While contemplating this first article as the new Chief of Safety, I reread numerous previous issues of TAC ATTACK, pondered the remarks of past safety chiefs, surveyed TAC's accident history — looked everywhere for something truly profound to write. I found nothing! As those before me also confessed, I do not believe that I have any startling new philosophy that will serve as a safety panacea. The nearest thing to profundity I could find is the distinct impression that we are still repeating mistakes. This, incidentally, is not a new thought either.

Recent editorials in this magazine have discussed the importance of disseminating information; the monetary value of our personnel and equipment; the essentiality of disciplined performance; and the critical fact that people are the key to everything. It should not be considered presumptuous to focus on the people aspect. People prevent accidents. People conceive designs that are not deficient; people develop correct tech data; people adhere to tech data; people properly plan and brief missions; people fly in accordance with regulations; people drive defensively; people wear protective clothing; people properly supervise people; ad infinitum! In the accident ledger, we find numerous disappointments, though.

Frustrating disappointments because of people who do not accomplish their tasks properly. We can do better. We must do better.

Conscientious supervision and disciplined performance are essential to accident prevention. Both are people factors. Both connote effective leadership and efficient management. Both mean involvement. In whatever capacity, whether supervisory, leadership, managerial, or command, no one can adequately function from the isolation of an office desk. We must get out and observe, instruct, correct, guide and motivate. Such direct interest will support disciplined performance.

There is one thing, perhaps, that almost everyone is reluctant to do. That is to challenge the rules. In my initial interview with the Commander, Tactical Air Command, he was very explicit regarding his belief that bad rules should be changed. He did not say or imply, nor did I interpret his meaning to be, that rules should be broken. He said changed! You troops doing the job, however, are the ones who must identify bad rules so that they can be changed to correctly accomplish the intended purpose, or be eliminated. Until a bad rule is improved or deleted, however, do not ignore it or intentionally break it. Avoid a situation where it would be broken or adhere to its provisions in a disciplined manner.

Another factor that should be mentioned is the absolute need for total candor from all involved in an accident or incident. In the opening paragraph, I stated that we repeat mistakes. There have to be a number of reasons for this. First of all, some may not be passing on the lessons learned from experience. In other words, loose, ineffective, inept leadership; avoidance of inherent responsibility. Another reason may be the omission of one or more pertinent factors while investigating. When mistakes are not identified, we do not learn. When we do not learn, we cannot properly teach, or again, supervise. Sometimes, it may mean exposing one's own deficiencies.

With the possibility of preventing recurrence of a similar accident or incident and protecting life and property, the facts must be revealed. Enough said.

The dynamic nature of Tactical Air Command and its people promise to make this the most challenging job I have had. While the Commander is the real Chief of Safety, we in the accident prevention business will be his safety emissaries and our charge is to assist you in getting the TAC mission accomplished in the safest possible manner. Have a good one!
When you're flying simulated instruments, are you really flying the gauges? Everyone knows one peek is worth a thousand cross-checks, but it makes for poor instrument flying when really "Popeye." Some of our jocks have little actual weather experience. If you're one of them, get some valid training before you find yourself in the same position where . . .

FLASH goes SPLASH
(or a fair weather flyer meets the weather god)

By Capt Marty Steere

In the animal kingdom of Grog, there lived a bird named Flash. Flash thought he knew all there was to know about flying. After graduating at the top of his class from primary training at Wily Bird Patch, he went to Eagle School, close by at Lucky Field. There he excelled in double underhanded snatch-backs and could do bar-turns with the best of them. On Bent Kahula Range, he had the lowest CEA. From there he was sent to Hardyman Air Patch, a few hundred miles away where the sky was sunny and the air was clean.

Like all eagles, Flash loved to go to the Eagle's Nest, where he could sip a few frosty ones and listen to all the war stories. He could relate to most of them. After all, he had pressed a few times on the range. Only been called a fowl once. Anyone knows you have to get right down in there to drop a good load. Sure, he'd over G'd his wings during ACM engagements, but who hadn't? Wasn't the important thing to get your beak on the target and track it?

The only thing that he couldn't understand was when all the other eagles talked about flying in clouds. Flash hadn't done much of that. Only twice had he gone "Popeye," but it was really no sweat. He was sure he could do anything those older eagles could do. No one would ever call him a chicken! Flash had read about others who had bent wings and torn talons when landing out of the weather. But those birds were just dumb chicks . . . just couldn't hack it. Flash knew he'd never make the mistakes those birds made.

MAY 1975
It was during the spring that the Ops Officer asked Flash if he would like to go on a weekend TDY to Hoverstead and pick up some parts for the maintenance troops. "Great," squawked Flash, "a TDY to Florida would be super. Lots of sweet looking chicks down there during the migratory run, and the seafood is outstanding."

The next morning Flash went down to Base Ops, checked the weather and all the NOTABS*. Nothing of interest there, but it's better to be on the safe side. Only a few rainshowers in the vicinity of Hoverstead about the time he should be swooping down ... VFR. He'd make sure all those birds knew how good he was ... a nice snappy overhead ... really water their eyes. Plus, with the VFR weather, he wouldn't have to worry about all those IFR feed requirements. With three bags on, he could two-hop it and be there in time to log a couple of hours of beach time.

Weather on the first leg was great ... Severe CAVU. "Get ready gulls, papa's on the way," Flash thought as he taxied out for the next leg.

*Notice to all Birds

TAC ATTACK

As Flash approached Florida, he could see quite a few buildups in the distance. "I'd better call Metro and check out the weather, just in case." Metro reported thundershowers in the area. MacGull Field was down, but MacGull was still OK if he had to divert. Not that he'd have to ... a little rain never bothered an eagle as good as he. He'd touch down with about a hundred pounds above min-feed.

Flash called Approach and asked for a letdown with radar vectors to initial. Quite a few buildups, but not enough to bother him. The reply was a shock. Hoverstead was now IFR due to a thunderstorm near the field. "Those weather birds," he thought, "they always blow it. Now I won't be able to show all those turkeys how to really fly a pattern."

"OK, Approach, I'll take a GCA to a full stop."

As Flash was being vectored into the pattern, he entered the murk. "It's pretty thick," he thought, "and a little bumpy ... sure is raining hard."

Flash lowered his claws and feathers and started down the glide path. He broke out of the overcast about three miles from the runway, but couldn't see the field because of the rain. At two miles, GCA lost radar contact due to the heavy precip and Flash was forced to go missed-approach.

"Approach," Flash queried, "how's MacGull's weather?"

"MacGull's weather: ceiling: 300 feet, visibility 1/2 mile, thunderstorms all quadrants," Approach replied.
"Just great," thought Flash, "now I'm min-feed; I'll have to get down on this next one."

"Approach," Flash squawked, "I'll take another approach and I'm... ah... I'm min-feed."

"Roger, turn left to 320. This will be radar vectors to the precision final approach course, runway 05. Present weather: ceiling 1,000 feet overcast, visibility 1/2 mile in heavy rain. Thunderstorm overhead. Winds: variable at 15 knots with occasional gusts to 25."

By the time Flash had been vectored to final, the largest storm cell had moved directly over the approach end of runway 05.

"On course, talons should be down. Begin descent," the controller directed.

"On course, slightly above glide path."

"Got to get this one down," Flash mumbled to himself. "I only have enough feed for one more approach after this."

Approaching decision height, Flash still could not see the runway. He was below the clouds, but the rain was fierce.

"At decision height... if runway not in sight, climb runway heading for radar vectors; contact Hoverstead Approach, this frequency," Radioed the controller.

Flash started his missed approach. "Wait a minute, there's the runway! All I'll have to do is chop the power and I'll be down."

The jolt was sickening as Flash slammed onto the runway. He bounced back into the air and started to drift off to the side of the runway.

"Airspeed's too low, come on wings, get your lift back," yelled Flash as he tried to keep himself on the runway. The wind was now blowing a steady 25 knots and it only took a few seconds before he was splashing and sliding through the wet grass and mud. Finally, he stopped.

As he lay there, with the sound of approaching sirens in his ears, Flash began to tremble. "The Big Bird is really going to have a piece of my tail feathers for this one," groaned Flash. "But I was trapped. I've never been in weather like this, and I only had enough feed for one more approach. What could I do?"

One of the rescue birds looked down at Flash and shook his head. "You sunny weather birds never learn, do you? Don't you know how fast a spring thunderstorm can pop up? Some of you guys hardly ever fly in weather; then you try to land in a storm like this! These things are usually over in a few minutes. During the thunderbumper months, our birds jack up their landing feed minimums, just in case we get weather like this. Then they have a larger divert radius or can hold until the storm blows over. I've never seen any real weather bird try to land on a wet runway like this without using an approach-end arrestment. Sure saves on hydroplaning accidents. As a matter of fact, most of our guys have set higher personal minimums than the command authorizes after they haven't flown in actual weather for a few months."
Captain Fred Buhl, an instructor pilot with the 4554 Tactical Fighter Replacement Squadron, was leading a flight of two A-7s on a ground attack mission. Due to light rain and wet runway, Captain Buhl elected to make single ship takeoffs. After a normal engine runup, he released brakes. Just prior to liftoff, approximately 3,000 feet down the runway, Captain Buhl saw approximately 50-100 seagulls land on the runway just in front of the aircraft. He increased the aircraft rotation in an effort to avoid the birds. However, at about 50 feet above the runway, Captain Buhl realized that the aircraft had struck the birds, the engine began to compressor-stall heavily, followed by severe engine vibrations. At the same time, witnesses observed flame and sparks shooting out the tail pipe. Captain Buhl realized that he did not have sufficient altitude to clear the compressor-stalls, and that sufficient engine thrust for a continued takeoff was doubtful. The options available to Captain Buhl were narrow. Facing the choices of an immediate ejection, continuing takeoff and flying an immediate precautionary landing pattern, or an attempt to land the aircraft on the remaining runway, Captain Buhl quickly decided to land straight ahead. Since he had not retracted the landing gear, he moved the throttle to idle and lowered the tail hook. From an altitude of approximately 150 feet and with less than half of the runway remaining, Captain Buhl executed an idle power approach to a touchdown 500 feet short of the BAK-12 barrier, 1,450 feet from the end of the runway. He successfully engaged the first available barrier, providing an additional safety margin in case of hook skip or barrier failure. Post flight inspection revealed damage to the first stage fan blades and holes in the engine inlet extension caused by ingestion of 5 to 10 seagulls. The aircraft had also suffered damage at the inlet duct lip.

Captain Buhl's timely reaction to an emergency during a critical phase of flight and the recovery of a severely damaged tactical aircraft qualify him as this month's Aircrewman of Distinction.
DRAG CHUTES AT TRANSIENT BASES

Have you ever heard the tower say to you, "Transient Alert advises they have no drag chutes for your type aircraft. What are your intentions?" There you are about to turn initial with 2,500 pounds of fuel, and they ask you what your intentions are! It takes a lot of self-discipline not to give a sarcastic answer. From the pitch 'til touchdown, you're trying to compute turnaround times, figure crew rest, clearance void times, and rationalize some way not to use your drag bag. Right? WRONG! Don't land "no chute."

Nearly all fighter/ reconnaissance type aircraft are required to land using drag chutes, except when meeting training requirements spelled out in the directives. Don't put yourself on the block by attempting a no-chute landing just to save a few minutes on your turnaround — even if it causes you to RON.

The secret of the drag chute problem is to plan ahead. You should know your itinerary in advance. Why not call Base Ops or Transient Alert to find out who has, or doesn't have, drag chutes for your particular type of bird? Don't forget the Enroute Supplement... the information may be published.

Sure, I know you're a great pilot and can land your bird any day of the week sans drag chute. That's not the point; the restriction is there. Plan your landing as though your drag chute will fail. But, once on the ground, deploy the chute. Save wear and tear on the aircraft and yourself.

MURPHY'S LAW

After releasing his last practice bomb, the F-111 driver noticed the Number Two engine oil hot light on. He retarded the throttle, but the wingman still observed smoke trailing the aircraft. Lead then shut down the engine. To make matters worse, darkness was approaching.

On GCA final, the runway lights failed. The aircraft was then switched to an approach to a parallel runway, but a late frequency change to the final controller required a single engine go-around. With 12,000 pounds of fuel remaining, the jock cancelled IFR and landed out of a visual approach, approximately 1,000 feet down the runway. During rollout, the pilot decided he might not get the Aardvark stopped in the remaining runway, so he put the anchor out and engaged the departure end cable. Shortly after crew egress, the blowout plugs relieved the excessive tire pressure.

Emergencies always have a way of complicating themselves, as was the case here. Even after the wheels are on terra firma, things can still go wrong. When you've finally made it down after an emergency, don't relax until you've signed off the 781.

OUCH!

The T-bird was at FL 310 when the aircraft shuddered, made a loud noise, and the engine flamed out. Numerous ainstart attempts proved futile, so flameout pattern to a small civil airfield was planned. The pilot discontinued the attempt when only the right main gear indicated safe. Both pilots then made preparations for controlled bailout.

The backseater blew the canopy and ejected at approximately 7,000 feet. Two to three seconds later, the front-seat pilot ejected. Although he thought both feet were in the seat stirrups, his knees contacted the windscreen bow on the way out. As a result, one kneecap and his fibula were fractured and the kneecap had to be surgically removed.

The front-seat pilot was wearing a back-style parachute; his measurements were well within the tech order limitations for its use. Because of his ejection injury, back-style parachutes are now prohibited by TAC in the front seat of T-33 aircraft. Criteria for use of back-style parachutes are being re-evaluated.

PHOGGED-UP PHANTOM

The pilot taxied his Phantom onto the runway and moved into number-four position for a trail departure. The weather wasn't the best... rain, fog, and a temperature/dewpoint spread of two degrees. With 20-second spacing, the jock released brakes, went to full cooker and was rolling along nicely when the cockpit suddenly fogged over.

The AC immediately selected full defog, full hot temperature and began wiping the left side of the
windscreen in an attempt to maintain visual reference with the runway. Because the aircraft was already at max-abort speed, he elected to continue the takeoff.

The aircraft drifted left toward the runway lights, so the pilot rotated in an attempt to keep the aircraft aligned with the runway. The left main gear departed the runway 2,200 feet down, followed shortly by the nose gear and right main. Luckily, there was enough lift on the wing and the Phantom got airborne at the 3,100 foot point with the left main gear 25 feet off the left side of the runway. Damage was minimal and the aircraft landed without further problems.

The culprit was the cabin temperature sensor; it had shorted out and allowed cooler than normal air into the cockpit. This, combined with the low temperature/dewpoint spread, caused severe fogging even though the cockpit had been properly preheated.

The pilot in this incident was a victim of circumstances. He had followed the proper preheating procedures. Do you? IFR in the cockpit is bad news on takeoff or final, so do everything you can to prevent it from occurring.

**AARDVARKS GET THE BIRD**

We’re at the time of year when midairs between aircraft and birds are on the rise. Migratory aves are heading back North, crops are being planted, and the streams have an abundance of fish. This combination of food looks awfully good to a bird after a sparse winter’s diet and guarantees an increase in feathered activity. Two recent encounters between F-111s and birds point this out.

The first battle between Aardvark and bird occurred in TAC and resulted in an aircraft incident. The F-111 was at 1,000 feet AGL and about to exit a low level route when the AC spotted a large bird. Evasive action was futile, and the bird impacted approximately six inches forward of the right windscreen, tearing a nine by eight inch hole in the aircraft skin (see photos).

The second bird strike occurred in another command. This Aardvark was in a low level route at 500 feet AGL and 450 knots. The pilot saw the bird just prior to impact and pulled up in an attempt to avoid it. The bird struck the center of the right windscreen, which imploded and the right canopy hatch broke outward. The crew members ejected about 60 seconds later.

Some similarities are noticeable; both aircraft were on low level routes at or below 1,000 feet AGL and both sustained strikes on the right side.

The Air Force has developed an improved windshield/canopy set for the F-111. In static and rocket sled impact tests, it has demonstrated the ability to withstand the impact of a 4-pound bird at speeds over 500 knots. A service test program, using ten F-111s in an operational environment, is in progress to determine if there will be pilot or maintenance problems associated with these new windshields/canopies prior to installing them fleetwise. The test aircraft will be modified for operational unit testing by June 1975. This test will be completed by 1 December 1975. Final retrofit decision will be made later.

Until then, when you’re flying low level, keep your visor down and be alert for the feathered ones. Report large numbers of birds seen in a particular area so others will know where the birds are congregating. Finally, if you fly in the Aardvark’s right seat... keep you head.
If I were asked to put my finger on the one thing that can do more than any other to improve safety in every industry, I would not pull out a copy of OSHA's standards. I would not speak of first-instance sanctions, or federal vs. state plans. I would point directly at you—the first-line supervisor.

You are the guys who know the jobs. You are the guys who know the hazards—because you have worked around them and, because you're here, gives proof that you survived them. You are the men whom the workers listen to and look to for direction.

OSHA's inspectors may visit a plant once in a lifetime. The safety committee or the safety engineer may come around once a month or so. But you are on the job every day—all through a working shift period. You can see hazards developing. You can see a worker sliding into careless habits. You can spot the faulty equipment, the dangerous situation, as soon as it begins.

And you correct it. You can force the change in the workman's habits; you can see to it that the dangerous tool is repaired or retired.

Yet are you doing these things?

It may mean "chewing out" a personal friend, or hassling with your own boss. But you may be richly rewarded. You may have saved a life or a limb.

If I seem to be saying that each of you should be a
IS KEY TO ACCIDENT PREVENTION

safety expert, then you are hearing me dead right. Each of you, when you think about it, must be a safety expert—you should know the dangers of your workplace.

All the laws, all the studies, all the books, however important they may be, can never take the place of your common sense. And no one is in a better position to use that common sense.

Let me pose a question. If a lathe or an earthmover or a press were ruined because you didn’t insist that the machine be properly oiled, what would happen to you? You know the answer: You’d probably be fired or demoted.

Let me pose a second question. When was the last time you heard of a foreman being fired because one of his crew had been injured in an accident? The answer, of course, is practically never.

Yet loss of a man is always worse than loss of a machine. And your men must be a much greater responsibility than your machines. That time has come. Industry must realize this and act upon it, now.

We hear a good deal about the importance of top management taking an interest in safety. And it is important—damned important. But no front office can do the job the way the foreman can do it.

I believe we are fast moving toward the day when, to hold his job, a foreman will first have to hold a certificate proving his knowledge of safe practices, standards, and detection of hazards. This requirement may first be seen in the longshoreman industry. Other industries will follow.

There’s nothing really new in what I’m saying. Fifty years ago, the Associated General Contractors put out its first safety manual. It said: “No hard and fast rules will insure safety on a job. This can be secured only by constant and careful attention on the part of the superintendent and foreman, with the cooperation of the workmen.” The manual goes on: “Accidents do not happen in convention, or in the contractor’s office. Accidents happen on the job.”

And that’s where you men are. And because you are there, on the job, where the accidents happen, I urge you to remember your importance in making the job safe, and in keeping it safe. And I urge you to take the same message to your fellow supervisors.

Because of your special knowledge, you hold in your hands the effectiveness and productivity of your co-worker. And often you hold his safety—his very life. It is a big responsibility; one that must be met unequivocally by people like you all across the country.

Only then can we reach our highest aim: the safest possible working conditions for each man and woman in America.

If all of us, working together, can achieve that, we will automatically achieve a lot of other things as well—higher morale—greater productivity—which should mean higher returns to each man for his labor.

But each of us will also achieve for himself as an individual, the greatest satisfaction I know of, the knowledge that he has lived well and benefited his fellow human beings.

Sometimes, just before I go to sleep, I can look back over what I’ve done that day and feel pretty good. I can feel that maybe I’ve saved a man’s arm, or a finger, or an eye; maybe a life.

If this kind of satisfaction can come to me, many miles distant from the workplace, how much more rewarding it must be for you to know quietly, at the end of a day, that you have done the same.

Not for a statistic, or a percentage, or a fraction of some tally of workmen; but for Joe, or Bill, Gus—the men who work with you.
Dear Fleagle:

The World’s Fastest Unguided Tricycle...

That’s what an F-100 becomes if we experience a rupture or even hairline crack on the left wheel brake pressure manifold line assembly. In plain English, that’s the rigid hydraulic tube that you can see on the outside of the left wheel brake (the one on the right brake is much shorter, and is no great problem). Accident experience has found this one little tube to be one of the most critical single hydraulic lines on the airplane — for the following reasons:

1. In the first place, if it does break, you lose utility pressure. That’s not normally such a bad deal because with utility failure you have two backup wheel brake pressure systems: the emergency electrical brake pump and the emergency brake accumulator. The trouble is, if utility pressure is lost because of a break in the brake line, the emergency system will probably not provide pressure to the opposite brake. Whether the opposite brake works or not is of little concern because, with utility pressure failure, you have no nose gear steering. One brake just won’t do it unless, of course, you happen to be landing on a circular runway.

2. Second, unlike other hydraulic systems, this one has no redundant lines to protect against total failure, and it always fails at the most embarrassing times, like on taxiing into the dearm area or parking ramp — when you’re too low and slow for safe ejection. (I investigated a failure of this type a few years ago at Wheelus Air Base. The pilot rode the unguided Hun down the hill from the dearm area and would have rolled right through the front door of the O’Club if the nose gear hadn’t collapsed first).

3. Third (and this is my punch line), the left brake line is highly subject to fatigue failure as a result of wheel/brake vibration — if not properly supported by the little bracket and Adel clamp gizmo at mid-length.

You will note that the tube is about 16 inches long, is shaped in a half loop, and is rigidly mounted on the brake pressure manifold which is mounted on the wheel/brake assembly. This wheel assembly routinely churns up and down the runway at around 200 MPH ground speed. Now all of that has got to create some kind of line vibration if not dampened by that little Adel clamp. And that little Adel clamp won’t dampen anything if it’s too big (like #8 rather than a #6 clamp), part of the grommet is missing, or if it’s mashed up against the brake because the support bracket is bent.

In the past two weeks, I have written up three different aircraft for having torn, oversized or mashed Adel clamps on the left wheel brake. When I relate a few war stories about some of the accidents I’ve seen or know to be caused by this little clamp, or lack thereof, it gets fixed right away.

The purpose of all the above is to advise that a one time Q.C. inspection of the fleet for proper installation of the MS 21919DG6 clamp on the left wheel brake would not be a waste of time. I also recommend that pilots be briefed on the criticality of an inflight utility system failure when hydraulic fluid is observed coming from the landing gear/wheel brake area. With this condition, a pilot can expect loss of directional control on landing and, accordingly, should make an approach end arrestment.

Colonel Robert E. Darlington, 116 TFW (ANG), Dobbins AFB GA (Head RAFSOB)

Right on, Sky King. All you Hun drivers take note... Fleag
Dear Fleagle:

Regarding the predictions about how many of us will bite the dust, mud, and/or water in "out of envelope" ejections, it might be pointed out that some of us are flying around in airplanes that have ejection envelopes smaller than the postage stamp. Specifically, the A-37B, now the tool of several ANG/AFRES units, has ejection parameters that would be funny if it wasn’t for the fact that there hasn’t been a single successful ejection out of the “Hummer” in the CONUS. The minimum recommended alt for a controlled ejection is 2,000 feet AGL. The absolute pucker ejection alt is 200 ft, and that is with an upward vector, 120 KIAS minimum, zero delay connected, and everything working perfectly (how often does all that happen at the same time?). In other words, every time we slip the surly bonds, we pass through an area where there is no "envelope." Example: GCA final, 1,000 feet AGL, 120 KIAS, and both engines flame out. The only way you are going to survive is if you have the reactions of Superman, and we aren’t issued that item.

So it seems to me that if TAC is really serious about improving the ejection statistics, then perhaps it is time to quit browbeating pilots about delaying ejections and getting with whoever is responsible for buying airplanes with envelopes that have holes in them.

Capt Eric Vartanian
757TFW (AFRES)
Youngstown Muni, Ohio

P.S. You are probably right about four of us not making it through an ejection this next year; I just wonder at whose doorstep that statistic will be laid.

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I don’t agree that the A-37’s ejection envelope is the size of a postage stamp—it’s at least as big as a matchbook cover. Fortunately, there’s been a modification proposed that would give the “Hummer” a better ejection seat. For example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONDITION</th>
<th>A-37 PRESENT SYSTEM</th>
<th>A-37 PROPOSED SYSTEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Altitude Required</td>
<td>1000 ft AGL</td>
<td>0 ft AGL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Turn</td>
<td>1000 ft AGL</td>
<td>0 ft AGL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Pitch</td>
<td>1000 ft AGL</td>
<td>0 ft AGL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Dive</td>
<td>17,730 ft AGL</td>
<td>350 ft AGL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Dive</td>
<td>30,500 ft AGL</td>
<td>3930 ft AGL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The approximate figures are computed to give full parachute inflation at 50 ft AGL.

NGB and AFRES have recommended that this modification be approved by their Configuration Control Boards. As soon as we hear some words on the status of the CCB actions, we’ll let you A-37 types know.

One final thing: Unless you’ve got a waiver from the laws of physics (specifically F=ma) or have physical characteristics that are non-standard for pilots, there is no advantage to be gained in riding an aircraft or ejection seat into the ground. The A/T-37 presently does not have a super Sierra Hotel ejection system; however, one-third of the guys who didn’t get out (1970-1972) had a chance, but waited too damn long. If this is “browbeating,” then consider yourself beat. If I do it, maybe the ground won’t.

Fleag
PHANTOM GETS SCREWED

When the F-4 pilot established the attitude for a full AB climb, the Phantom right engine compressor stalled. After landing, it was discovered that Foreign Object Damage (FOD) was the cause. A 10/32 screw had gone through all stages of the compressor.

Nothing appeared to be missing from the aircraft, but it was noticed that there were new screws in the lower center louver panel. Although the 781 indicated the panel hadn’t been previously removed, investigators removed it and found a screw bag in the right vari ramp.

This organization will now X-ray all vari ramps upon completion of Phase I and when maintenance is performed in the vari ramp area. Screw bags will also be tied to the aircraft so as to be visible to all personnel.

These are good ideas and, hopefully, this type of FOD accident won’t happen again. In case you’re wondering, during the first two months of 1975 those 10/32 screws are known to have caused $165,451.15 worth of engine damage in TAC alone. Last year engine FOD cost TAC $4,760,000. That’s a lot of money to spend on something that can be prevented by proper maintenance practices.

BUSHING, BUSHING, WHO’S GOT THE BUSHING?

When the OV-10 pilot turned on the master arm switch prior to his first strafe pass, one round from the left inboard gun fired... without pulling the trigger. All switches were turned off and the mission aborted.

Someone had forgotten to install the charging rod bell crank bushing which allowed the tolerance of the rod to vary and cause the gun malfunction.

No one got hurt this time... we may not be so lucky the next. Use the Tech Order.

LAST CHANCE MAKES SAVE

While the F-5’s SUU-20 was being armed, the end-of-runway (EOR) supervisor gave the aircrew the engine cut signal; the EOR chief indicated something had been ingested into the left engine. What happened?
with a maintenance slant.

When the arming crew supervisor pulled the centerline pylon pin, it slipped from his hand, was ingested into the intake, and lodged in the inlet guide vanes. By having the jock immediately cut the Number One engine, damage was minimized.

To help prevent this from recurring, this unit now physically ties the centerline pylon pin streamer to the SUU-20's bomb safety pin streamer. If accidentally dropped, the combination of pins will help prevent pin and streamer from being ingested. In addition, a warning area extending forward of the engine inlets in a 15-foot radius will be painted in the arming area and designated a no-entry zone.

These are both good preventive measures and can be used by other units. However, if caution is not exercised by all, this type incident will happen again. Here the EOR chief made a nice save of the arming crew's mistake and gets one "atta boy" for his alertness and quick reaction.

OVERSERVICED STRUTS

Tech data gremlins struck the Phantom recently in two identical incidents... left main gear upper strut chamber overserviced. In each case, when the pilot tried to raise the wheels, the left gear remained down. Because the gear strut would not shrink, the left main gear upper shrink link broke.

Both Phantoms landed without further incident, but the broken shrink rod could have caused further link damage. Come on, (guys and gals); let's get with it and use tech data.

INTAKE COVER BLUES

The Phantom started normally, but the crew chief noted sparks coming from the tailpipe as it taxied out of the chocks. The pilot returned the aircraft to the parking spot and shut it down.

TAC ATTACK

Investigation revealed engine damage caused by an engine intake cover retaining clamp that had broken off and fallen into the intake area. The crew chief did not notice the broken clamp when he removed the cover and the aircrew failed to spot it during preflight.

The unit plans to replace all the retaining clamps with bungee cords. Until this is accomplished, all previously broken off retaining clamps will be identified by stencil markings on the intake cover. This will enable the crew chief to identify a recently broken clamp so a thorough search can be made before engine start.

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TAC ATTACK

This wasn't the first time this FOD hazard has occurred (ref March 75 TAC ATTACK). Something is being done about it, though. All new intake covers will be fitted with a wider and thicker bracket (on an attrition basis). As for the local "bungee cord fix... TAC/LG forwarded the suggestion to AFLC for approval. Stay tuned for the latest on the intake cover problem.
DEAR MOM,

THE FLYING IS FINE AND ROOMMATES ARE GREAT.

HAS ANYBODY SEEN MY PANTS?

SHARK, WADDA YA MEAN, SHARK ???

ANYBODY WHO DOESN'T LIKE THIS STUFF MUST BE CRAZY!

MAY 1975
WE WOULD GET A LIFE SUPPORT OFFICER WHO OWNS A CHEESE SHOP.

YOU'RE RIGHT, HE DOES LOOK LIKE GEORGE C. SCOTT!
It was a cross-country Sunday. The young fighter flyer trudged out to his airplane, hang-up bag in hand. The sky was clear (the sun hurt his bleary eyes), and the noises of the flight line pounded into his skull. Being an old head (nine months out of UPT), our hero made his preflight quick and to the point: pack the clothes in the travel pod, pull the pins and strap in... let's listen to his thoughts (and voice on the radio)... "Come on, you hog, get off the ground... refusal speed (yesterday's)... screens cycle... gear, flaps..." "Phoenix Departure, Jerk 21, airborne at Willy..." "Roger, Jerk 21, radar contact, maintain runway heading..." "Gad, this airplane is loud... less... yaw damper... fuel... lanyard... no, not yet, you dummy... Jesus, look at the fuel venting out the tip tank... must be overserviced... good thing it's a short leg..." "Jerk 21, Phoenix Departure. Willy tower advises that something fell off your airplane on takeoff."
"WHAAA?" "Departure, Jerk 21... say again."
"Jerk 21, tower advises something fell off your airplane on takeoff..."
"Good grief, this is all I need... look at that fuel venting away..."
"Departure, 21, what fell off my airplane?"
"Jerk 21, stand by, we'll check..."
"How'm I gonna explain this... look at that fuel venting away... maybe I'd better go back..."
"Jerk 21, Willy tower advises they found a bag of clothes on the runway..."
"I FORGOT TO CLOSE THAT BAGGAGE POD!!!! and the door is flapping on the tip tank, tearing hell out of it, and I'm losing gas, mama..."

"Departure, Jerk 21; I'm returning to Willy with a ... ah... fuel leak."

"Roger, Jerk 21, are you declaring an emergency?"

"Ah... Ray, I guess you better call out the fire trucks..."

It's really embarrassing to land ten minutes after taking off, to be met by the fire trucks, ambulance, and


the base ops officer. A smirking crew chief hands you a well-stirred bag of clothes reeking of after shave lotion from the bottle which broke when the hang-up bag hit the runway. Then the fire chief says, "Never seen this before," as he inspects the small holes in the tip tank, punched by the Dzus fasteners on the baggage pod door that was flapping in the breeze. Then the worst part comes... having to wake up the squadron commander early on Sunday morning with, "Uh, sir, I have this problem with my airplane..."
We are proud to present the Tactical Air Command Individual Safety Award winners. The total contribution made by these men to our mission will never be known—we have no way of counting accidents that have been prevented. Selection for the highest Tactical Air Command award in their individual field is our way of recognizing outstanding efforts in behalf of accident prevention. We at TAC Safety would like to add our congratulations to the many they have already received.

**Outstanding Flight Safety Officer**

Major Nicholas Sivo  
103 Tactical Fighter Group (ANG)  
Bradley International Airport  
Windsor Locks, Connecticut

**Ground Safety Man of the Year**

Technical Sergeant Gene N. Pendergrass  
474 Tactical Fighter Wing  
Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada
Outstanding Contributor to Weapons Safety

Technical Sergeant Edward T. Gaskill
4 Munitions Maintenance Squadron
4 Tactical Fighter Wing
Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina

Outstanding Weapons Safety Officer

Captain Manuel M. Costa, Jr.
33 Tactical Fighter Wing
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida

Outstanding Weapons Safety Noncommissioned Officer

Technical Sergeant William M. Maynard
4 Tactical Fighter Wing
Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina
"...But I Didn't Write It Up"

by Capt Ted R. Powers
35th TFW/George AFB

You're waiting around the Ops counter. You've briefed your flight and now all you need are tail numbers. As the duty officer writes them down, you fill in your line-up card. Then one of your fellow pilots tells you he had that bird this morning. "It had a good doppler but the TACAN seemed a little weak. And, oh yeah, it lost four liters of oxygen in an hour and half of flight... but I didn't write it up." Didn't write it up?

How many times have you heard that story? Sometimes the discrepancy is as gross as a leaking oxygen system, and sometimes as subtle as an engine that's slow to come up to idle. In many cases, you hear about it after the fact. "Yeah, I flew that bird two days ago and the rpm seemed slower than normal then, too... but I didn't write it up."

There are times when you don't think your squadron has that problem. Then all of a sudden, no one is writing up the aircraft. Let's take a closer look at the problem.

First, it is there... cold hard fact. You have the problem just as much as the next squadron. If you tune in the grapevine, you'll find out there is an unwritten list of aircrews who are the worst offenders. It becomes common knowledge that you'd better look the bird over well if you fly after Capt Who or Maj Soano, or even Lt Col Whatevername. They're the guys who always bring back an "OK" aircraft.

Second, who are you really helping? The crew chief? Even if he does, he probably will not be able to get the specialists he needs. You've actually done him a disservice. If you put it on paper, he's got the justification he needs to get it fixed. What kind of priority do you think a verbal request gets? You're right - not much. If an open write-up doesn't get fixed, he'll hear about it. But if a word-of-mouth write-up doesn't get fixed... well, it just doesn't get fixed.

Are you helping your fellow pilot? No way. If it were a minor write-up, the aircraft is still flyable. Besides that, the next pilot can read the forms and be aware of it. He can make his own determination of its importance. If it's a major item, then it should be fixed prior to the next flight. Ignoring it only sets up your buddy. If he's lucky, you'll be around the Ops counter when the tail number comes in. If he's lucky, you'll pick it up early and ground abort it. If he's not lucky, he could be in real trouble. He's that "accident looking for a place to happen." AND YOU SET HIM UP.

Okay, so it doesn't look like you're helping anyone. Why didn't you write it up? It's simple, actually; you're a bit lazy. You don't really pay attention inflight and you don't feel like doing all that writing after you land. Good sooner you finish, the sooner you can head for home or chow. You just don't worry about the small details.

If you really look around, you'll notice something else about the guy who brings back OR aircraft... his habits are consistent. While airborne, he doesn't worry about the "small details" either. It's the difference between the run-of-the-mill pilot and... here comes that old cliche' - the true professional. The pilot who is critical of the aircraft and concerned enough to try to get it fixed is usually just as critical of himself. He's self-disciplined and he runs a tight flight. And, when the chips are down - he's prepared.

The next time someone says "... but I didn't write it up," listen. Listen well. He may have just told you something even more important - about himself. Something you may want to know the next time you fly with him.
DECOMPRESSION SICKNESS III

In continuing our discussion of decompression sickness (DS), let's look at some of its less common forms which can leave the victim with residual disabilities, such as central nervous system (CNS) disturbances.

Although this rarely occurs, and the probability is low that you will be stricken, it is important for every aircrew to recognize the symptoms. The precise mechanism by which symptoms are generated in the brain and spinal cord is not known. It is probably due to the presence of bubbles, either blocking blood flow through the capillary network, causing stagnant hypoxia, and/or exerting a direct mechanical pressure on the structure. The important thing for you to realize is that the tissue involved is irreplaceable. Severe damage to neurons results in their death — and that means a permanent loss of function.

There is no particular pattern for the CNS symptoms. Visual symptoms are most commonly encountered. These can be flashing lines or spots called "scotomata," double vision, or even partial or complete visual loss. In some cases, these visual losses have become permanent. After rapid ascents to 35,000 feet or higher, there have been cases of paralysis. Several involved temporary paralysis of the legs and even the complete lower part of the body.

You can better understand the lack of consistency in CNS symptoms if you consider the complexity. The brain is structured into areas such as the "motor area," "speech area," "visual area," "auditory area," etc. So the symptoms presented will depend upon the "area" involved. For instance, involvement of the motor area produces weakness or paralysis; involvement of the visual area produces loss of vision. A generalized involvement such as paralysis most likely indicates involvement of the spinal cord. Besides these symptoms which are called "neurological manifestations," there are "vasomotor manifestations," "neurocirculatory collapse" and "skin symptoms."

Initially, the vasomotor reaction is indistinguishable from simple fainting. However, recovery from simple fainting should be rapid once the victim is properly positioned by lowering the head below the heart level. Those who do not return to normal within a few minutes are likely to require specialized treatment.

Only a fraction (less than 1%) of all altitude exposures exhibit symptoms which indicate neurocirculatory collapse. This is essentially a severe shock state as indicated by the pale, clammy skin, rapid but feable pulse, decreased respirations and finally unconsciousness. This reaction may occur as long as 12-24 hours following exposure to high altitude. It is important that a person exhibiting these symptoms (even if they disappear spontaneously upon return to ground-level pressure), see a Flight Surgeon; he will most likely hospitalize the individual for 24 hours of medical observation.

"Skin symptoms" range from paresthesia (abnormal skin sensations) called the "itch" or the "creeps" to red mottling or a rash which may sometimes be raised, like "hives."

In the case of the itch, bubbles are the culprits. Small gas bubbles evolve in the tissue fluid of the skin; they stimulate the nerve endings to produce the characteristic sensations. It is more difficult to make a "guessedimate" of the location and actions of the bubbles which cause the rash or mottling effects. In the case of mottling reactions, since they have been reported to preclude neurocirculatory collapse reactions, involvement of the circulatory area of the brain is a safe bet. Again, this requires immediate medical attention... that's why we have Flight Surgeons.

Next month, in concluding this DS series, we'll take a look at establishing protection against DS and some of the current medical thinking in management of the disease.

By Lt Col Harold Andersen
HQ TAC Physiological Training Coordinator

24

MAY 1975
Maintenance Safety Award

Staff Sergeant John W. Naylor, 67 Organizational Maintenance Squadron, 57 Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas, has been selected to receive the Tactical Air Command Maintenance Safety Award for this month. Sergeant Naylor will receive a certificate and letter of appreciation from the Vice Commander, Tactical Air Command.

Crew Chief Safety Award

Sergeant James M. Ganis, 35 Organizational Maintenance Squadron, 35 Tactical Fighter Wing, George Air Force Base, California, has been selected to receive the Tactical Air Command Crew Chief Safety Award for this month. Sergeant Ganis will receive a certificate and letter of appreciation from the Vice Commander, Tactical Air Command.
The recent competition between the YF-16 and YF-17 lightweight fighters brought to fruition a long-time USAF desire for a light, relatively inexpensive, high-G aircraft. But the desire for such an aircraft goes far back in the annals of aviation history. The idea is not new by a long shot!

The lightweight fighter concept can be traced back to the biplane era of World War I. The requirement of these early concepts was not, however, to create an air superiority weapon, but to be able to carry the light aircraft aboard a dirigible or submarine. During the 1930s, the French Air Ministry displayed considerable interest in the lightweight concept; several wooden aircraft actually were built during the decade. The English built an all wood, 12-gun model, but the US seemed firmly set against the wood concept and continued the all metal construction.

With the start of World War II, the attractiveness of wooden construction became more prominent, mainly because the aircraft could be constructed out of nonstrategic materials. Experiences during the Battle of Britain had shown the advantage of a nimble and highly maneuverable aircraft... and the XP-77 was born.

The new plane was to have a high speed of slightly over 400 miles per hour at 27,000 feet, powered by a 500 horsepower supercharged engine. Its design gross weight was to be about 3,700 pounds. Armament was to be a 20-mm cannon firing through the propeller hub and two 50 calibre synchronized machine guns. The airfoil was to be of the laminar flow type. Because of the critical situation that had developed in the supply of aluminum, Bell (which had been designated as the prime contractor) planned to use wood for the wings, but metal for the fuselage and tail surfaces.
The initial contract called for six of the models to be built with delivery of the first XP-77 being late in 1942. The next five would then follow within two months. The total contract cost was less than $700,000! Seems hard to believe with today's cost doesn't it?

Unfortunately, problems surfaced quickly. Arguments raged between the Army Air Force (AAF) and Bell as to the advantages of an all wood configuration and the Bell proposed wood and metal combination. Eventually, it was decided that the aircraft would be built in the all wood configuration.

Bell faced problems which caused the aircraft to slip from its original delivery date. A reason for delay was that the new airplane incorporated wood, plastic and magnesium alloy – materials completely foreign to Bell. As a result, much of the work with these materials was subcontracted. These problems along with very strict AAF standards on construction, caused the price of the little bird to spiral out of sight. In fact, the cost had risen to over $2.5 million, or 365 percent over the original cost.

During May 1943, the XP-77 program almost came to an abrupt end when the Engineering Division at Wright Field recommended the program be cancelled immediately. The reason given was that Bell had taken on more experimental development work than the company could handle; work on the P-63A and P-59A would suffer as a consequence. The program was not cancelled, but the number of XP-77s to be built was reduced to two from the original six.

The first flight test of the XP-77 was made in April 1944 at Eglin Field, but the results were discouraging as the little bird failed to meet design performance. Top speed obtained was only 316 miles per hour; rate of climb was only 2,900 feet per minute as compared with the 3,050 contained in the model specs. Things did not look good for the XP-77's survival.

The flight test results proved to be the final nail in the coffin of the XP-77; and in December 1944, the development contract for the wooden, lightweight fighter was terminated.

Through the era of the 1950s and 1960s, fighter aircraft kept getting bigger and bigger. Aircraft like the F-102, F-105, and the F-111 approached or sometimes exceeded the size of World War II bomber aircraft. But in Vietnam, the nimble and highly maneuverable MiG 21 proved that the lightweight fighter concept was far from dead.

So now, in the 1970s, some thirty years after the XP-77, we once again have a lightweight fighter. Granted, it's a far cry from the antiquated XP-77, but the concept and requirements for its design remain basically unchanged. That goal for the F-16, as it was for the XP-77, is to provide a small, lightweight, low cost, air superiority fighter. Comparing the two aircraft, one gets the idea that the F-16 is far from being a lightweight fighter – weighing some five times more than the XP-77.

The XP-77 deserved a far better fate than she received. Like so many other wartime developments, the aeronautical technology moved too fast for the little bird, and she was obsolete by the time she first took to the air.

But, in a strange way, that little wooden airplane has been reborn in the sleek, powerful F-16.
TAC needs highly qualified officers to enter the safety field. Flight Safety Officer duty is an excellent, career-broadening assignment; you acquire experience in staff work associated with not only operations but maintenance, supply, civil engineering and other fields which support flying operations.

If you meet the criteria listed in AFM 36-1 and TACR 36-1, you can volunteer to be a TAC Flight Safety Officer — and navigators are now eligible.

Remember, according to the latest change to AFR 36-20, you won’t be stuck with a scarlet “X” on your chest for life. It’s now a maximum tour of three years.

Get prepared for increased responsibilities upon reassignment to other operational or command duties with a career-broadening assignment in Flight Safety. Contact your Wing Chief of Safety for further details.
Editor:

Burt Reynolds—eat your heart out!! You are no longer the Number One nude foldout since Fleagle showed up in the February issue of TAC ATTACK. Congrats go to Fleagle’s creator, Stan Hardison, for convincing Fleagle to “expose” himself.

Has TAC ATTACK considered getting litho type prints of the Fleagle foldout—say 11x14 (or even larger??) and suitable for framing (i.e., without staples and folds required for TAC ATTACK)? Though I lean toward the libbers persuasion, I would be the first to buy a large litho of Fleagle in all his glory! (Maybe Stan would even autograph it for me??)

Have you also thought about sending a copy of the Fleagle foldout to Burt Reynolds? Or even Dinah Shore??

Capt Gail D. Anderson 4500ABW/Information Division Langley AFB VA

No, but we sent a copy to PLAYGULL magazine. Seriously, we don’t have the funds to make additional prints and because of the demand, we’re out of the February issue. If you were lucky enough to steal a center spread, send it to us—Stan says he’ll be glad to sign and return it. —Ed

***

Editor:

A possible answer to why the T-bird was taking off from a country road in your February issue happened near Seymour Johnson AFB, NC, in either 1960 or 1961. Seems the aircraft was on a local mission when she flamed out. The crew couldn’t get an air start but hated to exit the aircraft and splatter it over the countryside. They opted to put it on the ground and spotted a perfectly straight secondary road. Unhappily, from their viewpoint they couldn’t see that they selected one of the straightest but rollingest roads in the whole county. Rumor has it that the touchdown was uneventful but it was a sporty course rolling up and worse than that, down that tobacco road.

The folks at a farm house were reported to be a little taken back when the T-bird taxied up but they agreed to let it sit under a big tree. Their son had a one-plane air force for a while but then the state police, electric company linemen, lots of base officials, and area residents arrived at his “airport.” The bird was checked out and a volunteer lined it up on the dotted centerline to disappear into the blue.

I’m told it’s SOP to watch the traffic ahead, behind, and most assuredly above, when driving down that road even to this day.

Sincerely

ALLAN C. “RED” VIGUERIE MAC/OIC

This is the third letter we received with basically the same story, so until we hear something to the contrary, we’ll accept the explanation. Thanks to all the people who called and wrote letters. —Ed

***

EDITOR:

I enjoyed your article “WRING OUT THE OLD” in the January 75 issue of TAC ATTACK to the extent of a salient moral, but I take exception to the example emulated by the seasoned boss to his protege, a young lieutenant.

You set the scene at the end of a retirement ceremony culminating in the club casual bar and with “the crowd around the colonel down to two guys.” I must assume that an appropriate quantity of booze has already been consumed. A round of horses is played and a pitcher of beer is bought. More chit chat and another pitcher is bought. Your main points are made and then in conclusion, your young hero “turned and went back to the bar.”

I think the point of your story was a need for a continuous professional attitude. You can’t pour a professional attitude from a bottle or a keg and you certainly will not attain one sloshing up the suds. Alcoholism is a major problem within our society. I do not think that a Command
LETTERS

Magazine dedicated “for efficient Tactical Air Power” needs to encourage consumption of alcohol or imply that consumption as portrayed by your article is the thing to do.

General Dixon, in his article states “we all need to work together to reduce the supervisory error in aircraft accidents.” I hope that future articles do a better job at portraying a professional Air Force image.

MALCOLM D. LEONARD, 1Lt USAF
6852 W. Rockingchair
Tucson, AZ

JAMES F. DUGAN, 1Lt USAF
3721 S. Jessica
Tucson, AZ

Thanks for your letter. I agree with several of your points. Alcoholism is a major problem within our society and you can’t pour a professional attitude from a bottle or keg — however, I disagree with some of the inferences you drew from those statements:

(1) In no way was it inferred that either of the two characters was drinking to excess. A pitcher of beer does not an alcoholic make.

(2) There’s a lot of professionals around who drink. It’s as wrong to assume that you’ll be a professional if you don’t drink as it is to infer that anyone who has an occasional drink has a problem.

The situation was set in a casual bar simply because most aircrews can relate to that setting — whether they drink beer or soft drinks. It was not done to promote the consumption of “an appropriate quantity of booze.” TAC ATTACK has warned of the dangers of drinking in the past (see Phyz-Biz, Nov 1974) and will continue to promote sensible health habits in the future.

Editor

As you know, the A-7 and F-4 are both prone to “strange” maneuvers on occasion. A “loss of control,” “departure,” the “Thing” or whatever, occurs more frequently than we’d like to believe. It may be induced by the pilot, faulty flight controls, or a combination of both.

When one occurs and the aircrew comes out of it (survives), too often the entire “hairy” episode is kept a dark secret, in fact, may not even be discussed at the bar, for several reasons — pride being one. Yet, A-7s and F-4s still fall out of the sky. The majority of our investigations do reveal the cause of the accident which we can evaluate and take action to prevent another like-accident; however, the one where the bird simply goes in for no apparent reason is the one that bothers us. A departure? Possibly, but we’ll never know. It can only be assumed that a percentage of undetermined accidents — however small — involved a departure.

When a departure does occur and the crew gets the bird back on an even keel with an uneventful RTB, that’s pretty much the end of it. Since there was nothing damaged or broken, an incident report is not submitted unless the crew decides to “tell all.” Therin lies our problem. A solution to any problem requires data — a lot of data. The question — how to get it?

We have developed a simple “departure form” that can be used to describe what happened, how recovered, and lessons learned. It might just be the answer. The form need not be signed and can be simply stapled and put in distribution to the local safety shop or mailed to our office. All replies — those forwarded from wings or mailed direct — will be studied by the most knowledgeable A-7/F-4 pilots available. Lessons learned will, of course, be fed back to the aircrews. We’ve requested that 9 AF units use the form as a master for local distribution. We hope unit safety types will use their imagination to make the forms readily available to their jocks and to emphasize the anonymous feature.

Let’s learn more about departures!

Sincerely
ROSS W. WATT, JR., Colonel, USAF
9AF Chief of Safety

Good idea — let us know how it comes out. It could be a good feature article in a future issue of TAC ATTACK... any volunteers? ED

Editor
## TAC TALLY

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REMEMBER MEN,
DON'T PRESS AND AVOID
TARGET FIXATION.
ANY QUESTIONS?

LET'S SEE... I'LL TAKE A COUPLE OF
GREEN ONES, TWO WHITES, A RED
CAPSULE AND FOUR MULTI-COLORED
MOTHERS.

GREAT GALLOPING GARNETS!
THERE'S A FEMALE
ON THE RANGE!!

IT'S A GOOD THING
I'VE FLOWN THIS MISSION
BEFORE...

FIXATION?
NO,
SELF MEDICATION.

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