

GENERAL HAL M. HORNBURG, COMMANDER
COLONEL KEVIN W. SMITH, CHIEF OF SAFETY

THE Combat Edge

Photo by SSgt Cherie A. Thurlby

Photo by SrA Michele G. Misiano



Photo by SrA Lakisha Croley

Departments

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Visit us on the web @ www2.acc.af.mil/combat-edge

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M Denotes images digitally manipulated.

Front Cover: *TSgt Jim Varhegyi*

ACCent on Safety

SPEEDING JUST A LITTLE IS OKAY

I often hear from ACC members that speeding a little doesn't hurt anyone. Unfortunately, it is that incorrect perception that leads to getting so many of our ACC men and women killed. When we complete our safety mishap investigations I think we will find all of the 22 individuals involved in motor vehicle deaths this year were speeding. Some were driving at obscenely fast speeds and the others were just driving too fast for the conditions and were not able to control their vehicles.

Many ACC members nonchalantly travel at 5 or 10 mph over the speed limit without giving much thought to it. People speed the moment they leave the base gate. I ask you just how much over the speed limit is okay. Is 10 mph, 25 mph, or perhaps 50 mph okay? The answer should be zero because it is breaking the law! Don't speeders immediately slow down when they see a law enforcement officer? They know it's wrong! Speeding and other violations of our traffic laws and civil standards are purely breakdowns in individual conduct and behavior. Society expects those of us entrusted with defending the country to be trustworthy at all times and follow all our laws. If conduct and behavior isn't consistent 24/7, on and off base, are we really trustworthy?

On the flight line, in munitions build-up areas, and in the air, we demand discipline. We should demand the same level of discipline of ourselves when driving. Be professional in everything you do and remember that integrity is doing the right thing even when others are not watching. Don't allow yourself to cavalierly slip into inappropriate civil behavior just because others are doing it. Speeding is breaking the law, and if you speed you compromise your safety and the safety of others.

Colonel Kevin W. Smith
ACC Chief of Safety

Photo by SSgt Christopher Mathews

Photos by TSgt Mike Buytas, graphic composite by SSgt Carrie Atwood

Red Flag Lessons

By Maj Jim Roy, Langley AFB, Va.

AIRCREWS GAIN VALUABLE EXPERIENCE

The Red Flag Exercise should have been a great memory. Flying an F-16CG with and against world-class pilots on world-class ranges in a very challenging scenario were all Red Flag standards. But this time, launching with me as part of the Blue Forces SEAD would be my brother-in-law, Mike, in an F-16CJ. Unfortunately, it turned out to be a Red Flag that I'll never forget, even though I've tried.

On my final mission of the Flag, a single Aggressor managed to leak through our Marine F-18 escort. When it became clear that the Aggressor was also slipping past the CJs, the next line of counter air defense, Mike turned his element toward the threat. Then due to some breakdowns in situational awareness and communications, Blue GCI responded "hostile" to a declaration request by one of the members of my four-ship.

Had I been on top of my game, I could have sorted out that the position call for the hostile declaration was actually Mike's flight had turned hot and tried to stop my wingman from shooting. But I didn't. Mike was "dead." Talk about fratricide. Imagine if the shots taken had been real, and me having to explain to my sister and her kids about what happened on that day. But this mission wasn't the only one that I remember from that Red Flag.

During the first week, I was given the opportunity on one sortie to drop live LGBs for the first time in my career. But due to multiple air-to-ground threat reactions prior to the Initial Point (IP) and then an air-to-air threat reaction over the target area, we were forced to go to our backup Time On Target (TOT). Then as a result of a switch error, I went through dry on the re-attack. By then, because our target was in the far northwest corner of the Nellis ranges near Tonapah, we were out of gas and had to return to base. Bringing live bombs back to base and landing out of a straight-in is not a story worth telling at the club. Explaining to a disappointed ...

Photo by MSgt Dave Ahlschwede

crew chief about why you didn't put bombs-on-target is not much fun either. But even this mission wasn't the most memorable of that Red Flag. A couple days later, we were given another chance to drop live — this time we had general purpose bombs from a low altitude attack. I had years of experience in basic bomb dropping, so I felt confident about the mission and was determined to not bring my bombs back for a straight-in again. And I didn't, but as it turned out this wasn't something to be very proud of.

On this mission we were to follow a four-ship of Portuguese F-16s on the southern ingress route, bend south to terrain mask behind Kawich, and then turn west for the attack on a row of vehicles. The Portuguese were supposed to follow a route south of our IP run, but due to air-to-air threat reactions, all of us went off the black line near the Farms. We lost track of the Portuguese until we turned south near Kawich, when we spotted some very low altitude F-16s crossing our flight path about 5 miles behind us. "Who is that?" I wondered (something often thought at Red Flag), and I decided to push it up (another common choice over the Nevada desert). But the Portuguese didn't go away.

When they flew off the black line, the Portuguese could no longer get back on course and make their backup TOT. So, instead, they decided to cut the corner and fly direct to their target. Bad decision. They had not done sufficient flight planning and/or briefing to realize that taking this shortcut would put them directly over my flight's live target area right in the middle of our backup TOT window. Fortunately my #3 was on top of his game that day and when my element popped for the attack, he

spotted the extra F-16s headed for the target and called for a terminate. So we went through dry and headed back to the IP for a re-attack. But as a result of another air-to-air threat reaction, we were now past our final TOT window.

I grumbled to myself, "another miss to report to all of our buddies in the de-brief." At least we had a plan for how to get rid of our bombs. And we had just enough gas left to make it happen. The dump target game plan was to move west of the target area and hold until the "war" was over. Then with clearance from range control we would do a hot pass on our target from the west, rather than from the east as originally planned. So that's what we did, at least that's what the other three members of my flight did.

My problem was that we had thoroughly studied and briefed the attack from the east, but not the west. The visual references I'd practically memorized were no longer of any use. And so when I popped on the green stuff for the dump attack, I misidentified the row of vehicles and rolled in on some others that were about a half a mile west of our planned target. This put me inside the Minimum Attack Perimeter (MAP) and steep in my delivery. Not realizing my mistake, I tried to compensate by pulling the pipper up to the target and pickling. As it turned out, I was only slightly steep and slightly below minimum altitude, but still it was a gross error for lots of reasons. Fortunately for me and for anyone on the ground, it was not a fatal one.

So what went wrong on this Red Flag. Lots of things, many of which were out of my control. Still, I was really bummed out by all the problems, especially about the mistakes I had made. I was fortunate that nothing worse happened and that I could take home with me the following lessons learned:

Expect unpredictable stuff to happen. It almost always does, so why not plan for it as much as possible and be mentally prepared and not frustrated when it does.

Being experienced doesn't necessarily mean you are as proficient as you wish. In my case, I had recently requalified in the jet and upgraded to flight lead after years behind a desk. Lots of experience means very little if you have been out of the jet for a while.

Don't let pride cloud your thinking. Bringing back my bombs for a second time would have been better than potentially fragging myself like I did.

Flight leaders must never lose track of their priorities and never drop their guard. When my wingman and I returned to base with our live bombs, it was to a very non-standard straight-in recovery to the north at Nellis due to the winds. Number 2 was low on fuel, so I sent him in first. The radios were chaos — Red Flag standard. His brain was scrambled. I could imagine, because my head was spinning, too. When he failed to call gear down on short final, I looked forward to see that he still hadn't put his gear down yet. A quick call on the VHF radio sorted this out and earned a big thanks from #2 on the ground. I guess not all the memories were bad from that Red Flag from hell.

And finally, **Don't shoot your sister's husband even if it's not on purpose.**


Photo by SSgt Cherie A. Thurlby


Photo by MSgt Thomas Meneguin


Photo by MSgt Bill Kimble

Being experienced doesn't necessarily mean you are proficient ...

loud bangs are not a good thing!

By Capt Todd Kalish, Beale AFB, Calif.

Loud Bangs are not a good Thing!

By Capt Todd Kalish, Beale AFB, Calif.



Photo by Maj Jeff Olesen

It was a hot June day as I donned my pressure suit for a local, high-altitude sortie above California. As the life support crew strapped me in the cockpit, I checked to see where all the switches were in this airplane. No two U-2s on the ramp are identical. They were built one at a time, and they all have their own unique personalities and quirks. Perhaps more importantly, they tend to make odd noises at inconvenient times. Even with almost 500 hours in the jet, I am still surprised by the noises.

Pressure suits are also a unique environment. Wearing it is demanding, both physically and mentally, so many of the normal tasks a pilot does are delegated to others. When you're going on a high flight, another U-2 pilot will preflight the airplane and do the pre-start checklist. All the pilot has to do is turn on the boost pumps and start the engine. There is no hydraulic assist on any of the flight controls, so everything the pilot does is by muscle power. Add warm temperatures and a pressure suit to the equation, and you have a sweat-soaked, dehydrated pilot sitting in the cockpit at the hold short.

As the ground crew buttoned up the airplane, they took the cooling air off of the Inertial Navigation Unit (INU) and closed all the hatches. Since every ounce of weight on the U-2 matters, there is no additional cooling unit on the airplane. The INU is very susceptible to overheating. Once the engine is started, the pilot has to help by selecting full-manual cold with the cockpit temperature and by keeping the power up for cooling. Even so, it is still a race against time before the unit overheats and shuts down. Since the day was quite hot, I did just as I was supposed to do and selected full-manual cold ...

The U-2 takes a lot of manual effort just to move it on the ground. The tail wheel turns only 6 degrees, which equates to a 189-foot-turn radius with no wind. You have to take winds and flight-control positions into account to successfully turn. I quickly taxied to the runway and ran my pre-takeoff checklist, while the ground crew did their last checks. Two important items in the checklist came into play. First, the checklist says to make sure your suit controller, which allows cooling air into the suit, is open only one notch. This does not allow for much air into the suit, but at full power, any more than that will inflate you like the Michelin Man, making control of the aircraft a problem. I checked the controller. The other important item is to make sure the temperature control is in auto to prevent the cockpit from filling with fog. Since I had selected full-manual cold for the taxi out, I reached over and gave the knob two clicks to auto. With everything set and a thumbs up from my supervisor of flying, I ran the aircraft up and headed down the runway. I parked about 32 degrees nose high for the climbout.

Passing 1,000 feet, I heard the cockpit air surging. But hey, there were a lot of strange noises in this airplane. This one just groaned a bit. But as I continued to climb, I noticed it was getting intolerably hot. Having direct sunlight on you while in the pressure suit is like wearing two or three sets of chemical gear and laying out in the sun. Even so, it shouldn't have been this hot. I glanced down at my cockpit temperature and saw it was pegged at 120 degrees, as high as the gauge would go. It turns out the two clicks I turned the temperature knob sent it from full cold, right past auto, to full hot. "Good job, knucklehead," I thought as I reset it. Passing 10,000 feet, I finally adjusted my suit-cooling knob for more air into the suit. The cabin temperature still was pegged at 120 degrees. Sweat soaked the inside of my suit.

I set the autopilot, passing 40,000 feet. I took my hands off and made sure everything was OK before I reached down for my mission board. As I reached down, I heard a loud bang and saw the yoke jump forward and then back. The airplane now had my undivided attention again as I pickled off the autopilot and began to hand-fly the airplane once again.

Something had hit me, I thought as I grabbed the controls. A bird? No, I was too high for that. Another airplane? No, I probably was too high for that as well. I decided to turn around and head for home. But before I started descending, I tried to figure out what the bang could have been. Maybe a hydraulic line had broken loose and had hit the side of the airplane. I glanced down at the hydraulic gauge, and it was pegged at 3,000 psi, right where it should have been. A minute or so had passed since I first heard the bang, and my pulse rate started to slow once again. My departure took me several miles south before turning me back to the north on my route, so I still was only 50 miles away from Beale AFB. Now that I had climbed through 48,000 feet, I had plenty of altitude to glide back if I needed to.

I decided to see if the autopilot would re-engage. This would free my hands to run checklists and to find the problem. The autopilot is temperamental — it refuses your offer to fly the airplane with loud horns if anything is wrong with the system. I reached down and flipped the switch, and, to my amazement, the autopilot engaged without a peep. I thought that was odd. I was sure that whatever had caused the bang would have made the autopilot quit working.

Maybe I had a loose panel under the airplane, and it was hung open. The U-2 has viewsight, which is like a reverse periscope, to see directly under the aircraft. You can move it up to see the bottom of the aircraft and the wings. Looking through the viewsight, I looked over every bit of the airplane but saw nothing unusual. I used the mirrors in and around the cockpit but saw nothing unusual there either.

Several minutes had passed, and I had found nothing wrong with the airplane. I pickled off the autopilot again, made a couple of turns, and the airplane performed perfectly. "If I go back now," I thought, "the ground crew will find nothing and write it off to another pilot who heard gremlins."

This is the point where a hot, dehydrated pilot in a pressure suit starts making bad decisions. Even though I knew better, I started second-guessing myself. I thought, maybe I didn't hear that loud of a bang. Maybe it was just one of those U-2 noises that caught me by surprise. The airplane is fine, it's probably nothing. Besides, I'm going to turn south in a few minutes and be close to the base before I head away, so I'll just wait and see what happens.

Fortunately for me, nothing did happen. The flight controls felt significantly lighter in pitch than I



I glanced down at my cockpit temperature and saw that it was pegged at 120 degree ... as high as the gauge would go.



Photo by Maj Jeff Olesen
graphic illustration by SSgt Carrie Atwood

was used to as I hand-flew the airplane down from altitude. I once again dismissed this because I knew the airplane had just been modified with some light servos. I didn't realize the pitch wasn't supposed to be that light.

When I unstrapped and climbed down the ladder onto the ramp, the crew chief asked me if I had a bird strike. I told him no but suggested he show me why he was asking. When we went to the back of the airplane, I could see the left horizontal stab had delaminated over about two-thirds of the surface on the trailing edge. What was once a strong composite material now had the consistency of cardboard. It was a very impressive sight to see, especially considering I had flown with it.

The two sections of the composite material separated with enough force to tear rivets apart and rip the composite material itself. Only four bolts hold together the aft section of the U-2. Had that stab departed the airplane or started some violent flutter at altitude, I would have gotten to test the ejection seat for my ride home. I wouldn't have particularly cared for a 13-mile free fall.

There were many lessons learned on this flight. First, I thought I was almost impervious to hot-weather ops. I've generally never been bothered by hot-weather ops before. But spending an hour in a pressure suit in late June with temps in the 90s before takeoff will wear on anyone. Also, I have enough experience in this airplane to know a U-2 noise from something that isn't. I talked myself out of doing what I knew was right, which was to come home. From now on, I will pay more attention to keeping myself hydrated and cool before a flight and doing what I know is right.

Editor's Note: Capt Kalish is a former Marine Hornet pilot and now is in the Air Force flying the U-2 with the 99th Reconnaissance Squadron. Reprint Courtesy of *APPROACH*, Jan 2002

The Two-Headed Foe

Mr. Murphy & Ms. Complacency

TSgt Raymundo Morales, Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz.

Photo by SMSgt Edward E. Snyder

Supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was an all-out effort that paid off in an early victory. Despite the fact Baghdad has fallen, it's important to remind ourselves the war is not quite over, not in Iraq and certainly not at many deployed locations. Saddam's regime was one enemy, but there are other enemies close by that can sneak up on us without warning. The first enemy is the mother of all accidents. Her name is **Complacency**, and when she drops in, you can rest assured that her best friend, **Mr. Murphy**, is lurking around the corner. This was true for me when I first arrived in the desert.

There I was at a bare base somewhere in the Middle East. When I arrived, personnel and equipment were already in place, but as I looked around it appeared as if everyone and everything had just fallen out of the sky, landed, and never been moved. As I examined the locations of personnel, equipment, and munitions, I discovered numerous weapons safety violations. Munitions were too close to the tent city, too close to unrelated facilities, too close to personnel, and too close to the aircraft. As I looked at all the violations I asked, why did I get picked to come to this place? Especially when I knew there are so many other places with fewer corrections to be made. I had to ask myself, was I ready for this? Did I have the experience to handle such an enormous job? All my questions would soon be answered.

Shortly after I got off the DC-10 and picked out a little corner of the 12-man tent to call home for an undetermined amount of time, the safety team hit the ground running. We showed up to our new office, but there was no one there who could tell us what was going on. After calling CENTAF, we finally had somewhat of a starting point. The first thing we were told was that all jobs are critical to the mission. However, with the pace of the mission being rush here, and rush there, no one had the faintest idea of how many safety dangers were lurking at every corner. Complacency and Mr. Murphy had moved in and now

called the place home. And so it began.

One of the first things we looked for was the ASHS II program. It was missing in action and nowhere to be found. We also realized that none of the facilities had explosive site plans completed on them. We discovered that the people did not consider them important because this temporary base would only exist for the duration of the war. Despite that, we knew we had a lot of work to do to keep Complacency and Mr. Murphy at bay.

Walking through dirt and fighting the wind and dust every step of the way, we pushed our old faithful friend the measuring wheel to develop a site plan. Time after time we discovered we were short — things that went BOOM and things that didn't were just too close ... How could this be? We did not meet the distance between our holding yard and non-related facilities, worse than that we did not meet the distance to related facilities either. How do we tell the wing commander that he is sitting on top of one of the biggest safety violations known to man?

Another violation we noticed when we drove around the flight line was that there were too many munitions. You could see GBU-12s, JDAMS, and missiles absolutely everywhere. I must admit, I worried every day that something catastrophic would happen on my watch. After an ORM assessment, we were able to convince the leadership that we were putting too many personnel at risk. There was just too much Net Explosive Weight (NEW) in one place. The leadership agreed. Loaded munitions trailers began making their way back to the bomb dump. A safety win!

When Baghdad fell, and victory was in sight, the anticipation of going home was definitely building. Complacency and Mr. Murphy were again knocking at our door. Despite the excitement, we had to remind ourselves there was still a job to be done. This job required 100 percent effort from everyone in order to accomplish the mission safely. It would serve no purpose to win the war, but send people home in a metal box, instead of an aircraft seat, because we had become complacent. So with this in mind, we continued to put forth a great effort to be safe.

We had to take care of each other. Supervisors took a look at their people and work areas for ways to improve the safety of all. We also kept an eye on our folks ensuring they didn't take any unnecessary risks. If risks were involved, we used ORM to determine the right path to take. Time was on our side and rushing a job was no longer an excuse. Everyone was tired, and Complacency was eager to set in.

Now we had to ensure that we beat Complacency and Mr. Murphy the same way we beat Saddam himself. We ensured all tech data was adhered to. We made sure all explosives on trailers were properly secured. With safety in mind we continued to work professionally knowing so much was waiting for us at home, our families and our friends. None of us wanted to explain to families back home that their loved one was not coming home alive, because they had decided to befriend the enemy, Complacency and Mr. Murphy. So I ask you all to remember, in a war, there is always more than one enemy and they all can kill you. Be aware and be safe!


Photo by SSgt Jessica Kochman


Photo by SSgt Cherie A. Thurlby


Photo by SrA Joann S. Makinano

Extreme sports involve the greater risks of death and injury. Often the best risk control measure is not to participate. However, for those who pursue the adrenalin rush, you can help mitigate the risk by using extreme equipment to gain a margin of safety.

Engineers control risk by designing equipment with a margin of safety. For example, if a hoist is nuclear certified to lift 1,000 lb, it must be able to handle a 3,000-lb. design load. The 2,000-lb margin gives the equipment and operator room to maneuver and ensures a safe lift over time.

The same principle applies to extreme sports. Whether you're jumping from perfectly good airplanes or racing cars, you need extreme equipment to give you an added margin of safety to control your risk.

"Several people had already died trying to climb the hill ..."

The fatality discussed in this story involved a member who enjoyed the extreme sport of off-road 4-wheeling in his purpose-built Jeep. The story ended in tragedy, in part because the member did not leave himself enough of a safety margin to absorb the unexpected.

On a Friday last summer, the member left work with his supervisor to grab a tow bar so that he and a friend could tow his Jeep south to the beautiful Blanca Peak area near Alamosa, Colorado. They met other friends and camped under the stars that night anticipating a weekend of off-road fun with their 4-wheeling club. The member was known for his jeeping skills and instructed other enthusiasts. That Saturday there were three Jeeps in a convoy working their way up Lake Como Road in Alamosa County. The member had not used his particular Jeep in over 2 years and was excited to see how his new "Ox Lockers" would perform. The positive traction devices would get their test this weekend on some of the most challenging trails in the area.

At or about 3:00 p.m., the member was making his fourth attempt over a very challenging rock obstacle with a steep grade below it known as "Jaws 2." According to the Colorado State Police, *"several people have lost their lives trying to climb the area."* The member had been foiled during his first three attempts and even had to straighten his tie-rod after bending it in an earlier attempt.

According to witnesses, the member then decided to attack the Class V (most difficult) challenge on the "high side." The police report states, *"He got too close to the right side of 'Jaws 2'."* The Jeep started to tip backward and he gave it more gas which caused it to flip over. The Jeep then started rolling and flipping down off the left side of the trail. It rolled and flipped for 190 feet before it crossed over the trail again and headed another 40 feet down an embankment. The Jeep came to rest on its left side against a large tree. The member did have his lap seat belt on and was not thrown from the vehicle. However, he had a severe head injury and died within about 10 minutes of the crash.

The member's roommate heard the tragic news first. The rest of the unit took the news equally hard.

From a safety standpoint, the tragedy could have been avoided if the member had not chosen to attempt the climb. This member, like many others, didn't live life backing down from challenges. Thus, the fatal decision to challenge the trail for a fourth time is not what the rest of this article will focus on.

Instead, the rest of the article is about margin. The member's equipment was legal for off-road 4-wheeling, but *extreme sports require extreme equipment.*

First and foremost, the member died from a head injury due to striking a rock. Had the member been wearing a helmet, he may have survived that impact.

Secondly, the member was only wearing a lap belt. Witnesses described seeing his torso being thrown in and out of the protective roll bar cage. Had he been wearing a 5-point harness, he may have stayed within the protection of the roll cage.

Thirdly, the roll bar itself was factory and gave way being torn loose and bent up and forward of the passenger seat. It's hard to say if a stronger roll bar would have offered enough protection, but an aftermarket roll bar could have definitely been more robust.

Finally, his Jeep had been altered since he'd last used it. The "Ox Locker" positive traction device was cited by one friend as the main cause of the accident. Traction and torque were delivered where the normal slippage of the factory differential was expected. Using essentially new equipment to negotiate an obstacle that had taken life before reduced the member's margin of safety below what he needed to live.

In this sad tale, the decision to attempt the climb itself was disastrous, but the four factors just discussed eroded any margin of safety the member needed to survive. If you attempt extreme sports, don't reduce your margin of safety by using low quality safety gear. It's important to remember that you pay for what you get, and what you get may save your life.

Extreme Sports

By Maj Brad Buxton, Schriever AFB, Colo.



As our readers should know immediately, this individual is jeeping without the proper safety gear. The military member in this story was killed participating in the sport without a five-point harness or a helmet. Had he worn them he would have likely lived.

Nellis AFB, Nev.

Lineage

Established:
57th Fighter Wing on
March 15, 1948

Organized:
April 20, 1948

Redesignated:

- 57th Fighter Interceptor Wing, on January 20, 1950
- 57th Fighter Weapons Wing, on August 22, 1969
- 57th Tactical Training Wing, on April 1, 1977
- 57th Fighter Weapons Wing, on March 1, 1980
- 57th Fighter Wing, on October 1, 1991
- 57th Wing, on June 15, 1993

General Characteristics:

Primary Function: Airborne surveillance reconnaissance and ta
four cylinder engine producing 101 horsepower **Length:** 27 feet
feet **Speed:** Cruise speed around 84 mph, up to 135 mph **Rang**
System Cost: $40 million **Inventory:** Active force, 48; ANG, 0;

Photo of RQ-1 Predator

7th Wing

he Predator

get acquisition **Contractor:** General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorprated **Power Plant:** Rotax 914 **Height:** 6.9 feet **Weight:** 1,130 pounds empty, maximum takeoff weight 2,250 pounds **Wingspan:** 48.7 **e:** up to 400 nautical miles **Ceiling:** up to 25,000 feet **Fuel Capacity:** 665 pounds **Payload:** 450 pounds Reserve, 0

Crew Chief Safety
Award of Distinction

SrA Benjamin Brunkow was de-paneling an F-15C for a hourly post flight one inspection. Having removed panels 110R and 106R, he took it upon himself to do a preliminary inspection of the primary heat exchange (PHE) package. Although the PHE appeared to be intact, he noticed the ram air door actuator under panel 103R looked abnormally low. He proceeded to remove panel 103R, a panel not normally removed for this inspection, using a flashlight and mirror to inspect the actuator more thoroughly. It was then that he discovered the actuator was not installed in its forward mount. He checked out the proper Job Guide for a breakdown of the hardware used to install the actuator and immediately conducted a search for any missing pieces. Each piece was found, which eliminated the need to impound the aircraft saving many man-hours. SrA Brunkow then inspected the airframe and support brackets for any damage that may have resulted from this 3,000 psi actuator shifting around in the bay. When he felt confident the system had no further damage, he installed the actuator in accordance with the proper technical order, had a seven-level inspector assess the repairs, and performed an operational check of the system. Under its previous condition the actuator could not have functioned properly. It was just a matter of time before the actuator would have become wedged and damaged the airframe and/or ruptured the surrounding hydraulic lines causing total utility hydraulic system failure. These are the same hydraulic lines and system that caused fire damage to another 33 FW aircraft recently. The inspection he performed was above and beyond the required -6 work card items. His attention to detail was directly responsible for ensuring a national asset valued in excess of $30 million was capable of continuing its service and prepared to support the 33 FW's mission.

SrA Benjamin Brunkow, 33rd Maintenance Flight, 33rd Fighter Wing, Eglin AFB, Florida

Pilot Safety
Award of Distinction

While preparing to fly an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to Otis ANGB, and approximately 45 minutes into an F-15A training sortie, Capt Halbrook's heading system suddenly failed. He was number two in a 2-mile radar trail formation, at 1,500' MSL, in IMC and on a base leg for an ILS approach. Capt Halbrook immediately selected a backup system, which normally would provide a stable heading to fly an approach. Capt Halbrook continued to follow his flight lead on radar that was now established on the final approach course and as he rolled out his HSI showed full-scale deflection. He quickly rechecked the correct ILS frequency and verified the localizer's ident. At this time the flight lead called for gear and flaps. When Capt Halbrook lowered his gear and flaps, the gear warning tone sounded. His left main was unsafe. Capt Halbrook informed his flight lead and they both executed a go-around. The formation rejoined above the weather in the 8-10k block, and Capt Halbrook assumed the lead to perform the appropriate checklists. It was determined that an approach-end arrestment was required. Unfortunately, there is no approach-end cable to the active runway, and the weather had deteriorated to the point that it was below the non-precision approach minimums to the runway that favored the winds. The only option was to fly the other ILS approach, which gave him a 15-knot tailwind. Capt Halbrook was going to have to fly an ILS approach to 300/1, with a 15-knot tailwind, land within the first 1,000' so as to have the nose gear down before the cable, which is only 1,500' down the runway, with a bad heading system/ILS. So, Capt Halbrook's backup heading system was now starting to drift at a rate of 10 degrees per second and was unusable to fly an approach. Capt Halbrook was now going to have to fly a formation approach to get below the weather. He gave the lead back to his flight lead and they executed a perfect formation approach to minimums, and Capt Halbrook caught the approach-end cable. His quick, expert actions and superior pilot abilities were directly responsible for the safe recovery of a combat asset.

Capt Sean D. Halbrook, 101st Fighter Sqn., 102nd Fighter Wing, Otis ANGB, Massachusetts

Ground Safety

Award of Distinction

TSgt Davidson is my top Non-Commissioned Officer. Ever since being selected as my Squadron Safety Manager, he has raised the bar on safety management and mishap prevention. His sustained superior performance and vision has led to making safety the top focus in his squadron. In a few short months he took the squadron safety program by the horns and revamped it into the most aggressive one in the wing. Some of his work included streamlining and standardizing work center safety programs to create ease of control and management, restructuring the extreme sport process and mishap prevention procedures, and initiating monthly safety meetings with work center safety monitors to disseminate information and training. He also created a pre-departure safety briefing for the entire squadron that ensures everyone arrives at their destination and home safely. He was also active in promoting safety awareness by creating and briefing high impact safety presentations during commander's calls and safety days. His leadership and eagerness to be involved in the squadron safety program resulted in the lowest mishap season ever. He also created a thorough tracking system for all squadron motorcycle riders to receive one-on-one counseling sessions with commanders as directed by major command. His entire safety program received top ratings during a recent wing safety annual assessment. His approach to safety was the driving force behind the squadron Driving Under the Influence Prevention program. With his monthly prevention meetings, initial launch of the squadron DUI poster contest, promotion of the 120 DUI-Free Day incentive, and high impacting DUI prevention skit at commander's call, he has set a benchmark for others to follow and achieved the lowest DUI count for the wing. He volunteered his off-duty time to be the sole driver for the base Airmen Against Drunk Driving program providing 13 airman a safe ride home, an alternative to driving home after drinking. TSgt Davidson is a model NCO and has taken the safety program to the next level. His campaign for safety and driving under the influence prevention will carry us well into the future.

TSgt Scott Davidson, 388th Component Maintenance Sqn., 388th Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, Utah

Flightline Safety

Award of Distinction

TSgt Clark was dispatched to troubleshoot an F-16CG Flight Control System Maintenance Fault with related popped circuit breakers for Jet Fuel Starter Power, Left Control 1, and Left Tach on aircraft 0463. After exhausting all options using the fault isolation technical order troubleshooting trees, TSgt Clark began an extensive search through the applicable wiring harnesses and discovered Flight Control Harness H16DW1702-306 was chafing on a stud mount located on structural beam 16B1265-41 under the left-side gun bay. The chafing was so severe that the wires within the bundle had begun arcing and welding themselves to the beam creating a large crater. Upon further investigation, TSgt Clark noticed a clamp missing and additional damage further along the harness that had been repaired in the past. This missing clamp allowed the wiring harness to move freely causing the chafing and subsequent damage. TSgt Clark's troubleshooting prowess, acute systems knowledge, and unrelenting attention to detail averted the potential loss of a $28 million combat aircraft and a pilot.

TSgt Shane Clark, 388th Aircraft Maintenance Sqn., 388th Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, Utah

ACC Safety Salutes Superior Performance

1Lt David A. Kerns
Chief, Operations Analysis Branch
36th Electronic Warfare Squadron
36th Electronic Warfare Group
53rd Wing
Eglin AFB, Florida

Capt Christopher A. Ridlon
Pilot
27th Fighter Squadron
1st Fighter Wing
Langley AFB, Virginia

Capt Christopher M. Olsen
Pilot
34th Fighter Squadron
388th Fighter Wing
Hill AFB, Utah

Col Joseph Reynes, Jr.
Wing Commander
53rd Wing
Eglin AFB, Florida

"Click It or Ticket."

During FY03 ACC has experienced 24 motor vehicle fatalities. Combined with alcohol and speed, lack of seat belt use is still a major factor in these mishaps. Lack of seat belt use was directly associated with 5 of our 16 four-wheel motor vehicle mishaps. Because seat belt utilization is the key to saving lives, the Air Force is supporting the National Law Enforcement campaign "Click It or Ticket." This campaign emphasizes seat belt utilization nationally to reduce the senseless lives lost in accidents.

Photo by TSgt Jim Verhegyi

Mirror Mirror

By MSgt Duncan C. Munro, Langley AFB, Va.

Tired of being told you will die if you don't use your seat belt? Maybe it's time we focus more on the reality of what happens to those who don't wear their seat belts, survive, and are "treated and released." My pre-military days training as a paramedic taught me quickly that being released often meant those folks were actually leaving to go have major dental or facial reconstruction done.

Let's face it; most of us have not died — yet — so we're unaware of the suffering that will be felt by our family, friends, and coworkers. We have, however, made a trip or two to the dentist. We know all too well the exhilarating sound of a high-speed drill, not being able to feel our lips or jaw, and the trickling of water down our necks — all while trying to answer those dentist's questions with a mouth full of instruments and hands. If you think having a tooth filled or a root canal is traumatic, imagine what kind of surgery is required to replace your teeth after they have been removed by your steering wheel!

Here's a typical scenario. You just need to do a couple of short errands, so you don't feel it is necessary to buckle up. You're at a stoplight and reach over to change the CD when WHAM — some idiot that has been drinking slams into the back of your car. The force of impact immediately sends you into the car in front of you. After your car stops, inertia keeps you moving forward until the steering wheel or windshield stops you — usually face first. You're pretty lucky because the impact wasn't enough to hurdle you through the windshield and onto the hood! Best of all, you're alive and "walk away" with a few missing teeth and some facial lacerations.

Most of us take the time each day to brush and floss our teeth, trying to reduce our trips to the dentist. So why can't we take a second or two to latch our seat belts? I know we all are concerned about our appearances. Some even worry that their seat belts will wrinkle their clothes. But will a few wrinkles really matter if the alternative is having false teeth anchored into your jawbone or stitches across your face to piece it back together? People do die from not wearing their seat belts, but hundreds more are injured in horrible ways. These injuries not only cost the Air Force manpower and dollars, they also result in long-term physical and psychological damage. Try not to become one of these statistics; wear your seat belt. Maybe my short poem will help to motivate you ...

Mirror, Mirror on the wall
Who's the fairest of them all?
The one who lacks wisdom in haste
Or the one who's smiling —
teeth held with paste?

Mirror, Mirror on the wall
Who's the prettiest of them all?
Someday those stitches will go away
But those facial scars
will forever stay.

Mirror, Mirror on the wall
I no longer look like that
picture in the hall.
All I had to do was take a
moment to click my seat belt on
Then the face I once knew
would not be gone.

The next time you get in a car and choose not to buckle up, look ahead ... what's going to stop you now? If you think a deploying airbag will save you, think again. An airbag can cause more injury than the crash itself if you are too close when it deploys. For more information on the safety of airbags, visit www.highwaysafety.org/safety_facts/quanda/airbags.htm#2. New technology is great, but nothing has been developed yet that will fully replace the safety our seat belts provide. Until that happens, don't have any regrets — always wear your seat belt.

Over the Hump

By Paula Allman, Fort Rucker, Ala.

THE NEED FOR SAFETY IN COMBAT

Safety professionals report that in spite of today's emphasis on safety by top leadership, there is still a perception among some young leaders that safety is something you have to consider in peacetime missions; but in wartime, safety becomes a luxury. If that is true, and if it is also true that when things get tough, the first things to go are the luxuries — then when war comes, we can no longer afford safety. The question really is, *"Can we afford not to consider safety during wartime?"*

One military officer who recognized the importance of safety in aviation operations was General William H. Tunner. General Tunner was responsible for the India-China airlift in the last year of World War II. General Tunner gives us an excellent example of how a vigorous safety program actually did work in a combat theater, and how safety made a difference in the success of the mission.

In his lively memoir, "Over the Hump," General Tunner recalls his stint as commander of the crucial India-China airlift and tells of his experiences during one of the first attempts to supply the Army by air.

In the 1940s, the very concept of military airlift was in its infancy. In fact, the India-China airlift had only been reluctantly called into existence by a ground-oriented command because a deadly combination of Japanese and geography made the better-known Burma Road somewhat less than efficient.

The purpose of the airlift was to carry enough supplies into Western China to keep the Chinese in the war. A Chinese military presence tied down approximately two million Japanese troops — troops that otherwise could be used against U.S. forces in the Pacific.

When General Tunner arrived in India in the summer of 1944, the airlift had been in operation about 2 years. Its performance was

graphic composite by SSgt Carrie Atwood

> "All efforts up to that point had concentrated on increasing tonnage, the prime indication of mission success. But all consideration for safety had been ignored." - *General Tunner, 1944*

barely adequate in terms of tonnage transported, but the major problem was safety.

General Tunner described the situation: *"Here, in a strange land far from home, on the fringes of a mysterious backward civilization, were all the conditions that bring hazardous flight: fog, heavy rain, thunderstorms, dust storms, high mountains, a necessity for oxygen, heavy loads, sluggish planes, faulty or no radio aids, hostile natives, jungles, and one-way airfields set in mountainous terrain at high altitude."*

As tonnage had gradually increased during the airlift's operation, so did the mishap rate. In January 1944, the accident rate was 1.97 per 1,000 flying hours! Every 200 trips over the Hump cost one airplane; for every 100 tons flown into China, three Americans died.

As General Tunner put it: *"Not only was the accident rate alarming, but most of the accidents were washouts — total losses with planes either flying into mountain peaks or going down in the jungle. In many of the cases in which there was reason to believe that some or all crew members had been able to parachute from their planes, the men were never seen again. The jungle had simply swallowed them up. The combination of a high accident rate with the hopelessness of bailing out was not conducive to high morale in the flying crews."*

General Tunner soon identified a major problem: *"All efforts up to that point had concentrated on increasing tonnage, the prime indication of mission success. But all consideration for safety had been ignored."*

Night flying had been introduced on the Hump, although radio communication and navigational facilities were nonexistent except at the terminals. Weather conditions were virtually ignored; the common saying was, "There is no weather on the Hump." Many planes flew in violation of standard Air Corps specifications. As one report indicated: *"If Air Corps technical orders were now in force, I doubt that there would be an airplane in the air."*

General Tunner's challenge became immediately clear: increase tonnage and lower the accident rate, seemingly contradictory actions in a wartime environment. Yet the record shows the two were not at odds at all. By instituting a safety program that seems obvious to us today, it became possible to change the whole tenor of the airlift.

What was the Program?

Nothing more than the basics distilled into four main points:

- Analysis of existing flight and maintenance procedures and practices
- Statistical investigation and analysis of accidents
- Recommendations for the correction of faults revealed in the foregoing analysis
- Statistical investigation and analysis of accidents

In particular, General Tunner and his staff carefully investigated the training of the pilots and made up for any gaps before sending them over the Hump. They began to take weather and communications seriously (there *was* weather on the Hump), attacking such conditions as icing and turbulence and becoming more familiar with navigational equipment and how best to deal with its absence.

Another major area was one we hear much more about today, particularly in the area of human factors — pilot discipline. General Tunner was very specific about the use and importance of the checklist, an aid which told the pilot "the exact procedure he must follow from the time prior to starting the engine to that following his cutting it off at his destination." We found planes without checklists and pilots who didn't bother. Both situations had to be corrected.

Briefing and debriefing, according to General Tunner, lay at the heart of the program: *"Brief-*

ing and debriefing proved to be of the greatest importance. Briefing involved not only a thorough preparation of the pilot for the route he was to take, but a check to make certain that the crew was competent to make the proposed flight safely. Debriefing would show up incompetent flight procedures, indicating the need for corrective action and additional training. Debriefing also provided our best weather reports."

Did all of this work?

In August 1944 (just before General Tunner's arrival), they airlifted 23,000 tons over the Hump to China with an accident rate hovering around 2.0 per 1,000 flying hours. In January 1945, with close to 40,000 tons airlifted, the accident rate dropped to 0.301. By July 1945, total tonnage jumped to 71,042 with an accident rate of 0.239. During August, the final big month of the airlift, 20 planes were lost during 136,000 flying hours, bringing the accident rate down to 0.154 per 1,000 flying hours.

General Tunner makes the statistics come to life by looking at them another way: *"If the high accident rate in 1943 and early 1944 had continued, along with the great increase in tonnage delivered and hours flown, America would have lost not 20 planes that month, but 292, with a loss of life that would have shocked the world."*

Serious military airlift was born in this distant theater on the almost forgotten edge of the 20th century's greatest war. Along with it, however, came safety. Can we afford the luxury of a safety program during wartime? History tells us we can't afford not to have one. We simply can't get the job done without it.

Editor's Note: *Portions of this article on the India-China airlift were taken from General Tunner's lively memoir, "Over the Hump," republished later by Richard W. Huling, Ph.D., AFISC Historian. Courtesy U.S. Army Safety Center.*



in memory of Cherish

By A1C Joey Swinson, Eglin AFB, Fla.

Photo courtesy of Amtrak

I am writing this with the hope that my story will place some insight into your lives. Cherish, a childhood friend of mine, and I had gone to school together for as long as I can remember. Cherish, was a cheerleader and very jovial person. She was kind and sweet to everyone.

In the summer of 1999, I was about to enter my senior year of high school. All of my friends who graduated the year before were preparing to leave for college. My class and the class ahead of me were a very enthusiastic crowd. We were always going out in large groups and had a blast at everything we did.

We decided to have a large going-away party for everyone that was leaving for college at one of the football player's family lake house. We billed it as the party of the century! The party began at around 9:00 p.m. and there were maybe 40 people attending. There was enough alcohol for everyone.

Cherish didn't like alcohol. As a matter of fact, I had rarely seen her drink. However, that night—I can only assume that she was overwhelmed by peer pressure—she decided "what the hell."

At midnight, the party began to die down. As we were all getting ready to leave, we felt we were sober enough to drive. They always say that when you "think" you are sober enough to drive..."it's a drunken person talking." Cherish and the rest of the party goers were far from being sober.

The party had not gone well for Cherish. She had become upset at a person and, in order to calm down, wanted to drive home alone. Some other friends and I watched her drive off in her car and departed immediately after her. Cherish was traveling in front of us, and through our impaired reasoning appeared to be driving just fine.

Ten minutes from the lake house, as we approached the outskirts of the city, the road traveled over a set of old railroad tracks. You know the type, the kind that are not level with the road and if you're sleeping when you hit them, then you'll surely wake up. We wish Cherish had been sleeping and someone else — a sober person — was driving because what happened on those tracks that night was something much more horrific.

> She thought the train was a slow moving freighter ... It was a high-speed Amtrak.

Cherish was still leading the car convoy that night. As we approached the railroad tracks the warning gate had just lowered, signaling an oncoming train. Cherish rolled down her window and yelled out, "I guess I'll see y'all in about an hour... bye." Then, in order to beat the train, she drove through the gate.

What Cherish didn't know, and could not determine because of impaired judgment, was that the train she thought was a slow moving freighter was a higher speed Amtrak. After a night of so-called fun, I got to see my very close friend die in a horrific crash. Her car was struck by a train that was traveling over 70 miles per hour. It took over an hour to remove her mangled body from the wreckage.

I know today that I helped kill a very good friend that night. All of us at that party that night did not set the example for Cherish or others to follow. We drank and drove and on that short drive home, all of our lives were changed in that one tragic moment. Drinking and driving cost my friend's life and taught an entire community to learn an extremely important lesson: Think before you drink for it may be your last thought. Don't let friends drive drunk.

Inspect electrical cords


Photo by SrA Lakisha Croley

Extension cords, with their ability to bring any appliance or lamp within easy reach of an electrical outlet, are one of the most convenient products in the home. But when they are misused, they can also be a source of potential danger.

The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) estimates that some 3,000 people are treated each year for injuries associated with extension cords. In addition, the CPSC reports that improperly functioning extension cords cause 5,000 residential fires annually.

While extension cords are an invaluable convenience, it's important to use them properly. But what does that entail?

To make your home as electrically safe as possible, you should take a few minutes each year to inspect the condition of your electrical cords, extension cords, plugs, and outlets. Here's what you should look for:

First, keep your eyes open for any electrical cords that are worn or damaged. Statistics show that two-thirds of all electrical fires are caused by these items. Replace any electrical cords that are in poor condition.

Next, check all electrical plugs to make sure they fit snugly into their outlets. Plugs that are loose or that wobble in the outlet are potential fire hazards, and should be repaired or replaced.

Also make sure that you or another family member haven't forced any three-prong plugs into a two-slot outlet. Appliances with three-prong plugs should only be inserted into three-slot outlets or three-slot extension cords.

Outlets, too, can pose a safety hazard if they are worn or damaged. Should you find any in this condition, you should replace them as soon as possible. Also, check that all cords between power supply, extension cords, and wall outlets are secure and that there are no exposed blades (prongs).

Take a moment to gauge the temperature of the faceplates on your electrical outlets. If a plate is warm or hot to the touch, it could indicate a potentially serious wiring problem that should be further investigated by a qualified electrician.

In addition, take note of any switchplates that are discolored. Discoloration could indicate that the electrical wiring behind the switchplate is overheating. Inspect all switchplates in the same manner, testing to see if they are warm.

Finally, make sure that you have not overloaded any circuit or extension cord. Remember that extension cords are not intended to permanently extend a home's wiring system.

Between these annual inspections, you should be alert to the performance of your electrical system. Here are some telltale symptoms of home electrical wiring problems:

- Household lights that dim or flicker, or a TV picture that shrinks in size
- Evidence of arcs, sparks, or flashes of bright light in the electrical system
- Sizzling or buzzing sounds emanating from the electrical system
- Damaged, cut, broken, or cracked wire insulation
- Frequently blown fuses, or circuit breakers that trip frequently

Before any work is done on your electrical system, always disconnect power from the circuit breaker panel or fuse box before attempting to replace a worn or damaged wall outlet (or call a qualified electrician to perform the work).

Editor's Note: *For more information visit http: // www. electrical contractor.netSafety_Education_Page.htm*

Unaware is not an Excuse

By MSgt Samuel D. Smith, Dyess AFB, Texas

I HAD TO GIVE A EULOGY

You may think you are doing all the right things concerning the health and welfare of your energetic young airmen, but do you really know what is happening during their prized and well-deserved days off? I thought I did.

This Airman had just turned 20 and had been at Dyess just 8 months. She was on her way to becoming a great weapons loader. Her bubbly personality and attitude made her a pleasure to be around and an asset to her section. She confided in me numerous times concerning her personal life and coordinated trips to Houston to see her relatives. Her family lived just over 6 hours from base, so she had ample opportunity to go home, and see her sister and grandmother. I knew when she was going and returning ... or so I thought.

During the accident investigation after her untimely death, I learned from one of her friends that she had traveled 6 hours after her swing shift one Friday night. She did not return until Monday morning and traveled back just in time to make it to roll call. She was never late for work, so it never occurred to me to ask if she had really traveled to Houston as planned over the weekend. Our squadron has a policy for signing out on Verbal Orders of the Commander (VOCO) with supervisor's knowledge. During your normal weekend pass, you can leave the local area for day or weekend trips and not be on leave. You must sign out and have it approved by your supervisor. This really works well knowing where your people are, and when they will return, especially in today's world political climate. We need to know where everyone is and must be able to contact them.

This terrible weekend in November started with great weather, sun shining, and everyone looking forward to having fun. This airman signed out saying she would visit her sister and grandmother, and return on Sunday. She recently moved to day shift, and she did not leave Houston until just after midnight on Monday morning knowing she had to report to work at 7 a.m. Just 35 miles from base on a lonely West Texas country highway, she crossed two oncoming lanes and ran head-on into a pickup truck. The other driver escaped with non-life-threatening injuries. She, however, lost consciousness and expired from her injuries approximately an hour after the accident. The Texas Highway Patrol accident report cited distraction as a possible cause. I believe fatigue played a part.

This terrible weekend in November started with great weather, sun shining, and everyone looking forward to having fun.

Knowing this airman was traveling on verbal orders, and having the route and times down on paper, did not help this situation. I was unaware she routinely had done this trip and pulled in just before her shift. Had I been aware of her past practice of pulling in before the shift, I would have spent more time talking to her about her plans. These young Airmen need to know that they are not 10 feet tall and bullet-proof, and sometimes there can be deadly repercussions to their actions. At work, they wear goggles, gloves and aprons, and watch each other for safety and Operational Risk Management even if they are not being watched. Off duty, they may not think twice about driving excessive lengths without adequate sleep or breaks.

This Airman made the ultimate mistake by not doing what she had said on the VOCO letter. When she didn't leave Houston on Sunday, she should have kept her supervisor apprised of her situation. I know it would have been better for her to call and admit she made a mistake by not leaving home in time to be at work after a full rest period. By not wanting to be charged a couple days leave or be counseled on her responsibility, she made a decision that cost this bright Airman her life.

Had I been aware, I could have taken further steps to prevent this tragedy. It is too late for her, but we can use her death to teach others and prevent a recurrence. Unaware is not an excuse. Become aware ... Now!

Supervisors, talk with your subordinates, and know what they are doing and where they are going. You, your unit and, especially, your subordinates will reap great rewards by not letting your people get themselves into trouble and not having to setup a memorial service.

One more reminder — make sure you and your troops have the Emergency Data Card and Servicemember's Group Life Insurance current. It may save your family and others unnecessary grief during an already tragic time.

Photo by Kenn Mann


Fleagle
I DON'T THINK I'LL EVER GET USED TO THIS DESERT HEAT.
IT TAKES A WHILE, BUT I THINK ONE CAN LEARN TO COPE.
HOW'S TINY TAKING IT?
TINY IS A RARE BREED.
REGARDLESS OF WHERE YOU PUT HIM...
©STAN HARRISON 2003
HE'LL FIND SOMEWAY T'MAKE TH'BEST OF IT.
ZZZ
ICE
HARRISON

FY03 Aircraft

As of July 3, 2003

	Fatal	Aircraft Destroyed
8 AF		
9 AF		HH-60
12 AF		
AWFC		RQ-1 RQ-1
ANG (ACC-gained)		
AFRC (ACC-gained)		

FY03 Ground

As of July 3, 2003

	Fatal	Class A	Class B
8 AF		6	1
9 AF		6	1
12 AF		10	0
DRU's		3	0

FY03 Weapons

As of July 3, 2003

	Class A	Class B
8 AF	0	0
9 AF	0	0
12 AF	0	0
AWFC	0	2

Aircraft Notes

After 2 months of not having a Class A flight mishap in ACC, our streak of good luck ran out. ACC experienced two Class A flight mishaps, one ground mishap that resulted in two jets being taken out of action for quite some time and one training mishap that tragically resulted in loss of life. The first mishap was an F-15E that entered an unrecoverable spin and the crew ejected. The second was an F-16 in the AOR that had the engine quit as a result of fuel starvation. The ground mishap was a taxi mishap in which an aircraft was proceeding to parking with a known malfunction. The last mishap was a training mishap in which a B-52 dropped some bombs that landed off target and hit a staging area where two Marine helicopters were parked. As in the past, a common theme of pilot error seems to be cropping back up in some of these mishaps. See your FSO for details, learn from the mistakes made, and don't be the next statistic.

Ground Notes

So far during the 101 Critical Days of Summer, ACC has experienced 6 Class A fatal mishaps; 5 have been off duty and vehicle related. The last mishap was an on-duty industrial mishap which also resulted in a death. ACC has experienced 25 Class A mishaps in FY03; this is an increase over FY02 which had 22 for the same period.

Weapons Notes

April and May were mishap-free months during this last quarter. This is the first time in 14 months that we had back-to-back mishap-free months. We had two test and evaluation mishaps. One Class C on a MQM-107 and an AIM-120 lost flight controls over the test range. There also was a sheared umbilical on an AIM-9 resulting in a Class D mishap. All-in-all folk's are doing their jobs safely. Please don't let your guard down now. We must put forth a little more effort to ensure we keep safety in the forefront. You are always one decision away from a mishap.

Legend

Class A - Permanent Total Disability; Property Damage $1,000,000 or more
Class B - Permanent Partial Disability; Property Damage between $200,000 and $1,000,000
Class C - Lost Workday; Property Damage between $20,000 and $200,000
* Non-rate Producing

Symbols for Mishap Aircraft



Photo by SSgt Tracy Reisinger

Lock on Safety

A 40th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron B-52 radar navigator runs a weapons targeting check during a bombing mission in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

The Combat EDGE