Cover Photos Courtesy of
SrA Andrew N. Dunaway, II
Combat Camera
FEATURES

4 WHAT DO HOT TUBS, SWIMMING POOLS & F-16'S HAVE IN COMMON?
The propane in the Bar-B-Q was near the boiling point; fortunately, the story does not conclude with a disastrous explosion. But it easily could have.

30 CULTURE THAT WORKS
An effective safety program must exist on a foundation of Integrity, Trust and Leadership created and sustained by effective communications.

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ACCOLADES
Thanks to you, our safety record for this fiscal year is even better than last year's. That's a good news story, written by every one of you who adheres to the highest possible standards and, in so doing, teaches others to do the same.

Every person in a leadership position — from wing commanders to flight commanders to crew chiefs — teaches others about safety's importance in hundreds of ways, day after day. Every action, philosophy and attitude, even hallway conversations, can communicate your views about safety. Safety's critical importance must be a theme that becomes part of the natural rhythm of day-to-day business for all of us.

The maxim that actions speak louder than words is so true when it comes to safety.

Commander's call briefings are great, yet they're not enough to educate our people about safety's importance. Lead by example. Follow the tech orders, use grounding wires and chocks, drive within the speed limit... You take the initiative. Do things the right way instead of the easy way and others will follow.

It's unrealistic to think we'll never have an accident. The only way we might achieve that goal is if we never again turn a wheel or start an engine. So, when accidents or mishaps do happen, we must determine the cause, distinguish between honest mistakes and negligence, re-evaluate our training programs, then ask ourselves an important question. Are we leading by example?

We are entrusted with our nation's most valuable resources to provide for America's defense. We have a special obligation to take care of these resources, especially the most valuable one of all — you.

General Joseph W. Ralston
Commander
We all have learned to live with various constraints and requirements. It's the way of doing business; and for the most part, we do a pretty good job of it. At least until we begin to take those constraints and requirements for granted. Take for instance when the bio-environmental technician calls and tells you that the chlorine pellets that you keep on hand for your hydrazine response team are not properly stored and that you must move the chlorine somewhere else right away. You pick up the phone, tell the person at the other end of the line to handle it and then assume all is well.

Now, a fuels technician has been tasked with finding a suitable place to store those plastic buckets full of pellets. They're the same pellets that he has at home for his hot tub, so it can't be too difficult. After all, it just calls for a well-ventilated, cool, dry place. He finds a shelter attached to the fuel cell maintenance building that is open on the front with no door. It meets all the requirements and the job is complete. During the following months, an oil-water separator and waste water filtering system are added to the building with the associated plumbing routed through the shed. A propane Bar-B-Q has also found a home in this small shelter. Winter is about to arrive; and because of the plumbing, we need to add a heat source and small thermostat to prevent the pipes from freezing. Oh, by the way, let's add a small garage door to keep the heat from escaping. Now things become interesting. A safety inspection by the supervisor might have discovered something was not quite right, but would it have? Sometime during this process, someone decided to place the chlorine pellet containers into a 25 gallon EPA approved barrel. That was smart. But still not good enough to prevent a potential disaster. Who could have guessed that the thermostat would be faulty? It's the middle of winter, no one needs the Bar-B-Q, no call for the pellets, and the water filtration system is working perfectly.
The interior temperature of the drum containing the chlorine pellets is unknown. However, it was hot enough to eat up all the oxygen, collapse the interior container, and create enough of a vacuum to collapse the large EPA approved container thereby generating a small crack in the outer barrel. The escaping heat now is burning a hole in an air line connected to the water filter system and turning on an air compressor located in the fuel cell maintenance building. Now we have good old air escaping from a ruptured air line feeding a more than combustible material. What more do we need to ruin our day. It is a weekend and the base is vacant except for a few Security Police who rose to the occasion. When smoke was observed coming from under the garage door, the Fire Department was notified and personnel from a co-located Alert Detachment responded and moved aircraft away from the fuel cell maintenance hanger. The Fire Department took care of the rest despite one exception. The Fire Department had no way of knowing what was inside that garage door; and when they opened it, they got a full breath of chlorine gas. Result: three firemen spent some time at the nearest hospital with minor respiratory congestion. Is this the end? No. The propane in the Bar-B-Q was near the boiling point; fortunately, the story does not conclude with a disastrous explosion. But it easily could have. On the good side, we found that some of our base personnel went home and found a better place to store their hot tub and swimming pool chlorine pellets. This series of events took nearly 1 year to develop into trouble. The results could have been much worse.

We now have a different approach in performing facility safety inspections. You might want to consider the same.
The 162 FS F-16 mission was a 1 V 1 intercept followed by air refueling (AAR), all in R-5503 (Southern Ohio). The weather was typical for Ohio in November, i.e., poor.

I was sitting on the wing of the tanker (#2 in the 2-ship) waiting for my turn to refuel. The intercept portion of the mission had gone well, and now it was time to get some gas. I began to fall behind and pushed the throttle forward...nothing. While looking at the RPM gauge, I cycled the throttle in the mil-midrange area.
two to three times; but the RPM continued a steady decay. As it went through 70%, I went “Throttle - Off, then midrange” (both aloud and with my left hand), bunted over very slightly to maintain 250 knots minimum, and told lead I had flamed out. I glared at the RPM gauge with disbelief and a little denial as it continued downward. “How dare you,” I thought. I then went “Engine Control Switch - SEC.” The RPM finally stopped around 45% and then slowly started to increase as did the FTIT. I don’t remember where FTIT bottomed out and at that particular moment didn’t really care; it was now starting to rise and I was gushing out less adrenaline.

The nearest airfield was Rickenbacker, so we declared an In Flight Emergency (IFE) and headed that way. Number one, who was a former member of the Rickenbacker unit and now my wingman, knew the airfield details cold and gave me inbound courses, frequencies, etc., which was a big help. With all apparently OK in “SEC,” I flew an ILS to a full stop, got out of the airplane, and kissed the ground. Two noteworthy thoughts I can pass on are: don’t hesitate and don’t be rushed.

Don’t hesitate! My flameout was caused by a malfunctioning T4B signal. The T4B limits maximum turbine temperature by commanding a decrease in fuel flow when certain temperatures are detected. After the mission, a tech rep told me that if I had just waited, the engine would have auto transferred to SEC on its own, restarted itself, and all would have been well, including my restored inner peace. Well, I admit I’m no engineer. But, I do know that idle RPM at FL 250 is above 80%! I was not waiting. As I saw the RPM pass 50%, I went “SEC.” I wasn’t waiting for the auto transfer...and neither should you.

There are a couple of things that cause hesitation. One is denial. In fact, that was my first mental reaction: “This can’t be so...I’m not even maneuvering...It’s not supposed to just quit...YGBSM.” The second is the fear of screwing up. Anyone who has ever flown the F-16 knows the old adage about a thousand switch errors to make, and it’s our job to find every one of them. This was my second gut reaction: “I’ve done something wrong.” I knew the story about the guy who turned his motor off by confusing the fuel master switch with the AAR receptacle door switch. I even looked at the two switches as I was cycling the throttle. The point is, if it doesn’t look or feel right, it probably isn’t. The more familiar you are with your EPs, the less likely that you’ll allow denial or fear of screwing up to cause you to hesitate from doing what’s right and doing it now.

Don’t be rushed. Specifically, don’t let other people rush you or cause you to lose focus on the task at hand. As soon as ATC heard that we were an emergency, they started vectoring with gusto. I was instructed by a voice conveying an extreme sense of urgency to immediately descend to 4,000 feet, turn to such and such, squawk this, etc., etc., etc. I wasn’t ready for that! I hadn’t finished all of my EP stuff, and the weather was 1,000 feet overcast and 1 1/2 to 2 miles obscured with light rain and fog everywhere. Also, Rickenbacker Approach was having trouble hearing our replies and just kept on talking, stepping all over our transmission. I actually thought I was in comm jam hell for a few minutes. So, I just set up an orbit above the weather (clouds were solid from about 15,000 on down); and when the comm finally diminished, let them know what I was doing. The first instinct to follow instructions would have put me totally IMC with a still somewhat questionable motor unprepared for the approach. Suppose something else bad happens? What now? Never forget that your emergency is your banana — no one else’s. Everyone wants to tell you how to peel it because they want to help. However, despite all their well intentioned efforts and attempts, it’s still your banana — peel it when you’re ready. Once again, if it doesn’t feel right, it probably isn’t. Don’t be rushed.
It's that time of year again. The weather is great and the family is looking to get away from the memories of bitter cold, rain or blowing snow, long work days and endless school days. Vacation time sends hundreds of thousands of people and their cars onto the nation's highways. Problem is, when they take off on their journeys, the destination is usually several hundred miles away. So, in anticipation of extra time at that paradise site, many folks try to drive straight through creating a dangerous situation — sleepy drivers on the roads.

Research indicates that somewhere between 1 and 10 percent of the 20 million automobile mishaps in this country are the result of sleepy drivers. The American Automobile Association (AAA) sponsored a study at Stanford University's Sleep Research Center to find out how accurately people can judge their chances of falling...
asleep in the next 2 minutes.

The study found that a driver's ability to judge sleep onset is limited and that drivers may not experience a drastic change in their physiological state just prior to falling asleep.

Researchers say drivers must be aware of two critical factors to reduce the number of sleep-related mishaps:
1. They may not be able to predict sleep onset as accurately as supposed.
2. They often do not have adequate information through signs of sleepiness to avoid sleep-related mishaps.

By rolling down the window, turning down the heat, subjecting themselves to blowing cold air, and by changing the music to something more upbeat, drivers may be able to ward off sleepiness temporarily.

Drivers must be able to make the connection between falling asleep at the wheel (even for just a second) and the increased risk of a high-speed mishap. Studies indicate that as many as 20 percent of drivers have fallen asleep at the wheel and suffered no negative consequences. This may create a false sense of security for drivers about falling asleep at the wheel.

According to Steven Weber, director of the sleep disorders clinic at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, “Most sleepy people manage to stay awake while driving through the sheer act of will. But if you're tired and driving in heavy traffic, and a car rapidly swings in front of you, you may not be able to brake in time.”

But, why do people drive when they are sleepy? Many drivers are more concerned with getting to their destination than the risk of a sleep-related mishap. Some drivers think that pulling off the road or putting up in a motel for some rest could mean added expense or loss of time at that vacation haven.

Some drivers are afraid of “missing out” on some of the fun and excitement of their vacation if they have to “waste” time stopping and resting during their drive. This fear could become permanently true if they do not stop when they feel drowsy or believe sleep is even somewhat likely in the next few minutes.

Drowsiness is estimated to contribute to approximately 10,000 auto deaths a year. Men appear to be the greater culprit of driving when they should be resting. Thirty-two percent of male drivers were found to have nodded off at the wheel, versus only 13 percent of female drivers. Also, 58 percent of male drivers were found to continue driving when they needed rest versus 28 percent of female drivers.

So, what can you do to avoid a sleep-related mishap during your trip? The following tips will help get you to your destination, safe and sound:
* Plan your trip properly.
* Get plenty of sleep before you start your trip.
* Take a break every couple of hours. Walk around and stretch.
* Switch drivers every so often, if possible.
* Stop and put up for the night in a motel when travel time is excessive.
* Do not take stimulants to stay awake.
* Do not drink alcohol and drive or take medication that can adversely affect your operation of the vehicle.
* Keep an eye out for other drivers. They may be nodding off.
* Be cautious of “highway hypnosis” caused by oncoming headlights or lines and reflectors on the roadway.
* Avoid excessive heat in the car while driving.
* Increase the space between you and the car in front of you to provide extra reaction time.

Realize that when you feel sleepy, your body is telling you — you are sleepy.

Take your time and get there safely, you will enjoy your vacation just as much if not more. Mishaps can take all the fun out of your “fun time.” •
To paraphrase Disraeli, this is your opportunity to help us be successful. Please don’t let opportunity’s knocking go unanswered. Our mission is mishap prevention through safety education, recognition, and marketing. To fulfill our mission, we attempt to provide everyone in the command with thought stimulating flight, weapons, and ground safety information so we can all learn from the pages of a magazine rather than painful personal experience or tragedy.

We are successful in our mission when we meet the expectations of our customers in the products we provide them. In simplified terms, we supply a product (The Combat Edge) to you the customer (reader). We are totally focused on our product and our customers. We measure our outputs to determine how well we are satisfying our customers with our product. Customer satisfaction is not just a buzzword—it’s a two-way street. It requires two parties, a customer, and a supplier with separate but equally important responsibilities. To satisfy you, our customer, we must know what it is you need, want, and expect. You are the key to our success!

How can you help us? Complete a survey and forward it to us. We know you don’t have much time to spare, but please take a few minutes from your busy schedule to fill out the survey form. We’ve included one form in each copy of the magazine and encourage local reproduction so everyone can let us know what they think.

The survey includes some questions about you. We’re not trying to invade your privacy; we just want to know more clearly who it is we’re communicating with. With that information, we will be better able to tailor the magazine to your interests. Please, no names.

The rest of the survey lets you sound off to us. Tell us what you honestly think about the way we’re doing our job. Don’t worry about hurting our feelings; just be as honest and accurate as you can. When you’re finished, fold and TAPE (no staples please) the survey so that the address shows. Send it to us through your official mail channels.

This month’s Safety Day would be a great opportunity to provide us with the information we need. Try incorporating the completion of our survey into your formal Safety Day plans. Safety offices and organizations could make the survey part of their agenda. Have all of your people fill out a survey; then collect and mail them to us.

We will read each survey and consider your suggestions; after all, it really is your magazine. This is your chance to sit on our editorial board and have your opinions heard. Help us do a better job of serving you by not missing your opportunity!
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<th>Branch of Service/Agency</th>
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| Job title/description | |

1. How often do you read this magazine?  
   a. Very often (every issue)  
   b. Often (most issues)  
   c. Sometimes (some issues)  
   d. Seldom (very few issues)  

2. How do you normally obtain this magazine?  
   a. Official USAF distribution (PDO)  
   b. GPO subscription/direct mail  
   c. Library  
   d. Co-worker, associate, friend  
   e. Other  

3. How much of each issue of this magazine do you read?  
   a. All  
   b. Most  
   c. About half  
   d. Some  
   e. A little  
   f. Look at but seldom read  
   g. None  

4. List the following magazines in your order of preference for reading (which one would you read 1st, 2nd, etc.):  
   a. The Combat Edge  
   b. Flying Safety  
   c. Road & Rec  
   d. Mobility Forum  
   e. Approach  
   f. TIG Brief  

   Why?  

5. How soon do you see a copy of this magazine after it is published?  
   a. One week or less  
   b. One to three weeks  
   c. Three weeks to a month  
   d. A month or more  

6. What magazines or newspapers do you regularly read?  

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We are interested in your assessment of The Combat Edge magazine. When choosing an answer, write in the number corresponding to the extent you agree or disagree with each statement.

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<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<th>No Opinion</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
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7. The Combat Edge satisfactorily presents safety information.  
8. The Combat Edge is as interesting as other publications I read.  
9. The Combat Edge is as informative as other publications I read.  
10. The level of reading in The Combat Edge should not be higher.  
11. The articles in The Combat Edge are technically accurate.  
12. Overall, the appearance of The Combat Edge is good.  
13. Coverage of flight safety issues is adequate.  
14. Coverage of ground safety issues is adequate.  
15. Coverage of weapons safety issues is adequate.  
16. The number of photos, illustrations and charts in The Combat Edge is sufficient.  
17. The Combat Edge articles are informative.  
18. The Combat Edge articles are interesting.  
19. The Combat Edge magazine is useful to me personally.  
20. Article topics are in tune with important trends.  
21. The Combat Edge is an effective mishap prevention tool.  

For the areas listed below, please rate each using the following scale:

<table>
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<th>Poor</th>
<th>Fair</th>
<th>Satisfactory</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
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22. Covers  
23. Layout (professional appearance)  
24. Article quality  
25. Photographs  
26. Illustrations  
27. Information value  
28. Use of color  
29. Thought provoking nature  
30. Type (size and style)  
31. General interest/entertainment value  
32. Article thoroughness  
33. Article variety  
34. Awards coverage (number and frequency)  
35. Award write-ups  
36. Usefulness in my job  
37. Timeliness of articles/issues  
38. Accuracy  
39. Usefulness in increasing professional expertise  
40. Attractiveness  
41. Overall value
42. Has a **Combat Edge** article ever saved your life or kept you from doing something dangerous? If so, briefly describe the situation.

43. How would you rate this magazine in comparison with other publications dealing with the same or similar subject matter?
   a. The best
   b. Better than most
   c. Average
   d. Worse than most
   e. The worst
   f. Don't know

Please tell us how you would improve **The Combat Edge**:

What kinds of articles should we print more of? Less of? **Additions**?

Other comments:

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**Official Business**

Editor, The Combat Edge  
HQ ACC/SEP  
130 Andrews St Ste 301  
Langley AFB VA 23665-2786
AIRCREW SAFETY
AWARD OF DISTINCTION

Capt Christopher P. Azzano
Capt Brendan S. Smith
336 FS, 4 WG
Seymour Johnson AFB NC

While flying an F-15E in a multi-national composite force strike package during a recent Maple Flag deployment, Captains Azzano and Smith experienced a catastrophic #2 engine failure and fire. During a 300' ingress at 550KCAS, the aircrew felt a loud bang on the right side of the aircraft, accompanied by severe vibrations and temporary smoke in the cockpit. They immediately began a climbing turn to the south and called “terminate.” The vibrations became violent and the #2 throttle was placed to OFF as the aircrew contemplated ejection. Passing through 270KCAS, the vibrations began to subside as the aircrew climbed to avoid the rest of the strike package and adversaries. The rejoining chase aircraft then noticed flames and smoke trailing from the right engine. The fire extinguisher was activated despite no indications from the internal fire warning system. The flames persisted and the aircrew completed pre-ejection checks while proceeding direct to Cold Lake CFB, 60 miles to the south. After coordinating to raise the departure end barrier, they elected to land opposite direction on RW13R to expedite landing while deconflicting from the primary Maple Flag recovery of over 80 aircraft. Twenty miles out, the flames appeared to confine themselves to the burner can. The aircrew executed a flawless heavyweight single-engine landing and brought the crippled aircraft to a safe taxi speed with 2000' remaining. They taxied clear of the runway, shut down, and emergency ground egressed, with no further indications of a fire. Post flight investigation revealed a catastrophic low-pressure turbine failure which progressed to #5 bearing failure and the eventual failure of the #5 bearing supports. Failure of the supports freed the turbine shaft to move randomly within the aft section of the engine causing the violent vibrations and inflight fire due to residual fuel and oil.
Senior Airman Torres was a crew chief for an F-16C being launched for a local BFM training mission. After start all checks appeared normal with the engine nozzle opening and closing as expected during the check of the secondary engine control. At the start of the flight control checks, Airman Torres walked to the rear to monitor flight control movement. At that time a slight irregularity in the engine nozzle caught his attention. The nozzle appeared slightly out of round with a portion of a nozzle leaf somewhat raised. The degree of the distortion in the nozzle was so minor as to be nearly undetectable; but to Airman Torres’ trained eye, the nozzle just did not seem right. He asked the pilot to confirm his nozzle indications in the cockpit and they were normal. Airman Torres still was not satisfied and, after conferring with his senior crew chief Technical Sergeant Hibbs, advised the pilot to shut the engine down due to the suspected abnormality. Tear-down of the engine revealed binding and failure of the actuating linkages and heat damage to the internal seals of the exhaust area. This failure, which occurred after the normal engine checks, would have caused a nozzle fire and inadequate thrust had the aircraft attempted a takeoff.

On 12 May 1995, Sergeant Calhoon was assigned to the team that was accomplishing the dimensional check and adjustment of the main landing gear downlock actuators part of TCTO 1F-16-2032. His team had completed their portion of the TCTO on aircraft 89-2091 and turned it over to the operational check team. Once the operational checks had been accomplished, the aircraft was down jacked and the Red X’s cleared. Sergeant Calhoon returned to ensure that all of his work was correctly safetied. While inspecting the installation of the right main landing gear downlock actuator, he discovered that the bolt connecting the actuator to the drag brace toggle “didn’t look right.” He investigated further and found that the bolt was partially sheared and the TCTO had a procedural error that could allow the actuator to be improperly rigged. Had the bolt gone undetected, the landing gear may well have collapsed during its next mission. TCTO 1F-16-2032, Supplement D, was issued as a direct result of Sergeant Calhoon’s discovery.
GROUND SAFETY INDIVIDUAL AWARD OF DISTINCTION

SSgt Timothy J. McKeon, 87 EWAS, 68 ECG, Eglin AFB FL

Sergeant McKeon developed the 87th Electronic Warfare Aggressor Squadron's ground, weapons, and radiation safety programs. His dedication and initiative in developing these programs have greatly increased safety awareness within the squadron. His ground and weapons safety programs received an “Excellent” rating during his first USAFAWC annual safety inspection and an “Outstanding” rating this year. The squadron safety metrics and processes that he developed were adopted as benchmarks by the USAFAWC quality team for use by all squadrons. The initiation of a squadron weapons safety program provided viable training and certification for personnel operating assigned weapons systems, reducing weapons safety incidents to zero. The radiation safety operating instruction he created was praised by the Eglin AFB Bioenvironmental Engineering Office and is used as a model for all base organizations with radio frequency emitters. His leadership resulted in an outstanding safety program which is second to none in the Air Warfare Center!

UNIT SAFETY AWARD OF DISTINCTION

71st Rescue Squadron, 1 FW, Patrick AFB FL

The 71st Rescue Squadron has distinguished itself by establishing and maintaining a proactive safety program that resulted in another year of zero Class A or B mishaps. Since the squadron's reactivation and transition to ACC in 1993, the safety office has had to build their flight, ground, and weapons safety programs from the bottom up. With the absence of any flying squadrons at the host base for several years, the squadron’s Flight Safety shop was tasked with providing original inputs to the host wing’s new MACA and BASH programs as well as developing internal procedures to ensure safe operation in newly established drop zones and low-level training areas. Ground Safety’s accomplishments range from identifying and correcting numerous safety hazards throughout the squadron’s recently acquired buildings to developing new self-inspection checklists and hazard reporting procedures. To help prevent driving under the influence, an “Arrive Alive” free ride home program was initiated and has kept the squadron’s DUI count to zero. Meanwhile, Weapons Safety, working closely with the wing, established handling and storage procedures for the squadron’s pyrotechnics, acquired the proper explosives licensing, and developed unit training and briefing guides. The entire 71st Rescue Squadron’s ingrained belief in safety allows them to say “The things we do, that others may live...we do safely.”
Courtesy of
ning Squadron • Dyess AFB, Texas
PILOT SAFETY
AWARD OF DISTINCTION

Capt Roy Qualls, 27 FS, 1 FW, Langley AFB VA

On 27 Mar 95, Capt Qualls was flying as #4 of an 8-ship of F-15Cs during a Green Flag mission. While marshaling forces on the eastern edge of the Nellis ranges, Capt Qualls noticed the oil pressure light was illuminated and that the right engine oil pressure was very low. As he began to accomplish the appropriate emergency procedures, he noticed the master caution light had again illuminated, followed by voice warning of a right engine fire. The right engine had thrown several compressor blades, cutting all flight control cables to the right wing and starting a fire in the right engine bay. Capt Qualls immediately pointed his F-15 toward Nellis AFB and began to accomplish the procedures for engine fire, just as his wingman informed him that he was trailing smoke. He shut down the right engine, but the fire light remained illuminated and the aircraft became increasingly more difficult to control, periodically pitching abruptly up and left. The control augmentation system (CAS) would not reset, and Capt Qualls noticed a significant decrease in right aileron authority, requiring large right stick and left rudder inputs in order to remain wings level. He prepared himself for the possibility of ejection and recommended to the Nellis SOF to prepare search and rescue forces, just in case. Approximately 50 miles from Nellis, the fuel gauge and primary airspeed indicator failed, forcing Capt Qualls to rely on the smaller standby airspeed indicator located on the lower portion of the instrument panel near his knees. Furthermore, the Airframe Mounted Accessory Drive (AMAD) fire warning light illuminated indicating the fire was still burning and spreading through the aircraft. Having already expended the fire extinguisher bottle on the right engine, he could do nothing to extinguish the AMAD fire. Meanwhile, his wingman informed him that the fire had begun to engulf the aft end of the aircraft and he was trailing 5-10 foot flames. From 20,000 feet, Capt Qualls entered a steep dive in an attempt to blow out the fire. The fire diminished somewhat but continued to burn. Realizing that landing would be difficult at best, Capt Qualls accomplished a controllability check and determined 190 knots was the minimum landing speed with full right stick and full left rudder. He decided on a touchdown speed of 200 knots, with a probable departure-end cable engagement. He landed within the first 500 feet of the runway and attempted to lower the tailhook while standing on the brakes. Unfortunately, the hook had fused into the fuselage during the fire and did not come down. Nonetheless, Capt Qualls managed to stop 300 feet prior to the departure end cable and egressed uneventfully.
Brigadier General Godsey, HQ USAF/SE, recently released an ALMAJCOM/CV letter addressing several Air Force flight safety concerns. The issues Gen Godsey highlights are of such extreme importance to all ACC pilots and crewmembers that they bear repeating. A portion of Gen Godsey's message follows:

The Air Force recently experienced two Class A flight mishaps in which an aircraft malfunction or emergency procedures were inadequately addressed in the flight manual. In both scenarios, experienced aircrews accepted aircraft for flight with the knowledge that "something was not quite right" with their airplane.

It is not clear what motivated these crews to launch on two routine missions with known aircraft problems. Perhaps it was a perceived sense of mission urgency, "get-home-itis," a multimotor mentality, or the insidious enemy of experienced crewmembers, complacency. Whatever the case, they were not able to deal with the critical problems they eventually faced.

From a safety perspective, I cannot overemphasize the importance of basic flight discipline. A professional aviator does not fly an airplane that "isn't quite right, but good enough to get home." That kind of attitude is a proven killer.

Gen Godsey's emphasis on the importance of basic flight discipline is right in line with Air Combat Command's safety philosophy. Commanders are the key to addressing these concerns throughout ACC and set the tone for mission conduct. To that end, it would be most appropriate for every commander to stress the importance of these concerns to their aircrews and conduct a thorough review of flight operations with these issues in mind. Aircrews must understand the absolute necessity of adhering to established operating procedures! Do not allow real or perceived pressure and distractions to override basic flight discipline. There is no good reason to start a mission with an airplane that "isn't quite right." As someone once said, "I'd rather be on the ground wishing I was flying, than in the air wishing I was on the ground." I need your help to stop this trend.
COLOMBIAN TROPHY

Established in 1935 by the Republic of Colombia, the Colombian Trophy is one of the highest flight-safety awards. The purpose of the trophy was to recognize the Air Force General Headquarters (GHQ) group that had the lowest mishap rate in the preceding year. The original criteria for the award have been changed, but the new criteria are in keeping with the donor's intent. The trophy is awarded each year to a fighter-attack, or reconnaissance unit for outstanding contributions to flight safety.

33d Fighter Wing, Eglin AFB FL

EXPLOSIVES SAFETY PLAQUES
Awarded to the following organizations for their outstanding achievement and contribution to explosives safety:

347 WG, Moody AFB GA
355 WG, Davis-Monthan AFB AZ
388 FW, Hill AFB UT
366 WG, Mountain Home AFB ID
314 AW, Little Rock AFB AR

FLIGHT SAFETY PLAQUES
Awarded to the following organizations for outstanding mishap prevention:

347 WG, Moody AFB GA
366 WG, Mountain Home AFB ID
314 AW, Little Rock AFB AR
5 BW, Minot AFB ND

MISSILE SAFETY PLAQUES
Awarded to the following organizations for their outstanding achievement and contribution to missile safety:

33 FW, Eglin AFB FL
366 WG, Mountain Home AFB ID
388 FW, Hill AFB UT

AERO CLUB CERTIFICATES
Awarded to the following bases for flight safety achievements:

Barksdale AFB LA
Beale AFB CA
Davis-Monthan AFB AZ
Griffiss AFB NY

Holloman AFB NM
Langley AFB VA
Offutt AFB NE
Shaw AFB SC
HQ AF/SE R131800Z July 95 message announced the following ACC winners of Air Force Annual Awards. "Congratulations to all for a job well done. Your efforts and dedication contributed significantly to the overall success of the USAF mishap prevention program. Let's continue to focus on mishap prevention. Remember — zero is our goal!"

AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SURETY OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENT AWARD

The USAF Directorate of Nuclear Surety created this award in 1981 to recognize the significant achievements of individuals in the nuclear weapons career field. In 1989, the eligibility criteria was amended to include the contributions of personnel engaged in nuclear power system activities. Effective with the FY 93 cycle, the approval level was elevated to the AF Chief of Safety and the award title changed to reflect this.

Majgt Dorsey C. Holsinger, Jr., 416th Bomb Wing, Griffiss AFB NY

NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL AWARD OF HONOR

The highest NSC award presented to the following organizations with a perfect record or a reduction of 10% or more in the ground mishap rate; a composite rate better than the AF composite rate for the fiscal award year; and zero on-duty ground mishap fatalities.

2 BW, Barksdale AFB LA
7 WG, Dyess AFB TX
93 BW, Castle AFB CA
99 WG, Ellsworth AFB SD
509 BW, Whiteman AFB MO

NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL AWARD OF MERIT

The second highest NSC award presented to the following organization with a perfect record or a reduction of at least 5% in the ground mishap rate; a composite rate better than the AF composite rate for the fiscal year; and zero on-duty ground mishap fatalities:

4 WG, Seymour Johnson AFB NC

NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL AWARD OF COMMENDATION

Presented to the following smaller organization meeting the same criteria for the Award of Merit:

319 BG, Grand Forks AFB ND

NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL PRESIDENT'S AWARD LETTER

Awarded to the following organizations that had a perfect ground mishap record in the fiscal year:

823d Red Horse Squadron, Hurlbut Field FL
Northwest Air Defense Sector, McChord AFB WA
### Class A Mishap Comparison Rate

**(Cumulative rate based on accidents per 100,000 hours flying)**

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* (Hours not available)
Units without a "Command-Controlled" Class A flight mishap since the stand-up of ACC on 1 Jun 92, or their respective assimilation into the command.

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(As of 1 August 1995)
It was the start of a long weekend, and I was just finishing my second cup of coffee while watching the weather report on the television. The weather was going to be unpredictable with rain and thunderstorms forecast for the day. I was very disheartened about the weather report because we were looking forward to a day of boating and fishing.

As my wife finished breakfast, we discussed going anyway and taking a chance on the weather. However, being the “safety conscious” person that I am, I decided it was too risky. The next question that came to mind was “What am I going to do for the rest of the day?” Never fails, the next thing I heard was the question that strikes terror in the heart of many homeowner, “Honey, why don’t you clean out the garage?” This from my sweet, loving spouse. How could she? I thought to myself, this is a holiday and I’m not about to tackle that garage today. I know! I need more work space in the workshop, so I’ll work on that. Besides, it shouldn’t take that long and, if the weather improves, I can still go fishing.

I finished breakfast and headed for the workshop. My workshop is a combination minor repair area and storage area for things I may need someday, like in the year 2005. I just don’t have the heart to throw the stuff away. I have grown attached to most of the things I have there.

First order of business was to get everything off the work bench and re-arrange the storage area to acquire more working space. Everything was moving along in fine fashion until I decided I needed a fan from the overhead storage area to cool off from the heat. The overhead storage area is approximately 7-8 feet above the floor. Being 6 feet in height I figured I could reach the fan without any problem. I reached up and took hold of the fan. As I pulled it towards me, I felt it bind on something. I gave it a slight jerk (more force will solve everything) to free it and everything broke loose. While I was trying to hold on to the fan, a small piece of 2x4 missed my head by mere inches. Still holding onto the fan to keep it from falling on me, I looked up just in time to see a piece of angle iron falling directly at me. It was as if everything was happening in slow motion, but I still couldn’t avoid the impending collision. The corner of the angle iron hit me just to the left of my right eyebrow knocking my glasses off. I immediately pushed hard on the fan to put it back into the storage area and grabbed for my eye. The pain was instantaneous. When I looked down for my glasses, everything turned red. Blood was everywhere. I picked up my glasses and headed for the house.

To make matters worse, when I opened the door to the house my dog Skip went wild barking and running in circles. I guess he realized that something wasn’t quite right and wanted to help. Instead, he got in the way and I tripped over him as I went through the door. This commotion brought my wife into the kitchen to see what on earth was going on. Seeing the blood she immediately went for a wet rag and the first aid kit. After cleaning the wound we realized it wasn’t as bad as it could have been. She cleaned and dressed the cut which turned out to be about a quarter of an inch in length just off the right eyebrow. A knot the size of a hen’s egg had already developed.

As I sat contemplating what I had done, I wondered how I was going to explain this at work. I not only had a cut but a beautiful black eye to go along with it. No way to cover it up. Yes, you guessed it my fellow workers are not going to let me live this down for awhile. Yes, I should have done a risk assessment and used a step ladder to gain access to the area. Yes, I should have ensured the fan was clear before I tried to move it or I should have placed it on a lower shelf to start with. Yes, some of my excess junk is now out of there.
THAT TUEY FEQGIT ALL THAT GOING AROUND THEM.

YOU READ ABOUT JOCKS WHO GET SO WRAPPED UP IN TH' PEACEFULNESS OF TH' MOMENT...

NOW IN MY CASE, I KNOW THAT BIG TANKER IS CLOSING IN...

BUT MY MANY YEARS AS A JOCK AND STEEL LIKE NERVES AIN'T GONNA LET ME GET IN TROUBLE.

FLEAGLE BEEN CRUISING TH' PEACEFUL SKY AGAIN?

YEAH, AND COUNTING ON THEM STEEL NERVES OF HIS TO KEEP HIM OUT OF TROUBLE.
While performing as a ground-man and fire guard during a maintenance engine run on an F-16, Staff Sergeant Rex Kaneshiro and Senior Airman Tom Summers noticed an excessive glow coming from the jet fuel starter (JFS) exhaust area during engine start. Further investigation revealed a fire emanating from above the JFS in the engine bay. Sergeant Kaneshiro immediately instructed the individual running the aircraft to terminate engine start procedures. Sergeant Kaneshiro then positioned the fire extinguisher while Airman Summers extended the hose. Sergeant Kaneshiro actuated the extinguisher and Airman Summers discharged the agent into the engine bay, extinguishing the fire. Although the aircraft was damaged, both Sergeant Kaneshiro and Airman Summers, quick reactions prevented extensive damage of the aircraft and possible injury or death to maintenance personnel.

SSgt Rex Y. Kaneshiro
SrA Thomas S. Summers
34 FS, 388 FW
Hill AFB UT

While operating out of RAF Fairford, England, in support of the joint exercise STRONG RESOLVE, the “heads-up” actions of three security police from the 2d Bomb Wing averted a potential major aircraft mishap. Adverse weather conditions with winds exceeding 55 knots caused an unmanned C-5 aircraft to jump its chocks and begin moving across the ramp. MSgt Dave Stoner, a 2d Security Police Team Chief, and Team Members, SSgt Lorenzer Brown and Amn Tasha Hooks immediately notified the command post and responded to the aircraft. The aircraft had already traveled over 100 feet across the crowded ramp and was headed directly towards a soft grassy area. Recognizing immediate action was necessary to prevent the C-5 from being blown off the pavement, the security police team rechocked the moving aircraft, halting its forward movement. Once stopped and chocked, they performed a visual exterior inspection for damage and monitored the aircraft until the aircrew arrived and took charge of the operation. Their quick, coordinated assessment and decisive actions were instrumental in preventing damage to the C-5 if it would have become mired in the soft soil with a subsequent impact to the operational tempo of the joint exercise. The manner that Sergeants Stoner and Brown and Airman Hooks accomplished this exceptional team work exemplifies the measure of true professionals and reflects credit upon themselves and the United States Air Force.
Between 2100 on 12 Mar 95 and 0830 on 13 Mar 95, King Abdul Aziz Air Base was subjected to heavy rainstorms, torrential downpours, hail, and high winds which caused extensive flooding and damage to equipment. This was the greatest rainfall in a 24-hour period ever recorded in the region. Despite flood preparation, main water drains and sandbags were unable to contain the downpour. The storm shut down primary power, stalled vehicles, took out telephone lines, flooded buildings, and spread debris throughout the base. Over 2.8 million gallons of water filled the JP-8 fuel servicing area causing the fuel bladders to float inside their berms. More than 150 people from the civil engineer squadron worked 24 hours straight during the height of the storm to pump the water out, saving almost 500,000 gallons of valuable fuel. Another group of volunteers started rebuilding the berms surrounding the servicing area, saving civil engineers over 100 man-hours of work. The electric shop made repairs and adjustments to 57 generators and secondary distribution panels during and immediately following the storm to ensure minimum disruptions. In effect, the work force practically tripled to meet the demand of pumping water from garages and low-lying areas to bring power back on line. The post office was under almost 3 feet of water and it took almost 2 days to clean up the facility. More than 200,000 gallons of water were pumped from the facility at a rate of 500 gallons per minute. Many packages were soaked; however, volunteers removed bundles of letters keeping them out of harms way. Another area widely hit was the 4404th Services Squadron, losing more than $200,000 in supplies. Volunteers helped save more than $15,000 in subsistence. Immediately following the storm, extensive debris created a serious foreign object damage potential. Only one runway remained open and four F-15 airplanes were towed from their normal parking area and placed on alert status using a modified taxi route cleared by sweeper equipment. The munitions storage area was submerged under a foot of water; however, there was no permanent damage to any munitions assets. Many volunteer work groups consisting of squadron first sergeants, members from the flying squadrons, supply squadron, mission support squadron, communications squadron, and safety personnel worked shifts to fill over 5,400 sandbags, move mail, and clean out damaged areas, ultimately preventing further losses. While the wing sustained some damage to infrastructure and supplies, the quick action of the entire wing prevented major losses to buildings, equipment, and personnel. The teamwork exhibited by everyone pulling together ensured the wing remained combat ready and able to perform the mission.

4404th Wing (P)
If there's one subject that is guaranteed to cause managers to lose sleep, it's the issue of nuclear certification. There is no other subject I know of, other than possibly the Personnel Reliability Program, which can cause individuals so much stress. I recently sat back and watched two highly reasonable people go "toe to toe" and engage in an unending shouting match (without, in my opinion, producing a clear winner) on this issue. The reason for this heated debate was a misunderstanding of the Nuclear Certification Program by one of the individuals involved. They did not understand what the nuclear certification program is or what the basic requirements for nuclear certification are. This was not an isolated occurrence. For some unknown reason, even individuals with many years of nuclear experience still, at times, have trouble understanding this important program. Along with a basic description of the program and a quick review of some of the design program requirements, we need to look at what is a modification and what is not a modification of a nuclear certified piece of equipment.

The Air Force Nuclear Safety Certification Program evaluates hardware, software, and procedures against specific nuclear safety criteria before they can be used with nuclear weapons. The program's goal is to prevent nuclear mishaps and incidents by ensuring these items are properly evaluated. HQ AFSA/SEWA manages the Nuclear Certification Program for the Air Force; and as part of its management duties, they certify hardware, software, and procedures to be used with nuclear weapons. They also ensure all certified items and all applicable restrictions on usage are listed in Technical Order 00-110N-16, Equipment and Software Authorized for Use With Nuclear Weapons. To maintain the integrity of these items, AFSA/SEWA ensures nuclear tasked units report deficiencies on certified items according to procedures in Air Force Instruction 91-204, Investigating and Reporting US Air Force Mishaps. These deficiency reports are instrumental in bringing actual or potential problems with equipment or software to the attention of item managers who can either evaluate the discrepancy and correct the situation or, if the discrepancy is serious enough, restrict the item from use with nuclear weapons. They are also the responsible agency for the decertification of hardware and software and getting this information to the field.

Nuclear certification is defined as those actions which must be accomplished in order to achieve a nuclear weapon system operational capability. All these actions should be listed in the Nuclear Certification Plan (NCP) prepared by the engineering MAJCOM. The NCP defines the approach for obtaining nuclear safety design certification of hardware and software items through proper planning. Nuclear certification encompasses the broad areas of: compatibility, nuclear safety, and support equipment evaluation.

Compatibility ensures the weapons will function safely and properly with the aircraft. Evidence of aircraft and nuclear weapon compatibility is contained in two documents, the Major Assembly Release (MAR) and the Aircraft Compatibility Control Drawing. These documents list which weapons are compatible with the aircraft and any restrictions to their use. Compatibility can be further broken down into two elements, mechanical and electrical.

Mechanical compatibility ensures the weapons can be loaded on the aircraft, the weapons will survive the flight environment, and the weapons can survive ejection shock and aerodynamically separate properly from the aircraft. Electrical compatibility ensures the aircraft is designed and functions in accordance with Aircraft Monitoring and
Control (AMAC) Program documents. Also, electrical compatibility ensures the weapons can operate in the electromagnetic environments imposed by the aircraft. To comply with the Department of Defense (DOD) safety standards, the Air Force has implemented a set of minimum design and evaluation criteria for their nuclear weapon systems.

One of the major considerations when a Air Force nuclear weapons system is designed is nuclear safety. The objective of the nuclear safety program is to achieve maximum safety consistent with operational requirements. As a minimum, nuclear weapons systems must be designed and operated in a manner that meets the four Nuclear Weapons System Safety Standards in DOD Directive 3150.2. Nuclear safety design and the development of the Weapon System Safety Rules for any nuclear weapon system must support the standards of DOD Directive 3150.2.

The introduction of Nuclear Safety Design Philosophy for a weapon system begins early in the planning phase and continues throughout the weapon system life cycle including weapon system modifications. The design concepts of exclusion regions, strong links, and weak links are used to ensure nuclear weapons' safety devices are able to withstand credible abnormal environments for a longer time than the weapon's critical arming components or until the weapon is physically incapable of providing a nuclear detonation. Another component of the nuclear safety program is the development of the Weapon System Safety Rules.

Weapon System Safety Rules are required to provide the procedural and operational safeguards necessary to ensure maximum safety consistent with operational requirements during all operations with nuclear weapons. This process is accomplished through AFI 91-102, Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies, Operational Safety Reviews and Safety Rules, which produces weapon system safety rules published in an aircraft-unique Air Force Instruction. This AFI constitutes a USAF "license to operate" the airplane as a nuclear weapons system. The Nuclear Weapon System Safety Group (NWSSG) is responsible for drafting and forwarding the rules to HQ USAF. Following coordination with the Department of Energy and Defense Nuclear Agency, the rules are approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

For weapon system modifications, the engineering MAJCOM prepares the Nuclear Surety Impact Statement (NSIS). The NSIS provides the functional description of the modification and an evaluation of nuclear surety impact. The NSIS addresses the hardware or software items that require certification and recommend a certification approach for verifying compliance with AFI 91-107 and AFMAN 91-118. Modifications fall into one of the following categories. The modification has no potential for adverse nuclear surety impact and does not require certification or approval by AFSA/SEWA. If the modification has the potential to adversely impact nuclear surety, HQ AFSA/SEWA must evaluate and approve these modifications. Often this involves a limited number of hardware or software items and these modifications must comply with AFI 91-107 directed criteria. If the modification meets all the requirements, HQ AFSA/SEWA completes the modification approval process by sending out a message or listing the modified item in Technical Order 00-110N-16. New restrictions could apply to the modified equipment and are listed for items to compensate for design deficiencies or significant operational hazards.

So, next time someone tries to draw you into a long, drawn out discussion about the Nuclear Certification Program or what to do to modify a piece of nuclear certified equipment — don't argue and shout. The answer can be as simple as notifying AFSA/SEWA on what you intend to do or it can require a methodical and deliberate evaluation involving a NSIS or NCP. You need to remember the Air Force has a nuclear certification program and that the program is managed by AFSA/SEWA with the guidance located in AFI's 91-102, 91-107 and AFMAN 91-118. If you meet all the certification program requirements, the Nuclear Safety Program will stay strong and you will not adversely impact your operations.
The Leadership Culture Workshop has been in existence over 2 years and has been conducted for more than 60 organizations. Our dual cornerstones of invitation by the unit commander and confidentiality of the results to the unit remain in place. We do not go where we are not invited, and all results are reported internally to the unit with no outside release. The unit has complete control over the results and is free to act or not act as they deem appropriate. We approach each organization as a stand alone entity without the comparative influences normally present in inspection activities. This produces a very pure result which has great credibility. The experience gained through the first 20 or so workshops early in the process led to the development of our foundation statement, "An effective safety program must exist on a foundation of trust, integrity, and leadership created and sustained by effective communication." If you don't have that, nothing else you do will make much difference. The unit is vulnerable for an incident or mishap to the extent these are deficient. All the QA's, Stan Eval's, and inspections based on compliance criteria will not identify or correct deficiencies in the foundation. The Leadership Culture Workshop identifies and points to alteration of culture issues as opposed to compliance. Our goal is to transform safety from compliance to culture based on integrity, trust, leadership, and effective communication. Our experience has shown that while the issues manifest themselves differently in each workshop and organization, they can always be placed in one or more of the foundation pieces. Each workshop exists as an invention created on the spot as the team meshes into conversation with the unit. A workshop starts when the invitation is issued and ends when the team chief departs. Each unit's uniqueness is manifested by the different ways the same issues are expressed or displayed. Through all the visits there are some common threads which are worth examining. Those units with high levels of trust, integrity, leadership, and communication shared some common actions which we might use as a blueprint for a healthy culture.

COMMUNICATE WITH STRAIGHT TALK.
A process for continuous improvement of communication throughout the organization is in place including up, down, and lateral. The process is formalized and includes measurement to assure real
Workshop. This month we are privileged to have Colonel Al Groben, who has conducted over 60 Leadership Culture Workshops, share his observations on what makes some units better than others in building a safety culture.

- Ed.

progress. It is not adequate to think there is improvement — if the improvement can't be documented, it probably doesn't exist. Communication processes are free of the influences of rank, and special care is taken to assure a continuous flow of accurate information. To test this for yourself, ask this simple question in such a manner that there is freedom to answer. “Do I allow you the freedom to speak your mind?” The actual measure of listening is that something actually alters or changes as a result of the communication.

**HIRE THE RIGHT PEOPLE.**

There is a systematic process for identifying criteria and selecting people based on that criteria. This includes a rigorous examination of the qualities and skills needed to perform the job. People are selected based on the foundation criteria for the job and on the basis of who they are, not on the basis of who they know or who likes them. What they know and their experience are secondary to a foundation expression of trust, integrity, leadership, and the ability to communicate effectively. The interview process is structured to examine these qualities and the choice is made in accordance with those results. The results are not ignored to choose buddies or friends. Selections are not made on the basis of potential but rather on demonstrated performance.

**PROVIDE STRAIGHT TALK FEEDBACK.**

Personnel at all levels conduct regular straight talk performance feedback for each individual communicated fully, freely, and on a timely basis. No person in the system is exempt from this process, especially the leadership. The absence of regulation or prescribed format does not constitute permission to ignore this. Each individual has a documented straight talk history such that any person could review the file and receive an accurate picture. Responsibility for this function is shared by both parties equally. Meaningful action is taken to correct performance deficiencies, and the process is used to assist people in becoming responsible and accountable for their actions and behaviors.

**MENTOR LEADERS.**

There is a formal process to develop mentors, mentoring, and a leadership cadre both for the unit and for the system. It is not good enough to select leaders from a list of marginally qualified candidates. The process includes a planned leadership track and performance is measured consistently to identify strong leaders early. The track exists outside of individual considerations and is made available to everyone. Some step up; some don't and actual performance is the primary measurement factor. People who have not demonstrated competence in accomplishing the track are not moved up. Performance issues are handled internally and not exported to become someone else's problem.

**INSTILL RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY.**

Personnel at all levels are responsible and accountable for their actions. Problems and issues are not pushed from person to person or from section to section. Each individual takes responsibility for working/solving the issue. “It's not my job,” “it’s their responsibility,” “it's their fault,” and “it's not my fault” are not spoken. The demonstrated behavior is to communicate as necessary to resolve the issue. When situations develop involving working around poor performers, action is taken to improve their performance to acceptable levels.

**TAKE ACTION TO CORRECT WHAT IS WRONG.**

People are trained to observe consistently and to engage to correct when they see something is not right. Knowing it's broken and fixing it are not the same. Situations requiring corrective action are treated quickly and effectively at all levels and a response of “oh well” is foreign. This applies to physical things as well as performance issues and behavior anomalies. Poor performance, poor work ethics and behavior problems are routinely challenged without regard to rank and/or position.

**MAKE BEST DECISIONS.**

Make decisions on a foundation of:

- What is best to ensure maximum mission readiness?
- What is best for our country?
- What is best for the unit/organization?

Decisions made on the basis of “I” or “ME” are missing.
I'm sure that when H.G. Wells wrote, "We live in reference to past events and not to future events, however inevitable," in Mind at the End of Its Tether, he had more esoteric "inevitable events" in mind than our Air Force way of life—staff tours, deployments, TTDs, and PCS moves. However, his words seem particularly appropriate as I write this—my last ACCent on Safety article. Wells wrote, "Time brings all things to pass." It is time for me to move on to be the vice commander of the 57th Wing at Nellis AFB, Nevada.

As I reflect on the past year, I realize that we didn't live solely in reference to past experiences. We have made some significant strides in the command and laid the foundation for future safety successes. We are currently on track to meet or better all of our safety goals for the fiscal year. We, the safety office, didn't do this—you did. It required hard work, dedication, support, and leadership from everyone in the command. THANK YOU! The past year has been a uniquely rewarding experience in my career. I found safety to be a world of intense highs and lows—the nervous excitement of watching days, weeks, and even months pass without a mishap; and then the reality of the investigation board briefing after a mishap.

One of the most frustrating things about safety is that success is almost impossible to measure, but its failures are hard and cold.

As I turn over the Office of Safety to Col Zak Tomczak, I would ask that you give him the same great support you've given me during my tour. Zak has been the vice commander of the 35th Fighter Wing for the past 2 years and brings a wealth of operational, staff, and safety experience with him. Additionally, he was the Chief of Safety at Nellis, so it won't take anywhere near the time to bring him up to speed as it did me. I'm confident his expertise and leadership will propel the ACC culture of safety to even greater successes.

Safety is most effective when it is an integral part of routine operations—not just a slogan or program. Safety minimizes risk by modifying our actions and behavior until the safe way becomes second nature. We do things the safe way without even thinking about it, and we train our new people to do the same. Leadership, teamwork, involvement, and caring form the foundation of this culture. Each of us must build upon that foundation to make our safety culture the best it can be.

Our culture of safety is real! Folks are actively doing things the safe way because it is the right way to do business. Your safety efforts over the past year, both on and off the job, have been truly remarkable. With dedicated professionals continuously seeking to "make it better," I'm looking forward to your continued success. To each of you—be proud! Work hard, play hard—BE SAFE!

Colonel pack Acker
Chief of Safety