve.

During the 69-70 winter season, TAC suffered 22 major aircraft accidents. Eight of these were associated with instrument flight conditions. That's right - and let me add that none of the eight had weather as a cause factor. In the simplest terms, failure of our crews to handle rather simple weather encounters took the lives of 11 crew members and destroyed nine good airframes.

Now, I don't say that the solution is to lock the birds in the barn when there is a cloud in the sky, but the cold, harsh facts of last winter should remind us all to plan for that unforecasted and unexpected bad weather that may come our way. We must look at every area - aircrew qualifications, airfields, nav-aids, and so forth. Special interest should be given to your recovery operation in the areas of channel changes, hand-offs, and coordination between all agencies that have a part in bringing the birds home. We live with many problems and much confusion caused by things which are out of our hands, yet we can, with strong supervision and control of our individual operations, stop the needless accidents that should never happen.
Preflight, start, and takeoff were uneventful. The dart tow mission was flown as briefed. Upon return to _______, completed one GCA low approach. All systems functioned normally. Re-entered pattern for VFR pitch-out and low approach. Immediately after gear and flaps were raised on go-around, the 'Check Hydraulic Gauges' light came on. Gauges were checked and the utility hydraulic pressure was noted dropping through 1000 psi. The pressure came back up slightly then dropped to zero. When the gear handle was lowered, the main gear came down and locked but the nose gear indicated unsafe. Mobile control and an airborne F-4 confirmed the nose gear partially extended (about 45 degrees). The pilot said he activated the emergency gear lowering system in the front cockpit. Also, numerous attempts to lower the gear by pulling Gs had no effect. One touch-and-go was accomplished to attempt to jar the nose gear down but to no avail. During this time the runway was foamed. The centerline fuel tank was jettisoned, emergency flaps lowered and a long flat final was set up. Touchdown was approximately 1000 feet down the runway, the nose was lowered into the foam and the drag chute was deployed. Rudder and emergency brakes were used to maintain directional control. The aircraft slid to a stop at the 3000 foot remaining marker. Canopies were opened and normal egress procedures were used by the crew.

So reads the narrative of an F-4E incident report submitted from a TAC base a few months ago. It cost 15 manhours and an M-61 cannon. The cause of the utility failure was material failure of the left outboard leading edge flap actuator up-line. The shape and physical dimension of the nose gun caused the M-61 cannon and associated hardware to act as a skid. No other aircraft parts made contact with the runway. The pitot tube was approximately three inches off the ground while the tail hook, fully extended, failed to reach the ground by six inches.

The aircraft nose was raised on the runway and the nose gear was lowered and locked by two maintenance personnel. When they towed the bird in and looked it over, they discovered that THE EMERGENCY GEAR LOWERING SYSTEM HAD NOT BEEN ACTIVATED!

Now let's back up about seven months and talk about another mishap on this order. This time we're talking about a minor accident. The difference, it seems, was the gun. This was a "D" model which skidded out on the radome and associated parts to the tune of 458 manhours.

The cause? THE EMERGENCY GEAR LOWERING SYSTEM HAD NOT BEEN ACTIVATED!

It started much the same as the previous incident. While on downwind leg following a GCA low approach the crew discovered that they had experienced utility system failure. They notified the tower, stated their fuel, and requested an approach end arrestment. They did not declare an emergency at that time. Tower stated it would take about five minutes to hook up the BAK-12 on the approach end and asked if they wanted to wait—they said they would. While holding, the back-seater reviewed the emergency gear and flap lowering and the approach end arrestment procedures with the front-seater.

When the utility failure was discovered fuel was 2400 pounds and shortly, when queried by the tower, the crew said they could hold for twenty-five minutes. Six and a-half minutes later they announced that they had five minutes max remaining. What transpired during this time is another story, the time element is brought out to illustrate the trap they backed into.

After announcing "five minutes max," they were cleared in behind an airplane whose crew HAD declared an emergency for BLC problems. The hook was lowered and the gear and flap circuit breakers were pulled at five miles. The pilot stated, "I placed the landing gear
The difference between an accident and an incident is the gun. The "D" model slid about 3500 feet, the "E", 8700 feet.
but one of its most outstanding attributes is that of a down and then pulled it sharply aft and held it there. The mains went down and indicated locked immediately. The nose gear indicated unsafe at this time. The gear handle was down and out.” Flaps were lowered, they were about three miles... the nose gear was still unsafe. The crew decided to land out of this approach since fuel was now 1400 pounds. The nose gear folded and they skidded to a stop 3500 feet later.

There was much discussion in both reports about the gear handle operation. We don’t propose to enter into that one — there have been too many successful emergency gear lowerings in the past. Besides, you’re not going to get another one in the foreseeable future so perhaps we’d better learn the operation of the one installed in the aircraft. In one of the mishaps we learned, that although the front-seater had done his time in the simulator, he had never actuated the emergency landing gear system. So what? Well, there are a lot of things that a simulator is not — but one of its most outstanding attributes is that of a procedures trainer. One of the front seaters had 10 hours in the airplane and the other had 100 hours. The “high timer,” when queried by mobile, allowed as how he didn’t think the man in his back seat could find the landing gear circuit breaker! Do you suppose he would have known the procedure if he had done it in the simulator?

At this point you’re probably all wondering what happened to Step 5 in the checklist under LANDING GEAR EMERGENCY LOWERING. It says under the heading, “if landing gear is still unsafe, — Retain front cockpit handle in extend position and pull rear cockpit emergency gear lowering handle.” The crews assumed that the emergency air bottles had been expended because all three sets of gear doors had opened and in both cases, the mains had indicated down and locked. It seems that trapped hydraulic pressure in the lines can accomplish the same thing since the main gear will free-fall and lock without hydraulic pressure.

It’s easy to see how a crew could be fooled into believing that the emergency landing gear system had been actuated — to a point. Perhaps we should add two steps to the checklist as was suggested by one of the investigations. They would be: 3a. Visually check Pneumatic System Pressure Gauge., and 4a. Visually check Pneumatic System Pressure Gauge for pressure change. If the gauge is still reading around 3000 pounds after pulling the landing gear handle aft, you didn’t blow the bottles so try again or get your back-seater in the act at Step 5. In any case, you are not finished until ALL eight steps in the checklist are completed!

As for the hook, there are three landing configurations in which it is not recommended that you perform an approach end engagement. So why drop... before the landing gear are in their final configuration? With utility failure the hook cannot be raised if you find that you acted prematurely. Along that line, with utility failure you will immediately request the field be set up for an approach-end arrestment. Without a nose gear the possibility exists that you could run the BAK-12 pendant cable over the top of your bird. The “E” skidded for 8700 feet on the gun, grinding it down continuously — on a 10,000 foot runway with the BAKs 1000 to 1500 feet from the thresholds there would only be 7000 to 8000 feet between them. Something to think about?

In summary, if you have to use the emergency gear lowering system, why rush? Nothing in the handbook requires that the gear handle be placed in the down position and simultaneously pulled. Why not just lower the handle and hesitate? If the doors all open and the mains lock down — consider that a gift and use the air to get the nose gear locked forward. Your pneumatic gauge should tell you if the air bottles have been expended, then you’re home free or you merely get on with the next procedure. Oh, and incidently — while preparing this story we heard about two troops who blew the air bottles while raising the handle during a go-around. Isn’t that something?
Major James H. Frogge of the 4429 Combat Crew Training Squadron, Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, has been selected as a Tactical Air Command Pilot of Distinction.

Major Frogge was flying a night instrument mission in a T-33. Shortly after takeoff, he experienced a muffled explosion, accompanied by rapidly decreasing oil pressure and increased engine vibration. He immediately declared an emergency and turned back toward the field to set up a precautionary landing pattern. As he retarded the throttle to 82 percent, vibration increased and the fire light began to flicker on and off. Unable to climb, Major Frogge set himself up at low key altitude for the precautionary landing pattern. As low key was reached, the oil pressure dropped to zero and vibrations became severe. On base turn, the fire light came on steady and remained on. Major Frogge was able to successfully accomplish a landing with no damage to the aircraft.

Investigation revealed a broken blade from the front side of the compressor rotor had caused considerable damage in the compressor guide vane assembly area. Major Frogge's outstanding airmanship in a critical inflight emergency readily qualifies him as a Tactical Air Command Pilot of Distinction.
"Good wingmen, smart wingmen, are the answer to a leader's prayers."

Since over twenty-six years ago, you may find it difficult to obtain a copy. Beginning with this issue we will publish selected accounts from the book. Our first is by a man who, at that time, had nine aerial victories and had destroyed six on the ground. The then, Lieutenant Colonel John C. Meyer.

In every case when attacked by enemy aircraft I have turned into the attack. We have found that the turning characteristics of the P-47 as against the ME 109 and FW 190 are very nearly equal. Since, when we are attacked the enemy aircraft has almost always come from ab
He has excessive speed and turning inside him is a simple matter. If the enemy aircraft is sighted in time, it is often possible to turn into him for a frontal attack. On two occasions I was able to do this and the enemy aircraft was reluctant to trade a head on pass and broke for the deck. Thus I was able to turn a defensive situation into an offensive one.

The sun is a most effective offensive weapon and the enemy loves to use it. Whenever possible I always try to make all turns into the sun and try never to fly with it at my back. Clouds are very effective for evasive action if there is 8/10’s coverage or better. They’re a good way to get home when you’re alone.

When attacked by much superior numbers I get the hell out of there using speed, or clouds (there are usually plenty around in this theatre) and only as a last resort by diving to the deck. An aggressive act in the initial phases of the attack will very often give you a breather and a head start home.

I had one experience which supports this last statement and also shows what teamwork can do. My wingman and I, attacking a pair of 109’s were in turn attacked by superior numbers of enemy aircraft. In spite of this (the enemy aircraft attacking us were still out of range for effective shooting) we continued our attack, each of us destroying one of the enemy aircraft, and then turned into our attackers. Our attackers broke off and gained the tactical advantage of altitude but during this interval we were able to effect our escape in the clouds. Showing a willingness to fight often discourages the enemy even when he outnumbers us, while on the other hand I have, by immediately breaking for the deck on other occasions, given the enemy a “shot in the arm,” turning his half-hearted attack into an aggressive one.

I do not like the deck. This is especially true in the Pas de Calais area. I believe that it may be used effectively to avoid an area of numerically superior enemy aircraft because of the difficulty in seeing an aircraft on the deck from above. With all silver planes this excuse is even doubtful. The danger from small arms ground fire especially near the coast is great. I realize that I differ from some of my contemporaries in this respect, but two-thirds of our Squadron losses have been from enemy small arms fire. Just recently I led a 12-ship squadron on a fifty mile penetration of the Pas de Calais area on the deck. We were under fire along the entire route. We lost one pilot, three airplanes, and three others damaged. I repeat I don’t like the deck and can see little advantage in being there. Caught on the deck by three 190’s I was able to outrun them by using water injection.

Mainly it’s my wingman’s eyes that I want. One man cannot see enough. When attacked I want first for him to turn me, then for him to think. Every situation is different and the wingman must have initiative and ability to size up the situation properly and act accordingly. There is no rule of thumb for a wingman.

I attempt to attack out of the sun. If the enemy aircraft is surprised, he’s duck soup, but time is an important factor and it should not be wasted in securing position. I like to attack quickly and at high speed. This gives the enemy aircraft less time to see you and less time to act. Also speed can be converted to altitude on the break away. The wingman’s primary duty is protection of his element leader. It takes the leader’s entire attention to destroy an enemy aircraft. If he takes time to cover his own tail, he may find the enemy has “flown the coop.” Effective gunnery takes maximum mental and physical concentration. The wingman flies directly in trail on the attack. This provides maneuverability and he is there to follow up the attack if his leader misses. Once, however, the wingman has cleared himself and is certain his element is not under attack he may move out and take one of the other enemy aircraft under attack if more than one target is available. Good wingmen, smart wingmen, are the answer to a leader’s prayers.

If surprise is not effected the enemy aircraft generally turns into the attack and down, thus causing the attacker to overshoot. When this happens I like to break off the attack and resume the tactical advantage of altitude. Often the enemy aircraft will pull out of his dive and attempt to climb back up. Then another attack can be made. A less experienced enemy pilot will often just break straight down. Then it is possible and often fairly easy to follow him. Usually on the way down he will kick, skid, and roll his aircraft in violent evasive action for which the only answer is point blank range. Compressibility is a problem which must be taken into consideration when following an enemy aircraft in a dive.

The effect of superior numbers in a decision to attack is small. The tactical advantage of position — altitude — sun — and direction of attack are the influencing factors. With these factors in my favor the number of enemy aircraft are irrelevant.

It is not wise to attack when the enemy has the advantage of altitude, and as long as he maintains it. If you’re closing fast enough to overshoot, you’re closing fast enough to get point blank range. At point blank range you can’t miss.

I am not a good shot. Few of us are. To make up for this I hold my fire until I have a shot of less than 200 deflection and until I’m within 300 yards. Good discipline on this score can make up for a great deal.

I like to attack at high speeds and break up into the sun, making the break hard just in case his friend is around. Then I like to get back that precious altitude.

Enroute to rendezvous we fly a formation which has
the
LONG REACH
for its basis mutual protection rather than flexibility or maneuverability. The group is broken down into three Squadrons of sixteen ships each. The Squadrons are stepped up with the second Squadron about 1000 feet higher, into the sun and line abreast; and the third Squadron 2500 feet higher than the lead Squadron on the down sun side and line abreast. This alignment makes it impossible for any one Squadron to be bounced out of the sun by an attacker who is not clear of the sun to one of the other Squadrons. The flights fly in line abreast providing mutual cross cover between individual planes and flights within the Squadron.

Upon rendezvous with the bombers the group generally breaks down into eight ship sections of two flights each operating independently and at various ranges from the main bomber force. One flight of this section remains in close support of the other on bounces. This method has been the most successful one tried by this organization. It has certain disadvantages in that they may run into superior forces in which case considerably more would have been achieved by keeping a larger portion of our force intact. However, our main problem to date has been in seeking out the enemy, rather than his destruction once found. This method of deployment has been the best answer to that problem. These eight ships are under orders to remain within supporting distance of each other at all times. These sections operate above, below, around, ahead, behind, and well out to the sides of the main bomber force. The extent of ranging is dependent upon many factors such as weather, number of friendly fighters in the vicinity, and what information we may have as to enemy disposition; the decision on this is left up to the section leaders.

There is no rule of thumb imitation on who makes bounces. The primary job of the flight leaders is that of seeking out bounces while that of the other members of the flight is flight protection. If any member of a flight sees a bounce and time permits, he notifies his flight leader and the flight leader leads the engagement. However, if the flight leader is unable to see the enemy the one who spotted him takes over the lead, or in those cases, of which there are many, when the time element is precious, the man who sees the enemy acts immediately, calling in the bounce as he goes.

Usually if the combat is of any size or duration, flights become separated. The element of two becoming separated however is a cardinal and costly sin. We find it almost impossible for elements to rejoin their Squadrons or flights after any prolonged combat. However, there are generally friendly fighters in the vicinity all with the same intention and we join any of them. A friendly fighter becomes a friend indeed no matter what outfit he's from.

Recently we have tried imitating enemy formations but have not had any particular success with it.

On the defensive the eight ship section turns into them presenting a 64 gun array which the enemy is reluctant to face. If we are hopelessly outnumbered or low on gas after the initial turn, the individual ships keep increasing their bank until in a vertical dive using the superior diving speed of the P-47 for escape. On one occasion when we were extremely low on gas one of our flights of eight was bounced by three 190s. That flight broke for the deck with the 190s following. We crossed over following the 190s down. They immediately broke off their attack and zoomed back up. We continued our dive and effected our escape.

We drop belly tanks when empty. Gas consumption is a primary tactical consideration in this theatre and we don’t like to use it to drag empty belly tanks around.

The number of aircraft to go down on a bounce is influenced purely by the number of enemy aircraft. In any case at least one flight stays several thousand feet above until the situation is carefully sized up at which time the leader of that flight makes the decision on whether to join the fray or stay aloft.

We pursue all attacks to conclusion if a favorable conclusion seems possible. In other words, if by continuing the pursuit it seems reasonable the enemy may be destroyed. There are exceptions to this however, as for instance, the enemy sometimes will send a single aircraft across our nose to draw us away from the bombers while their main force attacks. This must be watched for and the decision made by the flight leaders.

Every effort is made to hit the enemy while he is forming for the bomber attack. Generally he forms ahead and well to the up sun side of the bomber force. A large part of our group force is deployed in that area.

Our group was the first to attempt a penetration in force on the deck for a strafing mission. Out of this experiment I have these recommendations to make: That penetration to within ten miles of the coast be made on the deck, then the force to zoom to 8000 - 12,000 feet, navigating at that altitude, penetrate beyond the target, hit the deck at some prominent point a short distance from their target, and then proceed to it. This, rather than penetration all the way on the deck where the enemy small arms fire is intense and pin point navigation impossible. That when an aircraft is below 8000 feet over enemy territory, it be just as low as possible. Twenty feet above the ground is too high.
Captain Bruce J. Lotzbire of the 23d Tactical Fighter Wing, McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, has been selected as the Tactical Air Command Outstanding Flight Safety Officer for the six-month period ending 30 June 1970. Captain Lotzbire's accident prevention program for the 23d Tactical Fighter Wing reduced its aircraft accident rate to the lowest ever enjoyed by any operational F-105 Wing. Captain Lotzbire also developed a trend analysis system of aircraft accident/incident prevention and follow-up action which has been incorporated into a regulation, with the recommendation it be adopted by all Wings in TAC. For his contribution to safety Captain Lotzbire will receive a letter of appreciation from the Commander of Tactical Air Command and an engraved plaque.
Have you ever run across an article that makes you wish, "Why didn't I think of that?" We did, and with Brigadier General Williams' permission, have reprinted it below. The message is simple, and to the point. Does it apply to you? Ed.

FAT, DUMB AND HAPPY

FIFTY-TWO MONTHS! Four and a third years without an accident! That's damned impressive for an outfit operating at 6,000 feet pressure altitude, flying sixteen tons of iron with no flaps! The 140th is faster than the proverbial 40 pound robin when it comes to our accident record — Tops in TAC, huh? Well, that's what the records show and I, for one, am damned proud of it! But somehow, down deep, I've got a gut feeling that I'm sitting here in this plush air conditioned office, acting fat, dumb and happy!

It's nice to think that the 140th is better trained, better maintained and better controlled, therefore the safety record is well earned and justified — but really, is it? Hasn't old lady luck helped just a little? Probably every one of you can remember a time when things could have turned sour, but didn't. Maybe I should move over to make room for you to sit next to me.

DEFINITION: (RAMDON HOUSE DICTIONARY). COMPLACENCY, N. A FEELING OF QUIET PLEASURE OR SECURITY, OFTEN WHILE UNAWARE OF SOME POTENTIAL DANGER, DEFECT, OR THE LIKE; SELF-SATISFACTION OR SMUG SATISFACTION WITH AN EXISTING SITUATION, CONDITION, ETC.

Let's look at the average 140th pilot for a minute. He's a member of a red hot outfit just off active, combat duty. Nobody needs to tell him how to fly a bird! He's probably over 30, finding his flight suit has been shrunk by the cleaners, probably getting more martinis than push-ups. He has a good job with the airline, a growing family and a budding bank account. He's got over two grand total flying time, and probably half of it in the good old souped up sabre. His outfit provides him with first class maintenance and every advantage available. He likes to fly and stands just a little taller when he tells somebody he's a fighter jock. He's just a cut above the average or he wouldn't be around. Would you say he's complacent? Maybe so, maybe not. Instead of complacency, let's try these on for size: Overconfidence, boredom, carelessness, routine,
squarefilling. Shoe fit now? We all face complacency and know of its insidious nature and we all think it's worse in the other guy. Accident rates are higher among pilots who have 1,000 to 3,000 hours than those with less experience — How come? Wouldn't complacency be a likely suspect? Some of the indications of complacency are the decreased desire to remain proficient, less attention to personal equipment, sketchy flight planning, gradual decline of physical condition and a general unawareness of the gradual deterioration of performance. OK — is the average 140th pilot complacent? I think we can honestly say yes — in varying degrees of severity and particularly with the “old heads.” So what’s the answer?

I’d like to suggest one for your consideration: Remember when you were a brand new sport with shiny gold? You were still half-way up the learning curve and in the habit of thinking about each little step or phase of a flight. You were in the habit of thinking. Today, you can go through a complete walk-around, start and taxi, doing the right things automatically, and maybe hardly remember checking, for instance, the emergency fuel — Complacency? How about a wee bit of retrogression here — by forcing yourself to go back to some of the procedures or habits you had a few years back, that worked well for you while you were weak. Won’t they help now that you’ve got experience? I don’t mean the ABCs of flight school, but simply putting forth the effort you used to. Take 15 seconds to really look at your chute, helmet and equipment. Make a vow to actually use the checklist once in a while for a walk-around. (I’ll bet there is at least one item you’ve been overlooking.) As you pull on the runway for the runup check, think about what you’d do if you had to abort. In other words, think like you used to when you weren’t so experienced, and worry a little more about covering old number one’s fanny! If you take care of No.1, you’ll be looking out for your buddy and your outfit. The old “this can’t happen to me” attitude would make an ironic epitaph, wouldn’t it?

So, how about it? Will you help us try to double our safety record? Think about complacency and how it applies to you. That’ll be one less of us who is FAT, DUMB AND HAPPY—

WALTER E. WILLIAMS
Brig Gen, 140th Tac Ftr Wg
Commander
Wanted... Lightning Locator

The F-4 was in clouds at FL 370 with light to moderate turbulence. Center radar vectored the crew around thunderstorms in the area; their airborne radar was inop. Center kept them out of the heavy precip, but couldn’t give them any help on lightning strikes. Two blue darters zapped them about 20 seconds apart. They lost airspeed indications, UHF radio, and both ends of their 600-gallon centerline drop tank. An explosion within the tank blew the ends off. They landed okay.

Ground and airborne radar can help you zig around damaging hail and heavy precip, but so far we haven’t come up with a practical lightning locator for aircrews. If some inventive type in TAC ATTACK’s vast (?) readership can come up with a lightning sniffer, we’ll find a prize for you.

Runaway Hun

After landing, this “hundred” jock cleared the runway and dropped his chute; so far, everything had been routine. As brakes were applied to further slow the aircraft prior to entering the dearming area, both pedals bottomed. The pilot released brakes fully and reapplied them — still nothing. In the meantime, the aircraft had rolled about one hundred and fifty feet and was headed for the revetments about five hundred feet away. Utility pressure read 2900 pounds so the pilot attempted to turn using nose wheel steering, it didn’t work either.

The pilot knew he had lost both his brakes and nose wheel steering, so he dropped his tail hook to get maintenance troops’ attention and signal for chocks — it didn’t work either. Next, he jettisoned his external stores using the emergency jettison button; everything left except his 335-gallon drops. That maneuver finally got the attention of personnel on the ramp, but it was too late to try to stop the bird, now about 300 feet from the revetments. The pilot stopcocked and stood on the right rudder in vain. His aircraft impacted a revetment at an estimated 10 knots, utility pressure — zero.

A trail of hydraulic fluid was found on the runway starting at the 2000 foot marker and extending into the drag chute jettison area where the brake problems started. There was no hydraulic fluid on the ramp from that point forward. The cause of this incident was failure of the right main brake piston seal. The unit involved recommends that the engine be shut down ASAP if brakes and nose wheel steering are lost. And as a last resort, pilots should try using single brake action to attempt to trap brake pressure in the good wheel (you have a 50 — 50 chance of getting it).

Whoops!

Just after breaking ground the Thud’s trailing edge flaps began to retract, the pilot had not moved the flap lever. He placed the flap lever to “HOLD TRAILING EDGE” position but they retracted fully in spite of his attempt to stop them. He then ran three complete trailing edge flap checks at altitude but was unable to duplicate the discrepancy. He burned off fuel and landed, calling it a day.

The cause was erratic operation of the airspeed/altitude pressure switch, PN 71012. They found it out of tolerance on the first bench test, then it operated OK. An EMUR was submitted because of the obvious danger of sinking right after breaking ground, sans gear. And how about flap retraction on short final . . . or during takeoff while still on the runway? Isn’t it amazing that systems as critical as this aren’t made to fail safe?

Foul Fowl

If you think that bird bombs are just a low altitude hazard, think again. Cruising contentedly at 18,000 MSL, an unsuspecting Herky crew hammered a high-flying . . .
of prey sailplaning silently at the wrong flight level. Possibly hypoxic, or hungry, the feathered flyer attempted conquest by boarding ship through the center windshield. He didn’t survive. He did make a colorful, indelible impression though, and the concerned crew reduced both aircraft altitude and cabin pressurization quickly. The cracked windshield held out okay throughout the low altitude return and landing.

Air traffic control radar didn’t paint the intruder’s skin return or identify its squawk ... not even its last one. Clearly, the foul fowl was violating air traffic regulations. The bird species wasn’t indicated in the report, but we’re betting it was an illegal eagle ... or is it an illeagle?

**Bottle Baby?**

The Herky refueled on its parking spot for a quick turnaround. During completion of the Before Starting Engine checklist the loadmaster responded, “Ground equipment removed and clear.” Confident that a fellow crewmember wouldn’t mislead him, the pilot released brakes and rolled forward about three feet. Then he heard and felt the disillusioning “crunch.” A fire bottle tried to climb into the bird through the nose gear doors. Realizing that he had been had, the pilot minimized damage with a quick stop and held it to 50 manhours.

Wonder if his loadmaster is walking the ramp for 50 hours ... with a fire bottle in tow?

**No Fair**

The O-2 pilot landed smoothly on a newly surfaced runway after controlling a combat strike. The taxiways were resurfaced too, and joined the runway at sharp, 90-degree angles. A drop of a couple inches existed where “taxiway fairing” normally assists high-speed turnoffs. Asked by tower types to expedite because landing traffic followed, the FAC tried a square left turn, but it came closer to a left oblique. His left gear dropped into the unfaired runway-taxiway corner and his front prop promptly “grooved” the taxiway until engine shutdown.

Investigators figured that his speed was a little too high for a quick 90-degree course correction. And they weren’t exactly pleased by traffic controllers asking for demonstrations of precision close-order drill by landing pilots on runways without high-speed taxiways.

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**Blade Bomb**

On climbout the Provider pilot felt and saw number two engine vibrate excessively. He decided to feather it and return to base for some troubleshooting. It’s a good thing that he did. Inspectors discovered about nine inches missing from number one blade of Two’s prop. It’s anybody’s guess on how long an imbalanced prop will stay on an engine’s nose section. It’s also anybody’s guess on the travel route of separated props ... especially pieces. The unit completed a one-time inspection of all prop blades for fatigue cracks and will check them closely regularly.

**Oil Spill**

The EC-47 cruised for 45 minutes before unfamiliar fumes sickened several crewmembers. Smoke masks and a walk-a-round bottle helped until the Gooney landed and the flight surgeon checked crewmen for possible permanent injury.

Investigators discovered that a can of spilled lubricating oil (MIL-L-7870A) seeped through the floor boards onto the cabin heater ducts. The source of nauseous fumes couldn’t be located in flight and the crew was needlessly victimized by a maintenance type who violated a cardinal rule: Open containers of fluid are not allowed on an aircraft.
While pulling off a skip bomb run at 375 knots, this Super Sabre struck a large bird later identified as a Canadian Honker Goose. The bird impacted just below the right windscreen quarter panel and a bunch of his remains penetrated the cockpit, splattering the pilot’s visor (down) and bruising his left leg. The bird’s remains also knocked off all the right indicator lights, splattered and damaged the instrument panel, and sprayed the inside of the canopy.

The pilot raised his visor, declared an emergency and recovered “uneventfully.” A few minutes before the birdstrike the pilot was flying under clouds with his visor up—his helmet was not equipped with dual visors. The unit involved has dual visors on order for all pilots... does yours?

Dents caused by head and bill of the bird.

Shattered windshield and hole where the bird penetrated the skin of the airplane.
Damaged indicator lights, light bracket and instrument panel.

Parts of the bird imbedded between canopy and windshield bow.

Shattered windshield, hole, and splattered windshield.
**BE SURE THEY KNOW**

After landing, an F-4 jock pulled his bird into a designated parking position on the ramp of a foreign airdrome. A crew chief of the country’s air force approached the Phantom, apparently to lower the access steps.

Instead, he opened the external emergency canopy jettison door and pulled the handle. The M3A1 initiator and thrusters for the front canopy fired, but it didn’t jettison because it was already in the UP position. Evidently the crew chief stopped pulling the handle immediately upon hearing the front initiator fire because the rear canopy initiator didn’t fire.

Assuming the crew chief was concentrating on the job he was trying to do, about the only cause factor left was simply that the man was not properly informed. And it’s not beyond belief that similar problems could arise at our own Air Force bases. Transient alert crews know the equipment flown by their command, and if the Phantom isn’t one of them, the situation could be like landing at a foreign air patch. A couple of questions, and a briefing if necessary, may make the stay on foreign territory a lot shorter . . . and friendlier.

“**AN O-2 TRAP**

To accomplish an O-2 runup, the bird had to be taxied to another area of the ramp. A qualified tech sergeant planned to move the bird, working from the right seat, while one of his two-striper assistants handled the runup from the left seat. This procedure not only completed the daily chore of runup, but provided some OJT time for the young airmen under the close monitor of an instructor.

After starting engines, the two-striper ran through the "Before Taxi Checklist," including "Landing Gear Handle — DOWN." Why the young fellow moved the handle to UP cannot be explained (pilots have been known to do the same thing before landing), but he did. The nose gear retracted allowing the nose to ease down amid the grinding chatter of prop and ramp.

Admittedly, the airman made a wrong move. But even worse, a system created to prevent this kind of accident from happening to the bird, failed to work. Maintenance men found the landing gear lever lockout solenoid was stuck, with the pin still retracted. They checked the rest of the fleet but all were OK. But, one instructor in the unit is expected to be particularly fussy from now on when a student gets his hands anywhere near the gear handle.

"**MISSING DZUS DOWNS PLANE**

Descending for entry into the traffic pattern, an A-37 flyer flipped the speed brake switch. In seconds the cockpit filled with smoke and fumes, hydraulic pressure dropped to zero, and all hydraulic systems were inoperative. He declared an emergency, blew the gear down, and made an uneventful landing.

Maintenance men found a pin hole leak in a hydraulic line behind the voltage regulator panel. They concluded that the leak was caused by chafing. A Dzus fastener was missing from the rear of the number one engine voltage regulator cover panel. The missing fastener allowed the panel to shift thus causing a shock mount screw to chafe against the hydraulic line.

They replaced the hydraulic line and Dzus fastener, then took some time to talk about quality and pride in workmanship.
with a maintenance slant.

SAFETY PLUG FOULS ENGINE

Previous to an engine change, egress personnel dearmed both seats of an A-37 and installed caps and plugs to the disconnected seat and canopy initiator lines. With new engines installed, the bird was moved to a trim pad, both seats and canopy still dearmed.

The crew had trouble getting a good trim, and then when number one compressor stalled, both engines were shut down. The stalled engine had signs of FOD. The plug for the lap belt initiator line on the left seat had become rewed, and together with the attached streamer, was twisted sometime during the trim run.

It is possible that the plug could have been twisted out by the wind blowing the streamer over a period of time. The streamer was connected to the head of the plug with a stiff wire and twisting of the streamer would be applied to the head of the plug.

The unit has decided that this situation can be avoided by attaching a common streamer to all caps and plugs. They also believe that tech order can be more specific on how tight plugs should be installed so they submitted an AFTO Form 22. So be on the lookout for a change.

ENGINE RIGGERS SET-UP ABORT

Taxi and runup were uneventful for the F-4 crew in number four position during a wing takeoff. But while joining with the lead element the pilot realized one throttle would only retard half-way and the RPM stayed at 97 percent regardless of throttle position. He asked his GIB to try moving the throttle from the aft seat. It slipped back to idle easily but then would not advance beyond one-half. No matter where either throttle was placed, RPM held at a steady 97 percent.

The only thing left to do was head for home. At their base, the crew made an uneventful single engine landing after shutting down the maverick engine with the master switch.

The problem was simple. Maintenance personnel found the throttle linkage disconnected from the engine control. Apparently the throttle cross-over shaft had been improperly connected causing the engine to remain at last power setting when the connection finally came apart.

The unit decided to shave its odds of a repeat happening by special training on rigging procedures for all engine installation crews.

Hey! pass it along... nine others are waiting.
"Well, that's it, M.D. She should be as good as new. All we need is an engine run and the job will be completed."

Sgt M.D. Fixit, world's greatest (self-acclaimed) Phantom Fixer, was elated when the electrician, Sgt D.C. Watts, spouted the promising news. "Whew," breathed Fixit. "We'll make the afternoon schedule after all. I need all the flying time I can muster," he ruefully thought of yesterday's chastisement by Major Redcross, his Materiel Officer. "I put my reputation on the line when I told the major that Double 07 was not entertaining any notions of becoming a hangar queen. I'm sure he'll quickly reconsider his harsh actions when he sees the pride of the fleet in all her splendor departing on a priority mission."

Fixit's thoughts were interrupted as his faithful accomplice, Airman O.J. Tinker, asked, "Should I contact control and request permission to tow our bird to the run-up pad?"

"Tink, my boy! I just can't seem to get through to you," replied the hurried Fixit. "How many times do I have to tell you that on priority missions, we have to be expedient. Calling that Maintenance Control is strictly a time consuming, non-profitable venture. All those video watchers do is get strained eyeballs looking at a bunch of lighted boards. They're not elite and professional wrenchbenders with a true sense of dedication like us. They're a different breed of animal. Besides, with my extensive knowledge and experience, we can have that job finished in less time than is required to collect a SOAP sample. Now, let's get moving."

"But according to wing MOIs, all run-ups over 80 percent must be done at the pad," exclaimed Tinker.

"Those MOIs must be outdated," Fixit answered. "I know from personal experience we can run up in the parking area as long as we don't use AB. I've never gone..."
way down to the run-up pad when I could get the job done here in the parking area. Stick with me, Tink, old buddy, and I'll show you how to get the job done in minimum time. You've got to conserve your resources and make your own breaks in this game, or you'll fall behind the power curve and never catch up. MOIs are just guidelines for the uninformed and inexperienced. An individual of my caliber knows all the details by heart and doesn't need to rely on outmoded and superfluous information."

As M.D. concluded his words of wisdom, he walked over to fetch Double 0's run-up screens. Grabbing a screen, he yelled to a rotund staff sergeant 50 feet away. "Hey! Panelpuller. Come on over here and help me run-up my bird."

Panelpuller hesitantly made his way towards Fixit. "I can't stay long, M.D. I have to launch my own airframe in 45 minutes."

"This won't take long. All I need you to do is run the wolf and put the headset on. We must observe all that safety stuff, especially with those snooper sleuths from Wing Safety on the prowl. They've been after me for nearly a year now, but old M.D. is just too sharp for them."

With the oval sergeant in tow, Fixit started to attach the run-up screens over 007's intakes. Tinker immediately inquired, "Aren't we suppose to pull a FOD intake action before we run her up?"

"Ah, yes, Tink, my observant one. I was just testing your knowledge of engine run-up procedures."

Fixit put the screen back down as Airman Tinker crawled into the left intake, looked around and wriggled his way back out. He repeated the procedure for the right engine. As his feet retouched the concrete, he exposed a drab olive flashlight with the initials M.D.F. etched in the cap. "Look at this, Sarge! It's a good thing you thought of testing me, or we would have needed a new engine."

Fixit quickly grabbed the flashlight and threw it in his tool box saying, "All part of the test, Tink, my boy. OK, the screens are on. Are you ready to check the generators, D.C.?"

"Rog."

"Climb up in the cockpit, Tinker, and get our baby started."

"But, Sarge. You know that I'm only a three-level, I'm not qualified to run Double 0 up."

"Well, climb in the back seat and observe a professional. Hurry up, time's a wasting. What is this Air Force coming to? Why, back in the old days, we didn't have that one-two-three level mess. You learned the job by doing it. If you couldn't hack the program, you pulled K.P. In this so-called modern force, us old heads always have to spoon-feed you young recruits."

The crusty F-4 expert hopped onto the wing and in two steps vaulted in the front cockpit, just as young Tinker gingerly settled in the rear seat. Sgt Watts then climbed up the aircraft ladder, secured a foothold and peered into the cockpit, ready to analyze the instruments. "We're ready to go, Panelpuller. Start that wolf."

Within seconds, Double 0's right engine responded to the sudden surge of air. A quick disconnect, and then the left engine whined its approval and soon the pride of the fleet was humming musically at 70 percent.

Fixit began to reminisce of his old high-speed taxi days when he heard Tinker's harried voice over the intercom. "Sarge, what about that equipment near our bird? See those loose panels, stands, and that Coleman parked over there?"

"Don't sweat the small stuff, Tink! Just pay attention so you can digest the complexities of this job."

As the renowned Phantom fixer surged Double 0 up to full military power, he looked over and asked Watts, "How are those generators checking out?"

"Real fine, M.D. A couple of more minutes and we'll be through."

"What did I tell you, Tink, old buddy. Look at all the time we're saving by running up our baby here rather than at the trim pad. Just hang in there, I'll make you the world's second best Phantom fixer yet!"

Just as M.D. was exuding the fact that his nimble brain had once again saved the day, a disastrous chain of events commenced. Double 0, primed for action at full military, lurched forward, jumping the chocks in the process. (Whether this was caused by the master mechanic's feet slipping off the brakes or the scrounged T-39 chocks that were used hasn't been established yet.) As the pride of the fleet moved toward the parked Coleman like a duck to water, Sgt Watts lost his footing and departed the ladder, leaving a dangling headset as a momento. Jet blast hurled loose panels onto the ramp (just missing two other birds and several wrenchbenders). Two maintenance stands ended up intermeshed with a hydraulic mule in the next parking area. Fixit, startled at first, regained his composure in time enough to stop his runaway beast just as its Fiberglas head peeped over the Coleman's newly painted deck.

"Whew," breathed the perspiring technician, "Just in time!! Are you O.K., Tink? We almost bought the farm, but we sure found out about that brake malfunction that wasn't written up in the forms. I've been after those jocks for years to write up all their problems. See what happens when you don't get any cooperation from your crews. Why those ungrate . . . ."

Fixit's tirade came to an abrupt conclusion when he noticed his Materiel Officer plus the nucleus of the wing safety force, Sergeants Chockchecker and Hazardfinder,
approaching on the dead run and waving for him to cut the engine.

"What in the world are you doing?", exclaimed Major Redcross.

"Well, Sir, I was . . . ."

"Fixit, of all people, you know that you're not allowed to run up over 80 percent on the parking ramp. I don't know how many times this subject has been brought up in the daily meetings. Of course, if you had attended a couple . . . ."

Chock checker quickly interjected, "Look at those undersized chocks-no wonder the aircraft got away."

". . . and look at your area, Fixit," yelled Hazardfinder. "You've got junk all over the place. I'm surprised that only the panels and stands moved."

"But . . . ."

"No buts, Fixit. What do you think Maintenance Control does? It's the hub of all maintenance activity within the squadron, and you're suppose to call them before you begin any run-ups," reiterated Redcross.

As the world's greatest (self-acclaimed) Phantom fixer was being bombarded by Major Redcross and the two safety sergeants, the faint sound of a siren was heard across the ramp.

"Oh, no!! Look what else you've done, Fixit. By starting Double O's engines without notifying the tower, you've activated the wing's unauthorized flight security plan. Now the security police are on the way to keep an aircraft from being stolen."

"Fixit, in the space of an hour, you have managed to break numerous rules and regulations, cause a complete uproar and set an illustrative example for Airman Tinker of what not to do as a maintenance troop," steamed Major Redcross. "Do you have anything to say?"

"Yes sir! Double O's generators checked out A-OK, and if we can clear this area of unnecessary vehicles and personnel, I can still launch the pride of the fleet on that 1400 gaggle."
Our congratulations to the following units for completing 12 months of accident free flying:

152 Tactical Reconnaissance Group, May ANG Base, Reno, Nevada
   1 March 1969 through 28 February 1970

430 Tactical Fighter Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada
   10 March 1969 through 9 March 1970

442 Tactical Fighter Training Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada
   9 April 1969 through 8 April 1970

122 Tactical Fighter Group, Baer Field, Fort Wayne, Indiana
   9 April 1969 through 8 April 1970

123 Tactical Reconnaissance Group, Standiford Field, Louisville, Kentucky
   23 April 1969 through 22 April 1970

33 Tactical Fighter Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida
   9 May 1969 through 8 May 1970

155 Tactical Reconnaissance Group, Nebraska ANG Base, Lincoln, Nebraska
   11 May 1969 through 10 May 1970

179 Tactical Fighter Group, Mansfield Lahm Airport, Ohio
   14 May 1969 through 13 May 1970

192 Tactical Fighter Group, Byrd Field, Sandston, Virginia
   18 May 1969 through 17 May 1970

75 Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas
   29 May 1969 through 28 May 1970
Oftimes people, and pilots, feel they should get involved in the situation at hand and proceed to add their two-cents worth. At other times, they won't say a word. They're either afraid of getting their hands slapped for usurping someone's authority or don't think it's any of their business. We see this situation quite often — at times it can be disastrous. Evaluate the situation and act — or shut-up and sit down.

Most of the following narrative was taken from a tape at a stateside base earlier this year. It doesn't matter where it happened, only that the tower, a mobile control unit, and some aircraft managed to turn a simple situation into one that jeopardized several lives. So read on and see if you can find yourself as one of the cast of characters in this fiasco. Ed.

At the time of this accident the RSU was manned by two instructor pilots, one T-33 qualified, the other, an F-4 troop. Both had combat time in fighters, and both had been flying long enough to know that their job was not to control traffic but to supervise the landing pattern.

KAISER, a flight of two T-33s, had been in the local area when KAISER 2 noticed an engine vibration. The flight was only fifteen miles north when the problem developed, and luckily, traffic was landing to the south. KAISER 2 could easily position himself for a straight-in precautionary landing pattern.

At 1045L, KAISER 2 called the tower and told the controller of his problem. The tower operator replied, "KAISER 2, roger are you declaring an emergency?"

KAISER 2 answered, "Roger, we'll be declaring an emergency in two minutes." He was ten miles out at 5000
foot, the controller told him to report on a five-mile
final.

KETTLE, a flight of four T-birds on ground control
was running late for a 1055 takeoff. They changed to
tower, and Lead advised that his flight was number one.
He asked if they could takeoff.

An F-4 was in the pattern and requested that the tower
not break him out. The F-4 mobile officer commented
that two hours was a long time in a clean bird.

To further complicate the matter, the F-4 mobile
officer, without consulting the T-bird troop, picked up
the tower hotline and said, "I'd like you to get that
flight-of-four off, now!"

The local controller cleared KETTLE into position to
hold, while the flight data recorder reiterated to the
mobile officer, "OK Sir, we've got an emergency in
progress."

The mobile officer countered, "Yeh! Well, get them
off before the emergency. They've got plenty of time!"

The answer was curt, and possibly too obedient, "Yes
Sir!"

The F-4 was touching down as KETTLE taxied onto
the runway and was told to expedite because there was an
emergency on ten-mile final (KAISER 2 was only 7 miles
out) and four T-33s for departure. The landing F-4 delayed
KETTLE's departure.

A mobile, a bit more concerned now, called the tower
and asked the position of the emergency with a
questioning, "Eleven miles?"

The reply was, "Yeh!"

KAISER 2's next call was, "KAISER's seven... six
miles out, KAISER 2..."

"KAISER, the wind 290 at four, cleared to land; and
we have four T-33s departing," replied the tower.
KETTLE was cleared for an immediate takeoff. The
emergency was on a five-mile final.

KETTLE acknowledged, and KAISER 2 called three
miles out.

"KAISER, you're not in sight... continue approach," was
the reply. Then, everything seemed to happen at
once. The mobile officer made a rather insane phone call
to the tower stating that the aircraft was not KAISER but
KAISER 2. Simultaneously, the controller said, "KAISER
2, go-around, now! The T-33s are still on the
runway... they're on departure roll."

KAISER 2's reply was, "Thanks a lot, tower!" As he
advanced his power to go around, the mobile officer
observed something rip through the T-bird's fuselage
followed by a canopy and two ejection seats leaving the
aircraft.

KETTLE 1 and 2 were 2500 feet down the runway
when the crew of KAISER 2 ejected. The aircraft crashed
at 3500 foot point. KETTLE 1 and 2 were 3000 feet
through their takeoff and unable to avoid the wreckage.

Both pilots from KAISER 2 thought they were
home-free after their chutes opened... until they saw
KETTLE 3 and 4 moving toward them.

PEDRO was not in position to suppress the fire
because he was informed of the emergency too late.

All this, because one pilot didn't declare an emergency
(it wasn't on the tape); a mobile officer tried to control
traffic; and the tower controller, possibly bitten once too
often by a gruff mobile officer or pilot, was confused and
did not use his judgment.

The ending is fiction, but it could have happened this
way. KAISER 2 had declared an emergency on six-mile
final but was cut out by the tower. In any case, he should
have declared the emergency when he FIRST noticed the
problem. He was trying to be a nice guy. Three and
one-half minutes elapsed from the time he initiated his
first call 'till the time he made his go-around.

The F-4 mobile control officer should have kept quiet
and let the T-33 mobile officer handle the situation. If
KAISER 2 had been flying at his normal approach speed
there would have been no problem, but he was flying a
precautionary pattern at a higher airspeed.

The T-bird mobile officer did not know the other
troop had been talking to the tower since he was
concentrating on the traffic in the pattern. He made this
quite clear after things had quieted down; it would have
made little difference if the accident had occurred.

The tower controller, a monitored trainee, allowed
himself to get backed into a corner by following an
unqualified person's advice instead of using his own
judgment. Also, the controller was treating the situation
as though it was an emergency, but failed to transmit this
information on guard. KETTLE was on ground frequency
when the whole SNAFU began. PEDRO wasn't able to get
into position in time. One call on guard could have solved
almost everything.

Because of KETTLE 1's position, he didn't receive the
emergency aircraft's calls. Hearing tower's one-sided
conversation should have prompted him to look a little
harder down final before taking the runway. Also, if a
wingman had heard what was developing, he should have
spoken up. The cliche, "put the light on the star and
shut-up," doesn't apply here. Did KETTLE 1 see the crash
trucks at the end of the runway? He made his mistake by
trying to get airborne before the emergency had landed.
He said that he thought the emergency was on a ten-mile
final.

There are many lessons in this short story. Did you
identify yourself as any one of the cast of characters? If
you did, you've probably learned your lessons already.
And how about the rest of you readers... can it happen
to you?
The Directorate of Maintenance, Ogden Air Material Area (DM), has made extensive efforts through personal contact to communicate with various F-4 bases and organizations so that they will be up to date on the latest provisions of negotiated work packages. The visits have been beneficial, however when personnel changes occur, the problems of understanding the basic work package advantages and restrictions are back with us. This article should clear up any misconceptions you jocks may have had after picking up a bird that wasn't in the condition you expected it to be in. Ed.

An Air Materiel Area, by any standard, is a gigantic installation and Ogden AMA at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, is no exception. This sprawling industrial-technical complex has capabilities and "know-how" almost beyond imagination. But, since my subject for today deals with the Directorate of Maintenance, let's make a few notes.

Personnel at Hill AFB pride themselves with the fact that they can, and do, fix anything from the most minute components to the largest and most complicated missiles and aircraft, including the multiplicity of electronic and mechanical systems.

Most people don't realize that a crash-battle damage (CBD) aircraft, for instance, may be received as a real basket case, with unrecognizable twisted and punctured pieces removed from boxes spattered with a foreign and unfamiliar mud, or open crates and skid frames made from rough cut native hardwood, assembled somewhere in Southeast Asia. Somehow, with the skills and ingenuity at Hill AFB, all of this pile of seemingly useless rubble begins to take shape, looking more like an aircraft each day — then like an F-4 — and later a flyable weapons system. The aircraft is complete to the last detail with every system functional, every component operating at its top design capacity, everything completely brought up to date; time compliance technical orders, paint and all. Then comes a thorough and searching Functional Check Flight phase. Now ready, the aircraft is declared "Ready for Delivery" and awaits a pickup aircrew. And so it is with Hill's other aircraft projects, "Except."

But let me retrogress for a moment.

The other day I received a pickup pilot's written remarks on a transient personnel questionnaire that did not exactly reflect what I have just told you. I quote, excluding the aircraft serial number: "Aircraft XX-XXXX was given for delivery with an open stabilization augmentation write up, and no radar - very poor that a complete repair facility like Hill AFB cannot find the time to repair these items at the point where maximum parts service is available."

This pilot was honest in his feelings and his report was appreciated. What he said was true, but it also takes us back to my remarks "Except."
The aircraft arrived at Hill with these open write ups. You see the bird was sent in for a specified modification and this mod only. The project required compliance with three specific technical orders plus safety of flight items.

In other words, we were to bring the non-standard Air Traffic Control Beacon System and the Radar Homing and Warning System (RHAW) to a standard update and eliminate any safety of flight conditions, with NO OTHER requirements negotiated. The mods, as negotiated, were completed and the aircraft declared ready for delivery. What the pilot really expected I do not know, but he received what the work specification required and the contract was funded to cover.

As a pilot of our nation's most popular fighter, he was upset to think we, at the depot, hadn't gone further with...
"YOU" CALL'EM

our repairs and fixed the stabilization augmentation and radar squawks.

On the aircraft delivery line we find most every pilot looks for a new paint job and more spit and polish than he sees. Somehow the "OLD" idea of the depot repair still clings on. The Disassembly Inspection and Repair (DIR) in days gone by, meant the complete rebuilding of an aircraft rather than the Inspect and Repair as Necessary (IRAN) concept of today. Then, the aircrew could look for a bird even better than when it was new. This, alas, has passed on to oblivion, and the misconception of the fact that because your aircraft is scheduled for a depot visit does not mean you'll get a DIR or a completely refurbished F-4. But instead you must understand we at Hill work from your specifications. We repair, rework, modify, update, and paint your aircraft only according to the specific requirements of the work package negotiated for your particular aircraft.

You see, at recurring times, personnel from using commands - TAC, PACAF, USAFE, AFLC, OOAMA, etc., meet and agree upon work specifications for a particular project. In order to conserve the limited funds available for depot maintenance, the work requirements are limited to the programmed maintenance necessary to upgrade the reliability and capability of each F-4 weapons system.

We use the funds received to pay the expenses incurred in accomplishing the work. Our objective is to break even, but the most important point is, the amount of funds available for depot work is limited, hence the work accomplished must be limited to the most essential, as agreed. This, then, does not require you to pay for work you are able to do for yourself.

This all must be done within a budget system known as Depot Maintenance Industrial Funding (DMIF). Essentially all maintenance accomplished in the depot must be paid for by the Industrial Fund.

After the powers that be have finally agreed on requirements for each aircraft, the final package is sent to Hill Maintenance and to each of our customers - you.

In each work package there are definite obligations. In this myriad of possibilities we are required to fix, upgrade and so on, as defined in the work package designed to fit your bird. We, of course, will fix other things such as Safety of Flight (SOF) items and those you probably won't be able to see or easily get at later on. We like to give you the best you can get for your money with a lot of extra wherever possible.

Again, the "Except" I mentioned. In each work package there are exceptions in addition to the normal exclusion of Organizational and Field Maintenance. For example: In some cases we're not allowed funds (DMIF) to fix your cameras or any part of the system, or the side-looking radar, or provide paint and white wall tires - not all of the fringe items you'd like and we'd like to give you, but we do try to give supermarket value for the money you spend with us. Here is how you can help us.

On my desk this morning are several AFTO 64s, "Adequacy of Quality Reports." As I read through and analyze the findings in each case I'm reminded of another word that fits along with "Except," and that is "Briefing."

You see, briefing by the receiving organization would have alerted the pickup aircrew what to expect when they arrived for their aircraft. Briefing would give the squadron maintenance crew the advantage of knowing what systems, items, and units had been subjected to Hill's rework. Briefing would identify those items, systems, etc., NOT reworked or "excepted," if you will, from rework by your negotiated work package.

We at Hill AFB are proud of our skills and know-how. We have experts in every field and they are all anxious to give you, the customer, their very best, but the funds limited by your work package and the money you willing to spend with us. DMIF controls those little extras we'd like you to have and you, no doubt, would like to get.

Briefing would eliminate any question on what you can expect from your own specifications because of the meaning of "Except." Then, as you can see, we do "See 'Em Like You Call 'Em."
Tactical Air Command
Crew Chief of the Month

Staff Sergeant Robert W. Hulverson, 777 Tactical Airlift Squadron, Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, has been selected to receive the TAC Crew Chief Safety Award. Sergeant Hulverson will receive a letter of appreciation from the Commander of Tactical Air Command and an engraved award.

Tactical Air Command
Maintenance Man of the Month

Staff Sergeant Raymond Gibson, USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, has been selected to receive the TAC Maintenance Man Safety Award. Sergeant Gibson will receive a letter of appreciation from the Commander of Tactical Air Command and an engraved award.
LETTERS to the Editor

PHOTO GOOF

The article in the July 1970 issue of TAC ATTACK, "F-4 Out of Control," on page 4 shows a picture of an F-101 on fire. Is this intentional or an oversight? Just curious. I really enjoy the TAC ATTACK.

Donald T. Roderick
TSgt, USAF
58 OMS, Luke AFB, AZ.

We’d like to say it was intentional but we won’t. The day after that issue came off the press, the entire TAC ATTACK staff attended a course in aircraft recognition followed by a multiple question open book quiz. To make sure everyone passed, we used the key during testing and then had an impartial observer correct all of our exams to 100% before grading. We do not expect the problem to repeat itself before our semi-annual refresher which will be held concurrently with my instrument and proficiency checks. We appreciate your kind words about the mag and incidentally, you seem to be the only one who noticed our photo goof. What are the rest of you readers doing... wrapping fish with it? Ed.

DISTRIBUTION

For those of us fighter types presently flying desks at the Academy, TAC ATTACK is like a cold beer after a day of jump training at Ft Benning. Could you spare four copies for us has-been and will-be tactical types temporarily stranded between airplanes? Very frankly, one of the few professional magazines the cadets will read without being assigned, and provides an excellent window into the operational Air Force.

Lt Col J. A. Magee, Jr.
Group Air Officer Commanding CG-2
USAF Academy, Colorado

We hope you can be on the receiving end of TAC ATTACK distribution as soon as possible. Because we are obliged to maintain our distribution through normal channels, we suggest that you establish your office requirement with the Academy’s PDO, or CRCC office which presently is receiving 50 copies monthly. However, if their supply will not meet your needs, TAC ATTACK distribution to the Air Force Academy can be increased through normal PDO channels. In any event, we want you and each cadet to see every issue, so if your distribution problem cannot be smoothed out, let us know. Ed.
## TAC TALLY

### MAJOR ACCIDENT RATE COMPARISON

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## AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT RATES

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## TAC SUMMARY

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ATTACK
FLEAGLE

UNSCOREABLE AT 12...

THUD!