A WINNING COMBINATION
Quality, Combat Capability, and Leadership
General Ronald R. Fogelman
Air Force Chief of Staff

BULLISH ON LEADERSHIP
General James L. Jamerson
Commander, USAFE

CONTROL RISK--ELIMINATE HAZARDS--REDUCE LOSSES
General John G. Lorber
Commander, Pacific Air Forces

ESSENCE OF COMMAND
Brigadier General Orin L. Godsey
Air Force Chief of Safety

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When asked to describe a leader, Napoleon responded, “A leader is a dealer in hope.” This, perhaps more than anything, captures the essence of a leader — a dealer in hope guided by vision backed with action. During a time of unprecedented change, turmoil, and uncertainty, we in Air Combat Command have been fortunate to have such a leader — General John Michael Loh. In the face of force reductions, base closures, budget constraints, and increased commitments throughout the world, General Loh has been the leader saying we can do it better — smarter — safer; and we have!

Allow me to share some comments from General Loh’s “Letter from the Commander” in the 1994 Stakeholders’ Report which clearly detail the vision we’ve been provided and the results we’ve achieved.

“When we activated the command in 1992, we sought to establish a quality culture based on a leadership style that fosters trust, teamwork, and continuous improvement in the way we perform our national security mission. That quality culture is now the bedrock of the command, allowing us to capitalize on the talents and imagination of our people and meet our global challenges with unprecedented success.”

“Wherever you look in ACC, our people are working to stretch their goals — to raise their sights. Whether they are putting bombs on target, repairing aircraft, preparing meals, or filling prescriptions, ACC people are doing it better, quicker, and cheaper than ever before. At the same time we, as a command, are dedicated to finding ways to continue improving individual and unit processes — taking out even more time, work, and resources. Constantly trying to improve the way we do business is vitally important and it’s at the heart of remaining a world-class air force.”

The future will provide a host of new challenges for us. But, along with those challenges come opportunities to surpass our present levels of performance — to constantly improve. Such is the legacy we have been given by the first Commander of Air Combat Command.

As General Loh retires, we in the safety community will continue to remember the lessons he shared with us. One which has been especially meaningful is “ACC Quality helps unleash the human spirit by creating a working environment which inspires a sense of pride, professionalism, and ownership in everyone. It recognizes that no one in ACC is more or less important than anyone else.” Quality and safety are inextricably linked and built on a foundation of senior leader involvement. General Loh, thank you for your leadership. Godspeed to you and your family and continued success in all you do. Work hard, play hard — BE SAFE!

Colonel Fack Acker
Chief of Safety
In March 1991, General Mike Loh took charge of Tactical Air Command (TAC) with the goal of improving “everything we do; from the biggest things down to the smallest things, with fresh ideas and with great emphasis on Quality.” A year later, he effectively merged the warfighters in TAC and Strategic Air Command into a broader Air Combat Command (ACC) focused on providing America the best in highly versatile combat air forces.

General Loh readily infused his spirit of continuous improvement throughout this new command. He aggressively secured the best in high quality leadership, training, equipment, and living and working conditions for his people. He made quality come alive in ACC by unleashing the initiative and good ideas of his people.

Under the “Gold Flag” program, ACC maintenance technicians submitted nearly 4,000 initiatives to improve flight line and work center processes. More than half were approved, achieving a combined total of 29 million dollars in actual savings and costs avoided. Moreover, during quality assessments, the ACC inspector general identified more than 170 unit initiatives as “Benchmark Candidates” for adoption command-wide.

General Loh’s enlightened leadership produced the world’s premier power projection force with a true warrior instinct. ACC now underwrites the nation’s CONUS-based contingency force with ready, hard-hitting combat power that can range around the globe in a matter of hours to deter aggression, or to fight and win.

Air Combat Command readily demonstrated its responsive capability to project versatile combat power last fall in operation Vigilant Warrior. When Saddam Hussein menaced Kuwait with a massive armor build up, ACC swung into action and deployed 102 combat aircraft and 2,900 people into the theater within a matter of days to stave off Iraqi aggression. The command also prepared an additional 300 aircraft and 7,000 people for deployment in case they were needed.

The 1st Fighter Wing provided a telling example of ACC’s responsiveness when it deployed half an F-15 squadron within 10 hours of receiving the execution order. Aircrews flew directly to the Persian Gulf region and were ready to conduct flying operations within 24 hours of arrival. As Secretary of Defense Perry indicated afterwards, “The Air Force has
really deterred a war. When we deployed F-15s, F-16s, and A-10s in large numbers, I think they got the message very quickly."

The United States Air Force is truly indebted to General Mike Loh for building such a tremendous team of ACC warriors who can provide this kind of impressive global power for the nation. Effective leadership has been a key ingredient of his success.

For me there are three areas that are vital to effective leadership. First, take inventory of your organization to assess its strengths and weaknesses. Get to know your people and their talents so you can properly employ them in performing unit activities.

Second, show courage and take responsibility in handling a broad spectrum of issues — from commitment to organizational goals to dealing with people. Have the courage of your convictions even when you must make decisions with imperfect knowledge. Then, accept responsibility for the outcome of those decisions.

Third, dedicate yourself to making things happen. Continually look for better ways to do business. Get out and walk around your unit to discover opportunities for improvement. Cultivate an environment that promotes the Quality Air Force approach of "continuous process improvement." Encourage commitment from everyone to ensure we get the most out of our resources.

Leaders must also seek to preserve diminishing Air Force resources and to protect the valued people who use them. That is the essence of our mishap prevention efforts. It is crucial that you make safety a routine part of daily activities to ensure we maintain a robust capability to perform our warfighting mission.

In my Air Force experience, I’ve discovered that leadership makes the difference between a not-so-good unit and an outstanding one. You can make that kind of difference by taking responsibility, and making things happen. Moreover, your leadership initiatives will help us sustain General Loh’s legacy of a highly professional, highly capable Air Combat Command that is focused on continually improving its day-to-day operations.
“Bull” Loh...not sure how many know him by that call sign. Maybe the image doesn’t seem to fit the Commander, Air Combat Command. I think it does! We knew him that way years ago in a fighter wing and the approach to life and our Air Force that the name implies is still accurate. He’s always been bullish on combat readiness, the inseparably related discipline of safety and the foundation principles that command is a sacred trust and leaders must accept responsibility for their actions. Leaders in the air of course, but not just in the air — leaders at every level...in every capacity. Whether in the wing, in the lab or in the Pentagon — he’s always put leadership at the top of the priority list.

Not strange, then, that this commander would have his watch words “continuous improvement,” “trust,” “teamwork,” and “no one person is any more or less important than another.” These are familiar phrases to leaders, and they are the basis for the success that follows Air Combat Command. ACC has been an amazing and successful merger of cultures: bombers, fighters, rescue, airlift...even missiles at one point! Only a leadership style fully invested in the quality of people could create the atmosphere for such a merger...an atmosphere where leadership provides the training, the responsibility and the authority, then makes room for those people to get on with the mission — knowing they will do their best and they will be successful.

The Air Force and ACC were fortunate to have the right leader at the right time. The men and women in USAFE, beneficiaries of that leadership, wish General “Bull” Loh...and Barbara...all the best. Our thanks and appreciation for the strong support.
"Make our operations safe." That's the simple, straightforward statement we've adopted as one of PACAF's six goals, each intended to articulate and define our mission and purpose. While each of the six is intertwined with the others, we placed this declaration of safety second in priority only to our fundamental aim — "Forge a fighting team second to none."

Within that goal of conducting safe operations, we're concentrating on three principal objectives. First, we intend to control risk. Because of the nature of our job, there will always be some level of risk. Our focus in this area is to gain a better understanding of where we are in the spectrum of risk on any given day and take the necessary action. The needed fix could be a correction to procedures or it could be a better awareness by all of the dangers involved — complacency when operating in a high-risk situation leads to accidents. Wouldn't it be great if we could arrive at potential accident scenes before the accident occurs and prevent it from happening at all? It's tough to measure success when you have to count things that don't happen, but we intend to try.

Second, we'll strive to eliminate hazards. There are 43,000 pairs of eyes in PACAF; we plan to have those eyes constantly sweeping the horizon in search of potential mishap situations. That's a tall order for a command that covers half the globe, eleven time zones, and conducts roughly 35 major exercises annually, but we owe it to our people to provide them with as hazard-free an environment as possible.

Third, we'll seek to reduce losses. With tighter budgets, we can't afford to lose one piece of equipment, one tool, one facility or one person due to preventable accidents. More than ever we need to be faithful stewards of the capital entrusted to us. It goes without saying that injury or
loss of life is intolerable.

We'll charge PACAF members with applying these objectives daily across the safety spectrum — flight, ground and weapons. There's nothing more important to our mission or to our people.

As I think about safety issues, I'm reminded of the contributions to the discipline of safety made by ACC's outgoing commander, General Mike Loh. His efforts encompassed the entire gamut from design of aircraft systems that were not only more effective but also safer, to ensuring the combat air forces' daily operations were conducted with safety awareness.

At Systems Command and at ACC, General Loh did an awful lot for the durability and sustainability of aircraft engines, especially fighter engines and in particular the F-16 engines. He accumulated a lot of centerline thrust time and knew the importance of having engines that worked right all the time. I remember his pugnacious, insightful efforts in the “great engine war” that resulted in two outstanding engines for the F-16 fleet.

General Loh made sure we had fuel pumps that didn’t fail and turbine machinery that didn’t come apart in flight. He also thought about the knuckle-busters on the ramp, insisting that designs include simple, safe maintenance access and procedures.

The direct result was an improved safety record.

For all he has given to the Air Force, and especially for all he has contributed toward making this the most respected — and safest — air force in the world, he has my deep and lasting respect and gratitude. His retirement marks the completion of 35 years of selfless service for which the nation owes him a debt of enormous gratitude. I proudly stand among those who extend our most profound appreciation.

All the best, Mike, and godspeed.
Commanders, like everyone else, are measured by results. Having said that, I am compelled to add that they are also assessed by some other measures not usually associated with or required of those who are not in command.

The impending retirement of General John Michael Loh provides an opportune moment to reflect on some aspects of leadership, command and their relationship to safety. General Loh, himself, has commented very succinctly on the subject. For those of you who may have missed it, I commend the General’s article entitled “The Responsibility of Command” which appeared in the October 17, 1994, issue of the Air Force Times. The base library, your public affairs or safety office can undoubtedly locate a copy for you. The article serves as a tutorial on the essential linkage between command and safety. I couldn’t improve on it if I tried, so I’ll limit myself to some observations on the subject that may, in the process, tell you a little bit about General Loh.

General Loh has referred to command as a “sacred trust.” To me, these words imply a moral imperative that cannot be shirked or ignored. At the core of this imperative is honesty. A commander must have the intellectual honesty to deal with things as they are and the moral courage to make the right response regardless of personal consequences. The right response may not be the politically correct or the desired public relations response, but it is the only one that bears the stamp of truth. When General Loh advised our nation’s senior leadership of the risks and potentially adverse consequences of sustained high-intensity operational tempos and extended TDYs in support of our international commitments, he was speaking with the candor that marks men of conscience. He was not saying that we can’t do these things; rather, he was pointing out that in doing them we are assuming additional risk and stretching our peoples’ capabilities. He was alerting everyone up and down the chain that this wasn’t business as usual, but an intensely serious matter that would require the care, thoughtfulness, prudence and responsibility of all concerned, most of all himself.

Leadership, accountability, and devotion to duty are the foundation of command. Someone—I don’t recall who—once said that, “leadership is the art of getting others to want to do something you are convinced needs to be done.” The operative word here is “want.” If this is to happen, some basic principles are required. General Loh’s principles of leadership deserve to be repeated here. They are:

— Be the role models, lead-
ing by example as well as by authority and influence.

— Be open and accessible but not “one of the gang.”

— Promote a positive vision and culture within the unit, don’t look the other way to avoid facing a difficult problem.

— Distinguish between mistakes and crimes and deal with them differently.

— Apply discipline fairly and consistently across the board without regard for friendship, rank or other discriminators.

— Avoid favoritism, nepotism and cronyism in all their forms.

— Understand, and not misplace, trust and loyalty to the entire unit

— And, finally, commanders must understand when to administer discipline and compassion and not get the two mixed up.

At this juncture, I would like to address the issue of accountability. General Loh has been unshakable and persuasive about its being at the very heart of command. As Chief of Safety, I personally believe that the entire safety process hinges on accountability. Without accountability, we can never arrive at the true cause of mishaps. The insistence by a commander that true accountability be the watchword of the organization is not an easy mandate. It is basic human instinct to protect one’s organization, its people and its practices, from outside forces or intervention. It is a wrenching and agonizing experience for a commander to pinpoint individuals, command policy, or organizational practices, as the culprits in a mishap. Yet, as General Loh has noted, when commanders violate the special trust and confidence placed in them by looking the other way it is a matter of great concern and a serious breach of the responsibility of command. I don’t think you can say too much on the subject of accountability. It bears repeating over and over. Without it, people, policies, and procedures are compromised and doomed to failure.

Which brings me to the matter of discipline, another key aspect of command and an essential component of safety. Discipline is the cornerstone of human behavior. Without it, there is no process, no order, no reliability and no safety in the fabric of an organization. For me the vital litmus test of a military organization is discipline: no unit is functional without it.

When a successful commander’s military career draws to a close, there is no room for regret. Rather, there is the sure knowledge that the bedrock lessons and values of your command will constitute a continuing legacy to be passed on to those who follow. Integral to that legacy is vision. Clearly, General Loh’s vision was to make the greatest air combat command in the world even greater! That vision was tempered by the military man’s knowledge that we must be constantly prepared for the worst and constantly acting for the best. We must be strong enough to win a war and wise enough to prevent one.

General Loh had vision and it was twenty-twenty. He has earned our undiminished respect and admiration. That is the essence of command!
PILOT SAFETY
AWARD OF DISTINCTION

Capt Mark D. LaFond, 68 FS, 347 WG, Moody AFB GA

On 8 Feb 95, Capt LaFond was leading a two-ship of F-16s on a local close air support training mission. The mission proceeded uneventfully until the full stop landing. Shortly after touchdown, the right main landing gear collapsed and the aircraft began to veer sharply to the right. Capt LaFond quickly realized that a high speed runway departure was eminent and initiated a go-around in afterburner. He simultaneously advanced the throttle to max AB and applied controls to minimize the right roll and drift. The afterburner initiated before the aircraft departed the right side of the runway and the jet became airborne shortly thereafter. During the sequence, portions of the right side of the aircraft were damaged by contact with the runway. Capt LaFond maneuvered the aircraft away from the ground, left the gear down and called for his wingman to join on him. His wingman confirmed the damage to the aircraft and that the gear appeared to be down and locked. With limited fuel remaining, Capt LaFond performed a controllability check and accomplished the checklists for controlled ejection and landing with unsafe gear. The gear still indicated down and locked, but Capt LaFond decided that an approach and arrestment would be the safest means of recovering the aircraft with the questionable reliability of the gear. Capt LaFond executed a flawless straight-in approach and landing to a successful approach end arrestment. This time the gear remained down and locked. Post flight inspection of the aircraft revealed significant damage to the right stabilator, ventral fin, speed brake and the captive Maverick missile, which was loaded on the right weapons station. Capt LaFond later explained that he considered ejecting from the aircraft as it was about to leave the runway, but chose instead to stick with the jet as he felt this course of action would minimize the probability of harm to himself and the jet.

GROUND SAFETY
INDIVIDUAL AWARD
OF DISTINCTION

Michael J. Coffey, 910 AW, Vienna OH

Michael Coffey has been the 910 AW Civil Engineering (CE) Section Safety Representative for the last two years. During that time, he has held monthly safety meetings that are innovative, current, pertinent to the various CE shops, and tailored to the season. He has also developed a comprehensive safety checklist for each functional activity within the CE community. To complement this checklist Michael has instituted a vigorous quarterly self-inspection program designed to provide instant feedback to shop employees and managers concerning safety considerations and offer solid documentation to track safety hazards until resolved. Day-to-day Michael monitors personnel in the workplace to ensure proper Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and proper safety practices are utilized. As a direct result of Mr. Coffey’s involvement in the CE safety program, safety awareness among employees has increased significantly. This is shown by recent shop surveys and the upgrading of PPE plus the replenishment of shop safety gear and machinery devices. Further, CE is starting to realize a steady decrease in the number and frequency of reportable personal injury and property damage accidents.
UNIT
SAFETY AWARD
OF DISTINCTION

729th Air Control Squadron, 388 FW, Hill AFB UT

The 729th Air Control Squadron’s aggressive “safety first” position was put to the test when they were tasked by an Air Combat Command Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI). This tasking required the 225 person control and reporting center to generate, mobilize, and deploy over 2.5 million pounds of equipment. This included 100 trucks, 55 trailers of communications equipment, and 26 pallets of general cargo. The 729th Air Control Squadron processed and transported enough personnel and equipment to fill 17 C-5 cargo aircraft. Phase II of the ORI required the unit to deploy to an austere location in the Utah desert. Two hundred road miles and 4,200 manhours later the 729th was fully operational at their deployed location. During this time there were no injuries or incidents. Personnel endured 7 days of winds exceeding 30 knots, temperatures in the 30’s, and continuous simulated air and ground attacks. The adverse operating conditions did not affect the 729th’s group cohesiveness and determination to come out on top. After successfully winning the war, the unit’s redeployment activities were further complicated by a snow storm that greatly challenged the already exhausted unit. However, the 729th continued to maintain their standard of teamwork while preparing to return to the base. Throughout the rigorous inspection, the entire unit performed to the highest level possible, always making safety a top priority. The 729th’s efforts were rewarded with an overall “Excellent” rating from the Inspector General. The bottom line: The 729th Air Control Squadron’s outstanding approach to safety and mission accomplishment allowed them to move 2.5 million pounds of equipment over 60,000 total vehicle miles and log over 91,000 manhours in 7 days with zero injuries or mishaps.

FLIGHTLINE
SAFETY AWARD
OF DISTINCTION

MSgt Jeffrey Sutherland, 144 FW, Fresno ANGB CA

Recently, the C-26 had undergone a major modification at the Fairchild Maintenance Facility to upgrade the electronics capability of the aircraft and was in the process of a Maintenance Transition Inspection. On 17 Feb 95, the Merlin Express Site Manager requested Sergeant Sutherland to conduct an inspection of the area where maintenance had been completed on the aircraft. As he maneuvered around the open panels, he discovered that two of the rudder flight control cables had chaffed and cut 1/4 of an inch into an aircraft bulkhead. He also found similar damage on another structural rib and bracket. The cables were beginning to wear and fray. The chaffing problems were determined to have been caused by rerouting cables during the aircraft modification. The aircraft was immediately grounded and the manufacturer notified of the discrepancy. Sergeant Sutherland initiated a Maintenance Cross tell to other C-26 units. Like aircraft were grounded by the manufacturer pending a one-time inspection for cable chaffing. The FAA issued an Air Worthiness Directive within a few days adding additional flight control pulleys to prevent cable chaffing, caused by the previously approved modification. Due to the professional conduct of Sergeant Sutherland, a serious problem was detected and possible loss of life and equipment averted.

June 1995
The Combat Edge 13
AIRCREW SAFETY AWARD OF DISTINCTION

Capt Patrick Ellis, Lt Col William Sligar
20 FS, 12 AF, 49 FW, Holloman AFB NM

The mishap crew was number 3 in a 4-ship of F-4Es on a Low Altitude Intercept mission. Capt Ellis was in a turn to engage when he felt that the aircraft was “sluggish” in response. Lt Col Sligar noticed a master caution light and queried his front seater. Capt Ellis called “knock-it-off” and maintained his prebriefed altitude block. He cross-referenced the telewarning panel with the utility hydraulics gauge and determined they had “total utility failure.” Capt Ellis directed his wingman to rejoin and instructed his backseater to refer to the checklists. His wingman confirmed that fluid was leaking from the right wing in proximity to the leading edge slat. The crew informed the Supervisor of Flying and Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) of their emergency and set up for an approach end cable engagement. The crew wisely decided to delay hook extension until after the gear was lowered. On 20 mile final, with all checklist items completed, the gear was lowered. Both mains immediately indicated down; however, the nose gear indicated up. With chase confirming that the nose gear was up and the mains down, Capt Ellis coordinated with Lt Col Sligar to attempt lowering the gear with the rear cockpit’s emergency extension handle. When neither emergency gear handle extended the nose gear, Capt Ellis attempted to yaw and unload the aircraft to free the stuck nose gear. With still no movement of the nose gear, the mishap crew coordinated with ATC and performed a touch-and-go in an attempt to jar the nose gear free. After several attempts and the nose gear still stuck up, the mishap crew informed ATC of their intentions to land on the main gear only. The crew coordinated removal of the approach end cable, jettisoned their centerline tank, and set up to land. The crew touched down on center line and deployed the drag chute. Capt Ellis smoothly and skillfully flew the nose of the damaged aircraft to the runway to minimize impact damage. The aircraft began an aggressive left drift and Capt Ellis countered this drift with rudder. Once reestablished on centerline, Capt Ellis called for emergency brakes and Col Sligar activated them. Capt Ellis maintained the aircraft on the runway centerline using differential braking being extremely careful not to blow a tire (emergency brakes in the F-4 have no anti-skid protection). The engines were shut down and the aircrew emergency ground egressed. The aircrew’s outstanding performance localized the damage to the nose gear housing, minimal structural damage to the airframe, and no FOD damage.
Summer is here and that means an additional burden to most folks in or out of the flying world — heat stress. As the outside temperature and humidity climb, more problems will surface at work and at play. There are ways to deal with heat stress, and even more importantly, avoid it all together.

You could be on a defensive BFM sortie when heat stress strikes in the form of GLOC. Remember your Physiology Refresher training where they said that a 3 percent loss of body fluids equals a 50 percent reduction in G-tolerance. Physical and cognitive capabilities begin to suffer. This may affect basic flight skills, attention to detail, and ability to concentrate. It may be when you’re cutting the grass, running a 10 K race, or making your third flight for the day. What are some of the signs that you’re getting a little too hot?

* Heat stress — confusion, memory loss, minor discomfort.
* Heat cramps — you’ve lost considerable body salts.
* Heat exhaustion — cold, pale skin, weak pulse, dizziness, nausea.
* Heat stroke — flushed, hot dry skin; sweating has stopped.

When the outside temperature exceeds 80 degrees F, the only effective means for the body to dissipate heat is through sweating. High humidity environments reduce the rate of evaporation. Bulky clothing, chemical defense ensembles, and G-suits all reduce your capacity to cool the body. Overweight individuals have a greater tendency to become heat stress victims.

The picture looks bleak; short of a PCS to Thule, what can you do to counteract the threat? One of the best solutions is simply to ensure adequate hydration. This doesn’t mean pour water over your head; it means pouring it into your mouth! On a normal day you can easily lose 2.5 liters of body fluids/day. When it’s really hot, you can raise that quantity to 12 liters/day and up to 2 liters/hour (1 liter of fluid = 2.2 lbs body weight). Drink, drink, drink! Drink the good stuff — water. Prehydrate before you are exposed to the heat source and keep the fluids going throughout the activity. Watch out for the alcohol and caffeine scene — they really make you offload your precious fluid stores.

For fluid loss of less than 6 pounds in the average adult, salts are not generally an issue since most Americans get too much salt in their diet anyway. After numerous days of heavy sweating, electrolytes are readily replaced by adding a slight amount of salt to the food you eat (if the need exists). You can also increase your potassium intake by increasing your consumption of citrus fruits and bananas — sounds better than drinking a glass of salt water.

Finally, allow yourself a chance to get acclimated to the heat. Your body goes through changes that’ll help you deal with the heat as you’re exposed to it on a daily basis. Most heat acclimation is done in the first week of exposure and is essentially complete within 10 days. After this exposure the capacity of the body to sweat is nearly doubled, sweat becomes more dilute (you lose less salts) and is more evenly distributed over the skin. Physical fitness seems to enhance the acclimation effect. If you’re physically fit and acclimated, you are even better prepared to deal with the heat. Use common sense when dealing with the heat, and keep these ideas in mind to gain the advantage.

Capt Alex Bonner
21 AMDS/SGPT
Peterson AFB CO
The majority (61% in FY 94 for the Air Force) of aircraft mishaps involve human failure. Some of these human factor mishaps reflect causes which include stress-related performance changes. These errors may be linked to less than optimal stress-coping skills in the aviator. Early stress intervention measures can prevent unsafe behaviors in aviators due to inadequate stress coping.

EXAMPLE: A pilot, with 19 years experience, went to his Flight Surgeon for sleep problems. The Flight Surgeon found no physical problems and contacted the Aerospace Psychologist (AP). The AP suggested stress management. The pilot had marital conflicts. Marital problems may or may not stimulate stress reactions in aviators. In this pilot there were symptoms of situational anxiety induced by marital stress. Squadron contacts revealed no flying problems, but his recent night flying was “rusty” and possibly the result of fatigue. The pilot was quickly trained in relaxation and systematic desensitization to extinguish anxiety and aid in sleep. The pilot was also trained in cognitive restructuring to extinguish anxiety-producing thoughts, and replace them with effective relationship beliefs. In the first week, his sleep improved and his fatigue disappeared. After the eight sessions, there were no further anxiety symptoms.

Due to the strict selection and training program, the aviator is a person who has impressive mental control over his/her thought and attentional processes which enables performance of complicated aviation skills. That mental control is called a “flow state” where consciousness is harmoniously ordered. Compartmentalization is the main type of psychological control used to achieve this state of mind. Flow is the state of mind where attention is maximally invested in realistic goals, when skills match the challenges for action, and when the person forgets everything else and awareness is absorbed by the task at hand.

In aviation, the flow state is achieved when the pilot and machine act “as one” and the pilot has optimal situational awareness. SA is advance informational processing of the total flight environment and aerial combat situation. This extraordinary cognitive state evolves from mental control and flow. SA is susceptible to human factors that disrupt control and information processing, e.g., cognitive overload, stress processing, combat fatigue, and shock action.

Under distress, the aviator’s mental control can be disrupted and he/she fails to compartmentalize arousal factors and their personal life from their flying. They then fail to find the right strategy to handle the enmeshed stresses of flying and personal life demands. The result is their distressed behavior interrupts “flow” between pilot and machine. The disruption of the pilot’s information/decision-making reactions can create thinking errors.
and set up a mishap. Their “situation-response” behavior fails to cope with stress, and this distress is called “accident proneness.” Distress can cause accidents.

When an aviator becomes distressed and chooses an inadequate stress coping strategy, the resulting response may be a stress explosion or “acting out” behavior. Acting out is where the person misdirects negative or harmful thoughts/feelings externally. Acting out can produce aggressive or neglectful behaviors towards the pilot’s situation or the aircraft.

Stress can also elicit stress implosion. Implosion might be seen as “acting in.” Acting in is where negative feelings are misdirected within the person. In both cases the psychic effect is to overwhelm or disrupt the individual’s ongoing “flow” of optimal thinking and acting. The distressed aviator can lose control of mental focus, allowing disruptive personal emotions and cognitive beliefs to interfere with his optimal information processing. The chance of mistakes in decision making is increased and there is a deterioration in the pilot’s awareness and ability to operate the jet.

Cognitive-behavioral intervention can realign the aviator’s stress coping strategies and return the aviator to optimum mental control and performance. Aerospace Psychology can provide consultation and stress intervention training to aviators. The AP can teach cognitive restructuring in personal issues (e.g., marital problems). Also, Biofeedback can be used to train balanced arousal and controlled sensory motor mental pathway. This training can facilitate maintaining the mental “comfort zone” between mental states of underload and overload and thus reduce the high risk stress effects in flying.
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General John Michael Loh
Commander, Air Combat Command
Langley AFB VA

The warfighting capability of Air Combat Command rests on the talents and abilities of every single member of the command. When we lose people or equipment to safety-related mishaps, it affects our ability to perform even routine day-to-day missions. Eventually, our overall combat capability suffers, because the loss of every asset is felt deeply and is very difficult to replace.

Because of safety's importance to our combat capability, improving the command's safety performance is an enduring goal, and so one of our key goals for 1995. Flight safety is a particularly visible and challenging area we continually strive to refine. We are committed to achieving a command-controlled flight mishap rate equal to or less than 1 mishap per 100,000 flying hours (Command-controlled mishaps are those which someone on the ACC team could have prevented through their actions). We promote our culture of safety as a recurring theme because our people live and operate in highly demanding, and potentially dangerous environments.

One of the most demanding environments our people face is flight operations. Whether it's an F-15 on an air superiority mission, an EC-130 en route to Southwest Asia, an F-16 LANTIRN mission, or a helicopter crew on a rescue mission, risk is an ever-present factor. How can we continue to lower our mishap rates? One way to do that is by the "heads-up" flying of all aircrews in the command. This is a common-sense approach to flight safety — one that will enable us to prevent mishaps, improve our safety performance, and enhance our combat capability.

Quite simply, heads-up flying demands complete knowledge of all the flight and training rules as well as your aircraft and its systems, an honest assessment of your capabilities, and total
awareness and anticipation of what's going on around you. Heads-up flyers have to focus on the mission and concentrate on the task at hand while anticipating the unexpected.

Let me give you some examples of ACC crews' heads-up flying. A redeploying RC-135 crew had just passed the mid-point of their North Atlantic crossing when all three aircraft generators dropped offline and would not reset. Realizing they had limited battery power and instruments available with deteriorating weather at their divert bases, the crew decided to visually navigate to Goose Bay. En route, they calculated required fuel, discussed possible contingencies, and reviewed their procedures for crash landing or ditching. Despite further complications, the crew executed their plan flawlessly and landed safely at Goose Bay.

An F-15 pilot landing at his home base had just pulled his nose up for a full aerobrake when he noticed a civilian sedan enter the runway from the left, approximately 1000-1500 feet in front of him. The vehicle drove onto the left half of the runway and turned toward him. With only seconds to react, the pilot immediately selected full afterburner and steered to the opposite half of the runway, becoming airborne less than 100 feet from the car.

In order to rescue an injured fisherman, an HH-3 crew had to improvise an alternative method to recover their survivor when the helicopter's hoist system failed. Then, in the critical transition from a hover to forward flight, the crew experienced an engine compressor stall in one of their two engines which significantly reduced their ability to maintain level flight. Just to safely recover the aircraft, the crew had to perform a flawless single engine air refueling, then overcome an automatic flight control malfunction while landing.

There are some common threads running through these examples. Heads-up flying isn't a "cockpit only" event. It starts with mission preparation and planning. Likewise, it doesn't end when the wheels touch the ground. The concept of heads-up flying should permeate everything we do from academics to simulator training, mission planning, and debriefing.

These crews were mentally prepared for their missions. They had thought through possible complications and contingencies, and were prepared to respond quickly to save themselves and valuable combat resources. They prepared themselves as much as possible before the flight, leaving little to chance and even less to luck. If you're not mentally ready to fly — don't!

There is no such thing as a routine mission. Every flight has some risk associated with it and has the potential to become complicated and hazardous. Heads-up flying equates to continual vigilance, and does not allow for complacency.

Use all of the resources available to you. Whether it's other crew members on board, the AWACS controller, your wingman, or the SOF — use what you have available to help you safely recover your aircraft. Heads-up flying doesn't mean that you have to solve all the problems or find all the answers by yourself.

As leaders and supervisors, we must strive to develop heads-up aviators. Our training programs, evaluations, and exercises should all contribute to this development. Likewise, we must be careful that we don't push our crews too far, too fast. We must ensure that our flyers are not getting in over their heads. The best time to take a good hard look at the plan is during mission preparation; not after the mission's over.

I see or hear examples of smart, heads-up flying throughout Air Combat Command nearly every day. If we are to achieve this year's safety goals, everyone involved with ACC flight operations must be a heads-up flyer. Know your aircraft, know yourself, know your crew, and know what's going on around you — it's the common-sense, and best approach to flight safety.

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P

aul and Pat recently arrived on station at their new assignment in the Pacific. After several months of living off base, they received housing in the new towers. Three days before Christmas the movers delivered their household goods. For their children, it felt like a 3-day Christmas gift opening experience—all their books and toys had survived the move. With relatives soon arriving, they hurried to unpack all the boxes and decorate their quarters.

Three days after Christmas, a new, strange and terrifying phenomenon shook the very foundations of their security. While watching an evening movie, suddenly, without warning, and with no previous hint of impending catastrophe, the entire building and contents began shaking. The dining room light started swaying and vibrating until it came off its cable. The dishes in the china hutch danced and jumped to the floor. Cabinets in the kitchen opened and glasses, food and other utensils were thrown out. Stereo and television did belly flops onto the living room floor. Pictures and wall clocks were thrown from their hooks, and glass was shattered in all the rooms. The refrigerator door opened and milk and soda were spewed out onto the floor. Within 30 seconds, an entirely peaceful family scene was transformed into total chaos and terror because of a 7.5 earthquake.

As all these unexpected events were occurring, lights went out, children started crying, adults panicked and walls cracked. Psychologically, you see your comfort, security and possessions collapse and perish in seconds. “We felt trespassed upon—not from above or through the front door, but from below, from the earth, our terra.” Some families felt it was the end of the world, “My whole life flashed in front of me; I got that hollow pain right in the pit of my stomach. I thought of dying as our house shook and swayed. Was I ready to die? Oh God, I cried to my wife, not now God, not now!”

Every family, both on and off base, was affected by the quake. The base legal office reports that over a thousand cases were filed with them or their private insurance company. More frightening than this was the mental earthquake that traumatized the entire family. Tremors that followed were a constant reminder of the fear and trepidation that consumed all the family members. Paul and Pat had experienced tornadoes in the Plains states, hurricanes along the east coast, blackouts in the northeast, unyielding cold temperatures in the Northern tier, and excruciating heat at southern bases; but an earthquake attacks the very earth people walk on daily. The shock, fear and disbelief that surrounds the start of an earthquake shake the foundations of one’s physical, mental and spiritual security. The earth, the solid sphere of rock that has serenely rotated and revolved for centuries, suddenly shifts and sends devastation to any structure and person in the area.

Fortunately, the military family really becomes a family, with individuals knocking on doors to see if others are alright, if they need help with the children or assistance picking up fallen items. There was real support for these new neighbors. “Thank God there was no loss of life,” said Paul who went along with a neighbor checking the nine floors in the towers. “I don’t care about all these material things, I just can’t replace my children!” said a pregnant mother. Neighbors bonded quickly and learned about previous earthquakes and how to better
prepare for them while dealing with the present situation.

In the days that follow a natural disaster, there is usually a dramatic increase in the number of people who call the chapel and family support centers for crisis counseling. Support, understanding and caring are critical immediately following a natural disaster.

* Our earthquake victims were 8,000 miles from home, with no family or support group to help them get over the fear and shock of this earthquake. In the days that follow an earthquake, the after shocks are a constant reminder of the fatal initial quake.

* Many dependents could not stay at home alone; especially while the spouse was working a swing or midshift. Children also could not sleep or wanted their parents to take them to school.

* There was much irritability, crying and frustration with one’s limitations, feelings of hopelessness, insecurity and inability to be safe in an earthquake.

* Growing depression, insomnia and increased anxiety within one’s immediate family gave rise to displaced anger to those closest to military members.

* There were several families that reported increased stress among teens and children who preferred to stay home from school and sleep with their parents or with the lights on.

Remember an ounce of prevention is truly worth a pound of psychological and physical cure.

* Sit and discuss your evacuation plan and what to do during an earthquake with your family before an earthquake starts. Be sure everyone knows where to stand in the house - under the strongest beams and away from the windows. If you are outside, stay away from buildings, power lines, poles or big trees. Run into an open area. If you are driving, pull over away from buildings and electric poles or overpasses. If you are at school, get under a desk or table and follow your teacher’s directions. Practice, practice, practice — when an earthquake hits, your mind freezes, and only your training will get you through.

* Pack a bag with food, clothing, medicine, blankets, radio, bottled water, canned or dried food, MREs and toiletries for several days.

* Centralize all your important papers — military, insurance, wills, pictures, into one easy to carry bag in case you must evacuate.

* Have several flashlights with extra batteries, candles, fire extinguishers and rope.

* Have a list of important telephone numbers — police, hospital, friends that you can carry with you.

* Stay away from bookcases, cabinets, etc. I know we try to run and grab our material things, but they can be the very items that could fall and injure you.

* Secure large hanging items with extra hooks or nails. Pack away expensive items in boxes and take them out only as you need to use them. Remember many of our items are irreplaceable, or only at a very high replacement cost. You may want to leave these items safely in storage. It doesn’t cost much, and it will give you greater peace of mind if you have good renter’s insurance and life insurance.

* Check with your base Red Cross or Family Support Center and see if they have any plans or literature to assist you in case there is an earthquake.
Program
MSgt William A. Hodgson
HQ ACC/SEW
Langley AFB VA

Directives 5210.42 and Air Force Instruction 36-2104 (Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program) establish requirements and responsibilities for screening, selecting, and continuously evaluating all personnel who control, handle, control the launch of, or control entry or access to nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons systems. The program ensures that personnel who are selected to perform PRP duties, in either controlled or critical positions, demonstrate emotional stability, good judgment, and a high level of competence. If a person’s reliability in any of these areas is questionable, the program provides commanders guidance on how to remove individuals from the PRP. The objective is to make certain that personnel performing PRP duties meet the highest possible standards. To accomplish this objective, a commander must review a person’s past duty performance and consider all potentially disqualifying information before certifying a person to perform PRP duties. To help commanders make a decision, they receive information from base support agencies such as the hospital, AFOSI, Security Police, Military Personnel Flight, and Social Actions. Once this information is provided to commanders, they interview the individual and make a final determination as to whether the individual should be certified under PRP. The two types of certification are Formal and Interim certification.

Prior to performing PRP duties an individual must successfully complete nuclear surety training IAW AFI 91-101 and ACC Sup 1. This training may be accomplished prior to, or after, PRP certification, but must be complete prior to obtaining a line badge or performing PRP duties. To be formally certified under PRP, an individual must meet the requirements of paragraph 2.2.6. in AFI 36-2104, including a current security investigation and an interview by the commander (certifying official). This interview is commonly referred to as the “Spirit and Intent” briefing. A sample of this briefing is at Attachment 4 of AFI 36-2104. The second category, interim certification, allows individuals to perform
PRP duties pending completion of a security investigation. Individuals must meet the other requirements of paragraph 2.2.6. Individuals may be interim certified for critical PRP duties up to 180 days and up to 90 days for controlled PRP duties. Certifying officials may extend interim certifications at 90 day intervals if, after confirming with the Defense Investigative Service, the reason for the delay in the investigation is not the result of derogatory information. Interim certified members are monitored using the same criteria as individuals formally certified under PRP. They may perform the same duties except they may not form a “Two-Person Concept Team” with another interim certified individual or pilot a nuclear weapons loaded single seat aircraft. All certified individuals must be continually evaluated to detect signs of unreliable performance both on and off duty.

If at any time information is received that warrants the removal of an individual from the PRP, the certifying official must initiate removal action. Although the commander is ultimately responsible for the unit’s PRP, it is everyone’s obligation to report any behavior or circumstances which appear to degrade an individual’s performance or reliability. To make the program work each individual must understand his or her responsibilities. If you are on PRP, you must monitor your own reliability (commanders should cover this area during the “Spirit and Intent” briefing) and that of your subordinates. Failure to do so may indicate questionable reliability and serve as grounds for your removal from PRP duties. You must be aware of how stressful circumstances may reduce your effectiveness, capabilities, and reliability to the point of placing you and your subordinates at risk. Report such situations to your supervisors or commander. There are three methods of removal from the PRP:

1. SUSPENSION: Immediately removes individuals from PRP duties without decertification when:
   - Reliability is not in question.
   - Expect short duration to resolve situation. Authorized for 30 days maximum (extensions are not permitted).

2. TEMPORARY DECERTIFICATION: Immediately decertifies an individual from PRP duties when reliability is in question and neither suspension nor permanent decertification is appropriate.
   - Used for further evaluation and monitoring of individual and resolution of any problems. Authorized for 180 days (may extend in 30-day increments, not to exceed a total of 270 days).

3. PERMANENT DECERTIFICATION: Immediately decertifies a member from PRP duties on a permanent basis when:
   - Questionable reliability.
   - Long-term impaired capability.
   - Confirmed drug abuse. Possession or use of illegal drugs or misuse of legal drugs. Investigations by AFOSI do not warrant immediate suspension or decertification; commanders must consider all information prior to removing the member from PRP. Nuclear surety, not the investigation, must be the overriding factor in the decision to remove an individual under investigation from the PRP.
   - Diagnosed alcohol abuse or dependence.
   - Voluntary discharge action is initiated.

The commander makes the initial decision as to the individual’s suitability to perform PRP duties and must make any subsequent decisions regarding the individual’s continued reliability. The commander has the ultimate responsibility for the safety, security, and reliability of all unit assigned personnel, nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons systems. Each individual has the responsibility to report factors that could impair their performance or that of other PRP-certified individuals.
**Questions or Comments Concerning Data on This Page Should Be Addressed to HQ ACC/SEF, DSN: 574-7031**

### Class A Mishaps

**Aircrew Fatalities**

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### Out of Envelope Ejections

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### Class A Mishap Comparison Rate

(Cumulative Rate Based on Accidents per 100,000 Hours Flying)

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* (Hours Not Available)
Units without a "Command-Controlled" Class A flight mishap since the stand-up of ACC on 1 Jun 92, or their respective assimilation into the command.

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Military members constantly make decisions that affect the resources of our nation. Whether leading a multi-national strike package into Iraq or planning fuel stops on a routine cross country flight, we are faced with choices, each with varying levels of risk that will ultimately determine the outcome of the task at hand. Accurate risk assessment and positive action are important factors in the successful outcome of any decision.

Recently I had the opportunity to make an ejection decision. I was lead of a two-ship of F-16's flying Close Air Support with the US Army at Fort Stewart. The mission was uneventful until landing. After touchdown the right main gear collapsed and the aircraft quickly settled on its right side. My left hand went immediately to the ejection handle and tensed as my body quickly assumed the ejection position. My right hand continued to input full left stick to minimize the drag on the right wing. The aircraft was riding very comfortably on its right side because the AGM-65 under the right wing was actually lower than the wing tanks and the aircraft was riding on the missile. I realized that the aircraft was going to depart the prepared surface, but would not hit the barrier housing or any other obstacle. I selected full afterburner and the aircraft flew into the air shortly after leaving the prepared surface. My hand went instinctively to raise the gear; but noting three green lights, I elected to leave it down. I climbed in full AB away from the ground checking my engine instruments and directing my wingman to go around and join with me. After determining the damage to the aircraft and accomplishing the appropriate checklist procedures, I landed the aircraft uneventfully in the approach-end cable.

The time lapse from initial gear collapse to becoming airborne was only a few short seconds, but it felt like an eternity. My initial reaction was one of disbelief, "I can't believe my right main just folded. I thought that problem was fixed." (This same problem has happened 3 times before in the F-16 community.) My hand tensed to pull the handle and I thought to myself, "Do I really want to do this?" It was time for risk assessment. I remembered the pilot who had his gear collapse at night talk at a safety meeting about how going around saved his life. I had just briefed my operations officer the day prior on Aces II ejections. Since 1981 there have been 170 ejections with most fatalities being out of the envelope. The survival rate for in-the-envelope ejections was roughly 92-93 percent. I knew I was in the envelope, albeit the extreme bottom; and I knew the procedure for departing the prepared surface above taxi speed in the Viper — Eject. There was no doubt that
my chance for survival was better by initiating the afterburner and getting the aircraft airborne rather than following the procedure to eject. My decision was made. It was now time for positive action. My hand went quickly from the ejection handle to the throttle and selected full AB. I was committed, giving flying the aircraft my full attention. I chose the course of action that would minimize the risk to myself. The survival of the jet never entered into the decision process. Don’t misunderstand me. I’m not advocating staying with an aircraft that is departing a prepared surface. I had ideal conditions — no obstructions, an inert store that acted like a training wheel, and an engine that provides plenty of thrust. I do advocate selecting the course of action that minimizes the risk to you yourself. It would be foolish to follow an emergency procedure if, in your judgment, it places you in greater danger. You’re the boss; don’t let the situation control you — you control the situation.

Years ago at Electronic Combat Pilot (ECP) School I remember an F-16 instructor pilot offering the following formula. Not being a math major, I’ll keep it as simple as I can:

\[
PL = PD \times PE \times PK
\]

It stands for the Probability of Loss equals the Probability of Detection x Probability of Engagement x Probability of Kill. As professional aviators we plan and lead sorties within the constraints we’re given to minimize our probability of loss from enemy weapons systems. We attempt to drive the probability of threat detection, engagement, and/or kill to zero, thereby driving the entire probability of loss to zero. At the same time we try to maximize target probability of loss by executing tactics that increase our probability of detecting, engaging, and killing them. The same formula can be applied to an ejection decision. The threat has already detected and engaged you. The only probability that can be affected is the probability of kill. Select the course of action that minimizes the danger to yourself.

Decisions all involve choices with varying levels of risk. If you always choose the course of action that minimizes the risk to yourself, others, and the aircraft, you’ve made the right decision. Never get too comfortable — Fly Safe.
Capt Soren Jones
4402d Reconnaissance Squadron
Saudi Arabia

Captain Soren Jones, a deployed U-2 pilot, was flying a combat high altitude reconnaissance mission deep into Iraq on 27 Dec 94, when he lost all hydraulic pressure. He immediately initiated a turn to exit the area and lost his auto pilot. This required him to hand fly out of the area—no easy task given the narrow flight envelope at operational altitudes. He navigated out avoiding potential threats and regained use of the auto pilot over friendly territory. He was able to extend the gear using the alternate procedures. He descended for landing with no spoilers, speed brakes, or trim which resulted in flying the aircraft for an extended period of time against abnormal and significant flight control pressures. Three hours later, he arrived at the home base and flew our most difficult approach; a no flap (1.5 degree glide path), two knots above stall speed in a full pressure suit. Captain Jones flawlessly landed the U-2 (Dragon Lady) and emergency braked to a stop, saving this valuable national asset. Post flight inspection revealed the primary hydraulic line had ruptured.

Ann Wade J. Shatter
4 FS, 388 FW
Hill AFB UT

Airman Shatter was performing combined Basic Post-flight and Pre-flight inspections on aircraft 90-0801 when he noticed a serious problem. He climbed in the engine intake and discovered five unserviceable engine blades. One of the blades was so damaged it could not be repaired. Airman Shatter contacted his supervisor and they initiated the removal of the engine. Upon further inspection by the engine backshop, the engine was found to have severe damage, presumably caused by ice buildup on the engine intake lip. Had this crucial discovery not been made, possible loss of operator life and serious damage to valuable equipment would have occurred.
It just ain't gonna be th' same 'round here without General LoH.

It will be different.

I think you two is missing th' point.

Quality depends on us as individuals to make a world class organization.

It's a command culture now an' we're gonna keep on pressing for continuous improvement.

Huh! Kinda hard fer an old fighter jock to get much better, but...

Thanks General, for your years of outstanding leadership. Good luck and god speed in all your future endeavors.
The Air Force has been involved in several tragic and preventable aircraft accidents during 1994.

Those incidents, including ones that have dominated headlines, have caused me to step back and review the way in which I view the responsibilities of commanders and the issue of absolute accountability within our Air Force.

I carefully have examined the results of investigations conducted into this year's tragic accidents.

One common thread that links the findings and conclusions of each of those investigations is that of insufficient direct commander awareness of, and involvement in, events that culminated in the tragedies. That failure to be involved and stay engaged contributed to a lack of focus and discipline on the part of subordinates.

All Air Force members should be deeply concerned about the findings from those incidents, and we need to focus on correcting any flaws and command and what it means.

The tenets of command transcend any individual case. Command is a sacred trust.

We deliberately surround the change of command with dignity and ceremony to dramatize the sacred meaning of military command.

A commander is not just the person in the top block of the unit's organizational chart. A new commander becomes a different person than he or she was prior to accepting command.

Commanders are awarded a special trust and confidence to fulfill their units' missions and to exercise good leadership, discipline, justice, fairness and compassion in peace and war. Therefore, we must select our commanders with the utmost scrutiny and care — and for the right reasons.

Commanders must foster a strong sense of duty and service. They must create a vision and motivate and instill pride in team performance.

When the going gets tough, commanders must rise above the strife and lead.

The essence of command and leadership is to create a climate throughout the unit that inspires all to achieve extraordinary goals and levels of performance at all times and under all conditions, especially in the stress of combat.

So, when a commander violates this special trust and confidence by looking the other way and tolerating breaches of discipline, it is a matter of great concern and demands deep introspection.

When one member of a unit flaunts discipline and directives to the detriment of safety and mission accomplishment, the commander's obligation and loyalty must be to the rest of the members of the unit — those in the unit who are loyal, dedicated and working hard to deliver and support the unit's mission every day.

Protecting the few at the expense of undermining the many is to misplace loyalty and is a serious breach of the responsibility of command. Our people deserve commanders who understand the difference.

Honest mistakes in the execution of our demanding air missions — even when they result in injury or loss of equipment — can be and frequently are tolerated. We learn from these mistakes and put in place safeguards to prevent recurrence. We must apply common sense and sound judgment here.
We train and trust our people to perform in stressful, difficult and sometimes hostile environments.

Because of that, we are obliged to provide them the same trust and loyalty that will allow them to make split-second decisions and carry out their missions with a feeling of security and confidence even when honest, explainable mistakes occur.

But a crime is different from a mistake.

The distinction lies in the culpability of careless or negligent acts or the degree of premeditation and willful disregard for directives, regulations and sound judgment.

Commanders must realize the difference between mistakes and crimes, and, in the case of the latter, must display the moral courage to protect the loyal many at the expense of the disloyal few.

Our people deserve quality leadership from all our commanders all the time.

I have jotted down some time honored principles that come to mind that apply to leadership and yearn for reinforcement today.

Commanders must:

—Be the role models, leading by example as well as by authority and influence.
—Be open and accessible but not “one of the gang.”
—Promote a positive vision and culture within the unit, not look the other way to avoid having to face a difficult problem.

—Distinguish between mistakes and crimes and deal with them differently.
—Apply discipline fairly and consistently across the board without regard for friendship, rank or other discriminators.
—Avoid favoritism, nepotism and cronyism in all their forms.
—Understand, and not misplace, trust and loyalty to the entire unit.
—And finally, commanders must understand when to administer discipline and compassion and not get the two mixed up.

Fortunately, in our Air Force, we are enriched with a plentiful supply of commanders at all levels who understand these principles and are applying them conscientiously and scrupulously at home and around the world.

They are real leaders in every sense of the word, and their people hold them in high esteem, would follow them anywhere, and risk their lives for them.

I see these commanders every day throughout Air Combat Command and our Air Force. We must not let the actions of a few overshadow their leadership, accountability and devotion to duty.

These commanders understand the responsibilities of their positions. They are accountable. They deserve our trust and support, and they have both in full measure.

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