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It's been said that "we learn best, what we learn first." When we receive training throughout our careers, it's presented in a building block approach and we learn the basics first. The underlying theme of this month’s magazine is "Stick to the Basics"—four quick words that can help prevent the next mishap, and see you through to a positive conclusion of a dangerous situation, and a solid foundation of knowledge for something you can fall back on when faced with adverse conditions. Read through this month’s award section and see how "Sticking to the Basics" helped Lt Col Fenton, as his "quick action, smart decisions, and expert flying skills enabled him to safely recover a crippled aircraft," or TSgt Bryant encouraging members to implement the CRM process in all activities.

In order to prevent the next mishap, we need to consider when and how it might happen. History shows that our next flight mishap will likely be one of the following three scenarios: a midair due to complacency or misprioritization, a night mishap with or without NVGs as a contributing factor; and finally, we could have a flight mishap associated with weather or a bird strike. Our next ground mishap will most likely involve fatigue, darkness, drinking, and a failure to wear seat belts. Failing to follow technical order guidance on the flight line could be our next Class A weapons mishap waiting to happen. The key to preventing any of these mishaps from happening is involved leadership at all levels, taking advantage of opportunities to make safety proactive in your unit, and by "Sticking to the Basics."

Colonel Creid K. Johnson, ACC Director of Safety

January 2005
CONFIRMED RELEASES

By Maj Anton Komatz, Langley AFB, Va.

January 2005
In the waning days of Strategic Air Command (SAC), just as DESERT STORM had begun, B-52 "H" model Buff units were heavily involved in fighting the Cold War and focused on the nuclear mission. As a new "mission ready" navigator in a nuclear wing, I had never flown a conventional mission in the B-52. Conventional ops were assigned as our unit's secondary mission, and we had very few crews who were mission certified much less proficient in conventional ops. When DESERT STORM began, there was a scramble to familiarize and certify all the crews. Shortly after the air war began in Iraq, our unit began to fly 12-hour round trip Red Flag missions from home station in preparation for DESERT STORM participation should the call come. It was then that I learned the harsh lesson that safety doesn't take a vacation during times of war, or when preparing for it.

My first Red Flag flight as a mission ready navigator was leading a three-ship of B-52s dropping live munitions on a night sortie. The mission profile consisted of takeoff, air refueling, and a 4-hour "drive" to the Red Flag range to drop one live 500-pound MK 82 from an altitude of 15,000 feet. Upon exiting the range, we were scheduled for three simulated high level bomb releases at three different radar scoring sites starting at Flight Level (FL) 420 at the first release and then step climbing 2,000 feet between releases, finishing with a high altitude "dash" for home at FL 460. With a war on, there was added emphasis, and pressure, to make the most of every training opportunity. As the "new guy" the pressure was always on to perform, and the presence of a "by the book" mission commander in the second aircraft was bested only by a senior leader conducting a ride-along in the third aircraft.

During the mission brief the day prior, our crew planned the flight in detail and then briefed the rest of our three-ship cell. This brief included planning for a bomb bay check after the live releases. Checking the bomb bay consisted of one weapons qualified crewmember visually checking for an empty bomb bay prior to conducting any other release activity. Crawling from the B-52 crew compartment around the main gear to the bomb bay is a tight squeeze, and it's even tougher dragging an oxygen bottle. For safety reasons, the bomb bay checks are supposed to be completed below 10,000 feet within the confines of the range to avoid the requirement for the crewmember to carry oxygen with them and to ensure that a potentially hung weapon didn't fall on an inhabited area. With a release altitude of 15,000 feet, we planned and briefed a descent down to 10,000 feet after release to perform the required bomb bay checks before exiting the range and then a climb to FL 420 for the first three simulated bomb releases.

Everything from crew show to the weather brief went well the following afternoon, until our arrival at our aircraft. Our first indication that we needed a change of plans was the sight of open access panels on every engine and maintainers working on the aircraft. With the rest of our cell in the green, we decided to go to the spare aircraft, and we completed the "bag drag" across the ramp to the new aircraft in record time. We briefed the forms at the nose of the aircraft and were informed that other than a few minor write-ups, our aircraft was in the green, but it didn't have a weapon loaded. The crew chief explained that a weapon wasn't loaded because it didn't make sense to load a live weapon "just in case it was needed." We knew we would lose the live weapon activity, but training was training, so we accepted the aircraft and pressed with our preflight checks. We caught up to the rest of the cell by engine start, and we completed the taxi, takeoff, and refueling without incident.

Another flight of B-52s had already entered the range and pressed on to their target when our cell arrived at the range and checked in with the Airborne Warning And Control System (AWACS) for clearance on the range. The range was busy and the radios were screaming with...
threat calls and maneuvers to avoid them as our cell crossed the Initial Point (IP) of the bomb run. Our copilot called "IP inbound," and our cell was "cleared hot" on the range. Acknowledging chirps of "Two" and "Three" from our cellmates came over the radio as my radar navigator and I ran our release checklist. The bomb doors opened at 3 seconds to go and we "released our simulated weapon" on time and reformed the cell after the last aircraft completed their weapon release. The radios were still busy when our copilot requested a descent down to 10,000 feet to complete the bomb bay check. "Havoc Flight, standby" was the only response from the AWACS before being passed off to range control. A second request to descend was denied due to a conflict with other range activity taking place below us.

While waiting for clearance to descend, our crew discussed our options and a fallback plan if we couldn't complete the visual bomb bay check. SAC regulations prohibited an aircrew from opening the bomb bay doors or conducting any weapons release training without a visual bomb bay check, and also directed the crew to treat the situation as a hung/retained weapon, avoid over flight of populated areas, suspend weapon activity, and land as soon as practical. "Havoc Flight, unable to lower, climb and maintain PL 280, proceed point Hotel (our range exit point), flight planned route" came over the radio before we could run through all of our options.

Our copilot acknowledged the controller, passed the clearance back to the other planes in our cell, and we started our climb and turned toward the exit. Once established in the climb our crew informed the mission commander that without a bomb bay check, we were done for the night, and that we would provide the cell with an updated route of flight around populated areas back to home station. Clear of the range we passed our revised plan of flight to Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and the other two aircraft, and then explained over the interplane radio that we were going to lose the last three simulated high bomb runs. It was then that a test of wills broke out over the radio.

Suddenly the senior leader's voice came over the radio like the voice of God, "this is Alpha", you do not need to do a bomb bay check, I have three confirmed releases, you can still do the high bomb runs..." Our pilot started to explain our options to the mission commander cut in and calmly began to explain why the crews couldn’t perform the simulated high releases, citing the paragraph and section of the applicable regulation. Alpha replied back of that in his position as number three, he visually confirmed three weapons releases, followed them down and saw three distinct explosions on the target area. Upon hearing "three confirmed releases" my radar navigator and I began discussing the fact that if our airplane didn’t have any weapons loaded, how could he confirm our weapons release? Suddenly hit with a moment of doubt, we both turned and reached for the aircraft forms package to reconfirm that our aircraft didn’t have a weapon loaded.

The mission commander tactfully explained that by regulation, without a bomb bay check, we couldn’t do any more weapon releases, live or simulated. Alpha reiterated that we didn’t have to perform the check if the releases could be confirmed visually, and because he could confirm three releases and explosions that we could still get the high release training and suggested that the cell complete the high bomb runs training. The mission commander pointed out that the range spotters on the ground, and not aircrew, were the only people able to confirm a weapons release visually, and that the range spotters hadn't confirmed our releases. The mission commander then asked if Alpha was sure he saw the releases and followed them down considering the release altitude and the break in the wall of smoke.

"I confirm three good releases, three explosions in the target area, you do not need the bomb bay check, complete the high run" came the response.

"With all due respect sir," the mission commander responded, "we fly and operate under the rules of regulations for safety reasons, and those regulations do not permit us to perform the high bomb runs." At that point, my pilot was finally able to break into the conversation to remind everyone that our aircraft was not carrying any weapons; therefore, it wasn’t possible to have seen three releases and their explosions. Several very quiet minutes passed before Alpha replied on the radio to say that he concurred with the mission commander’s plan to forego the high bomb runs, however, he felt that the flight could have safely performed the high bomb runs as planned, without the bomb bay check.

As lead, our crew requested a clearance directly back to base and then spent the next 4 hours discussing the evening’s events and the lessons learned from it. The main lesson we took away with us was that flight regulations then and flight instructions now exist to provide guidance and direction in order to accomplish the mission and accomplish it safely, both in times of peace and war. Safety doesn’t take a vacation when war breaks out, in fact, it becomes even more important and shouldn’t be compromised in the interest of training. We lost valuable training that night when we missed the high bomb runs and high altitude flying experience, but the risks involved in pushing the envelope far outweighed the gain. I will never forget the safety lessons I learned that night, or the courage the mission commander displayed in being the voice of reason in an extraordinarily high pressure situation.
HAVOC 12, 120 K!
By Capt Dan Hoadley, Minot AFB, N.D.
I promised to be an exciting day to fly the BUFF. It was my first sortie out of Andersen AFB, Guam, as the copilot in the number two bomber for a live drop exercise and a low level over the ocean. We had 27,750-pound M117 bombs in the bomb bay, 270,000 pounds of fuel, and the keys to a B-52 for 6 hours.

The high fuel load and full load of internal weapons put the aircraft at 470,000 pounds, close to the tech order maximum of 488,000 pounds. I had control of the aircraft for the takeoff, and computed and briefed the S1 time as 15.9 seconds. "S1 speed and time" a performance check speed and a decision speed, as the takeoff will be aborted if the jet hasn't met the S1 speed within the computed time. Additionally, if the aircraft aborts the takeoff before reaching the expiration of S1 timing, the crew has the ability to abort and stop the aircraft within the runway remaining. On this day, our heavy gross weight combined with the balmy conditions at Andersen put our jet near its performance limits.

I lined up for takeoff and pushed all eight throttles up to the takeoff power setting 30 seconds after the lead bomber applied power and accelerated down the runway. Everything went smoothly until just before the expiration of S1 timing. Before the navigator could say, "Coming up on 15.9 seconds," the Master Caution light illuminated. The forward throttle position blocked my view of the central caution panel, so I couldn't determine why the Master Caution light was lit. The Aircraft Commander, who had a clear view of the caution panel, called "Abort! Abort! Abort!" over the interphone.

"Abort" was the last word I was hoping to hear that day, but I executed the boldface immediately. I pulled the throttles to idle and jerked the drag chute handle back while the aircraft commander raised the airbrakes. As I applied the wheel-brakes, I looked down at the airspeed indicator and noted that we were traveling at 120 knots. My pucker factor shot up momentarily as the end of the runway filled my windscreen.

Then the familiar tug of the drag chute appeared. I couldn't have been more surprised. I pulled the drag handle, and the windscreen became clear. The aircraft commander raised the flaps, and the aircraft slowed down to an estimated 50 knots. I applied the brakes and set the aircraft down on the runway.

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According to the B-52 tech order, "The brakes are limited in the amount of work they can perform and still function properly because this work will be dissipated in the form of heat." At 120 knots our brakes were already 5 knots into the "Danger Zone." The tech order warning under "Danger Zone" states, "Tire explosion and hydraulic fire are imminent." The fact we were carrying 27,750-pound bombs on the aircraft made a hydraulic fire a particularly "bad thing," and we knew an emergency ground egress doomed in our future.

I slowed the jet to a comfortable taxi pace as we approached the departure and hammerhead. With my view unobstructed, I noted that the generator light on the central caution panel was illuminated. I looked at the generator panel, which is on my side of the jet, to note that one out of our four generators had fallen off-line. After exiting the runway, I brought the jet to a complete stop and set the brakes. While the aircraft commander and I shut down all eight engines the rest of the crew egressed the aircraft. The normal egress distance for a B-52 without weapons onboard is 2,000 feet, but with a full load of weapons we would have to double that. The flight and I scrambled out of the jet and joined the rest of the crew in our 4,000 foot dash away from the aircraft and weapons. Upon reaching safety, we turned around to watch for the 'imminent' tire explosion and hydraulic fire.

Thankfully, it never happened. But because of the amount of brake energy absorbed, the gears, wheels, and brakes had to be replaced. The cost of all of this
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new equipment came to a grand total of $260,000, qualifying our takeoff abort as a Class B mishap. The aircraft was damaged; however, our crew came away safely and more knowledgeable as no story is complete without taking away some lessons learned.

First, I gained confidence in the Takeoff Data and tech order procedures. We were low grade test pilots that day. We took a jet at the very edge of the performance envelope and stopped it within the distance specified in the tech order. Secondly, crew coordination was very smooth; everyone performed as briefed and in accordance with the standards, making it the highlight of the entire event, as the abort was executed as smoothly as possible. The crisp execution was due to the abort procedures we brief every time before we fly and the hours spent in Emergency Procedures Simulators. Some may consider the pre-takeoff brief as mundane and routine, but I can tell you it helped to have a mental rehearsal of exactly what would happen that day. A thorough brief leaves no question in the minds of the entire crew on how to deal with a situation that can progress from boring life threatening, if not handled properly.

This incident also taught me a lot about the complex nature of pilot judgment. In this case the aircraft commander was forced to make a decision with imperfect knowledge of the situation at hand. He could see a generator warning light on the caution panel, but the warning light only indicates that at least one of four generators is off-line; it doesn’t specify how many generators are off-line. He could not see the generator panel, so he assumed the worst case - that three of four generators were off-line. He made a judgment call that it was better to stop the jet than risk getting airborne and losing, what could have been, the final generator.

These events illustrate that there are countless factors that go into making an abort decision. The pilot must measure the ability to get the aircraft airborne and deal with a given emergency against the consequences of stopping the aircraft at a certain point in the takeoff roll. The ability to weigh all of this information comes from in-depth systems knowledge, an understanding of Takeoff Data, and a respect for the severity of the emergency. Forethought and experience is required in order to make a sound decision, because the 3 seconds allowed by the tech order for making the decision to abort provides little time to weigh all of this information.

We stuck with the basic maxim of “Aviate, Navigate, and Communicate,” during the duration of our abort and egress, with only one snag: communication with the tower was a problem. After the boldface procedures were complete and the aircraft was under control, the AC announced our abort and asked the tower to “roll the trucks” three times over the radio before we exited the runway. We never received an affirmative response from the tower to confirm our abort. The tower kept inquiring if we needed assistance, and having a handful of jet, we gave up after the third attempt. As a result of the miscommunication with tower, the fire trucks didn’t arrive on scene until 15 minutes after we shut down the jet and were well clear of it. The time delay is significant because the tech order states that the brakes will reach their hottest point 15 minutes after first brake application, increasing the danger to the fire personnel and those around the airfield. The fix to this problem lies in familiarizing tower and fire personnel about aircraft specifics (in this case brake heating), and using standardized radio procedures and terminology when deployed and operating out of an unfamiliar airfield.

In short this incident re-iterates an age old adage which happens to be printed in the 1B-52H-1 Technical Order: “When dealing with an emergency or abnormal condition, determination of the most correct action to be taken must be derived using sound judgment, common sense, and a full understanding of the applicable systems.”

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The dangers of low carbohydrate diets for fighter crews

By Col James W. Dooley and Maj Denise K. Black, Langley AFB, Va.
American spend $40 billion annually on weight-loss programs and devices, special diet foods, diet books, and other related “get skinny” programs. As many of us have experienced, some of the myriad of weight loss plans actually are effective; however, in the long run, most are not. Even for those plans that do result in weight loss, many of them cannot be sustained for long periods without medical contraindications or without negatively affecting performance. “Extreme diets” are included in this last group. The focus of this article is on low-carbohydrate (low-carb) diets, a popular but possibly dangerous type of extreme diet that may help you lose weight, but one that may impair your cognitive and physical performance and lower your ability to fly your aircraft, particularly high-G weapons systems.

As many can attest, low-carb (a.k.a. “high protein”) diets can promote rapid weight loss; however, much of the weight loss is water, often leading to dehydration. If you think this is not a big deal, think again. Centrifuge studies have demonstrated that as little as 3 percent dehydration can reduce sustained acceleration or G tolerance up to 50 percent. Additionally, the severe restriction of carbohydrates can easily result in depletion of muscle glycogen stores and lowering of blood glucose levels. The combination of muscle glycogen depletion, low blood glucose, and dehydration has been demonstrated in numerous scientific studies to impair both cognitive and physical performance, including dramatic decrements in muscular strength and power.

In training or in combat, impaired cognitive and physical performance can result in a degraded or failed mission outcome — or worse. For example, in F-22 Raptor, F-16 Viper, F-15 Eagle, and other high-performance flight crews, muscle glycogen depletion and dehydration can impair muscular strength and adversely affect performance of the anti-G straining maneuver. A degraded anti-G strain reduces tolerance to peak and/or sustained G and can effectively take a crew member out of the flight. Although not pleasant to discuss or even think about, low-carb diets also can result in impaired bowel function, and we all know what a serious performance deterrent that can be. The following flight scenario illustrates some of these concerns.

Eagle 1 and Eagle 2 briefed their early morning, two-ship offensive Basic Fighter Maneuver (BFM) sortie. Both were experienced flight leads, current and qualified in BFM. During the past year, Eagle 1 had gained a few pounds; the same gradual weight creep experienced by all too many Americans who eat or drink a little more than they need and don’t exercise enough. He decided to get back into fighting shape and started a popular low-carb diet 10 days prior to the BFM sortie. Just this morning he weighed himself and noticed he had lost 8 pounds. He skipped breakfast because he was “getting skinny” and feeling “ops normal.”

Eagle 2 also had gained a little weight over the past year. Several weeks earlier, he decided to cut back a little on the sweets and began exercising more (i.e., aerobics and weight training). He ate the standard three meals per day and even enjoyed an occasional dessert. Even after eating a light breakfast, he noticed he had lost a little over 2 pounds in the past 3 weeks and felt good the morning of the BFM sortie.

The two-ship launched at 7:10 a.m., arrived at the designated airspace and began their first engagement as briefed with Eagle 2 in the offensive role. On the second engagement, Eagle 1 grayed out during his first defensive, 5G break turn, and then backed off to 6Gs to get his full vision back. Eagle 2 recognized this BFM error and quickly scored a guns track and kill. A third engagement ended in similar manner. Eagle 1 correctly recognized he was behind the jet and that his G tolerance was substandard. He decided it was time to “knock-it-off,” come back and try it another day, a smart decision since pressing the fight could have been disastrous. During the postflight briefing, Eagle 1 admitted that he missed breakfast and that he wasn’t feeling too well. Let’s review and determine some “lessons learned.”

What caused Eagle 1’s poor performance? Consider the following: Ten days on the low-carb diet likely lowered his muscle energy stores and caused Eagle 1 to become dehydrated. An extended time on the low-carb diet, coupled with missing breakfast, possibly impaired his cognitive function and contributed to his inability to keep up with the jet. His already low muscle energy stores probably were even further depleted, hampering his ability to sustain a good G-strain, especially during his second and third engagements. All things considered, the outcome could have been much worse for Eagle 1. Bottom line: While his low-carb diet may have made Eagle 1 initially feel like he could fly BFM that day, it caused or certainly contributed to the impairment of his ability to fly.
Stepping to the jet without a preflight meal or healthy snack is asking for trouble

fight, and win. Regardless of the type of diet he was on, missing breakfast didn’t do him any favors, either. In fact, even if you are not dieting, stepping to the jet without a preflight meal or healthy snack is asking for trouble.

What about Eagle 2? He was the same age as Eagle 1. They both participated on the squadron sports teams and both had recently started a weight-loss program. Despite these similarities, there were differences.

Eagle 2's weight loss was more gradual and, therefore, less likely to result in dehydration and depleted muscle energy stores. He had continued regular participation in aerobic fitness activities and a resistance training program, which both probably helped him to pull high G without fatiguing. Because he had three meals per day, his blood glucose levels were normal, enabling him to cognitively "keep up with the jet." Bottom line: Eagle 2 was more "nutritionally fit" and prepared to fly, fight, and win.

Admittedly, no one has studied the effects of extreme diets on G tolerance. However, based on proven physiological principles associated with extreme diets, the scenario described here is realistic. Here are some good nutrition guidelines to help you make good nutritional choices.

- Eat a balanced diet that includes carbohydrates, fats, and protein food; try to get some of each at every meal.
- If you want to cut back a little on carbohydrates, cut back on those that have little or no nutritive value: soft drinks, candy, chips and other high-sugar or high-calorie snack foods.
- A little more protein is not necessarily bad, but avoid extremes. If you need to lose weight, employ a smart weight loss strategy that includes cutting back in total calories — not just restricting carbohydrates or fats.
- You should include exercise as part of any weight-loss plan and keep a diet/exercise log to make you aware of how much and how often you eat and exercise.
- Don’t skip meals and plan ahead. Try to make healthier choices of what you do eat and, if you need to, bring your lunch. Don’t leave meals to chance!
- If step to postbrief exceeds 4 hours, take food and water with you on the flight.

Remember, you don’t have to be extreme to be effective. Eat smart, fly safe, fight effectively!
Last January and February we endured minus 20 degrees Fahrenheit almost continuously. If you arrive here from south of the Mason Dixon line in January, it’s probable the temperature difference may be as much as 70-100 degrees. You’re probably going to step out of your jet in your summer weight jacket, leather flight gloves, and summer weight boots onto the DV pad where you parked at Minot. The DV spot to base ops is about 40 yards away, and as you bravely walk those 40 yards to activate your next flight plan, you stand a good chance of receiving frostbite on your hands, nose, ears, and possibly your feet. If you were wearing your long johns (yeah right), it will be pain like you have never felt before as your body attempts to thaw out. Frostnip and Frostbite are alive and well and still regularly kick our collective hind ends here at Minot, and if the wind is blowing, let’s just say it will really suck to be you.

Driving in snow and ice is not like driving on wet roads, it’s two orders of magnitude worse. “But,” you say, “I have a 4 wheel drive vehicle.” Up here, the number of wheel drive you have only accounts for the total number of wheels taking you to the crash site on windy, icy highways. Drive slowly, use your hazard lights, and use the road as a reference. Last winter we had five vehicles, one after the other, drive off the road because the first person in line went into the ditch and the others stopped navigating, and just followed him in. Going off the prepared surface in the north in the winter is baaaadddddd on so many levels. I’ve had three tours up north and 4.5 years as a kid in Alaska, so I’m not making this up.

Lt Col Kevin P. McLaughlin

January 2005
For some, cold weather means you bring a light jacket with you when you go out at night, but for those who know, it's when snow squeaks when you walk on it, and motor oil turns to molasses and water freezes before it runs off the hood of a car. We're talking below freezing, and beyond! You're reaction may be, "well that's why I chose a southern base, so I wouldn't have to deal with the cold or worry about it." With an attitude like that, O' Murphy will be chomping at the bit to spank you the first chance he gets. Ever heard of COPE THUNDER, or divert? If you have, then listen up, because cold weather plays havoc with the flying mission, but protecting freedom doesn't take a vacation, so you can hope to do is cope, and minimize its effects.

Technical assistance for this article came by way of the fine folks at the Minot AFB Safety Shop; who better than the "Frozen Chosen" to ask about winter flying ops? We poke fun, but they endure winter ops? We poke fun, but they endure.

Mission Planning

Adapting a motorcyclist's mantra of "dressing for the crash," flight crews should "dress for the walk home," in that if you eject or crash land, you're only going to have what you are wearing at the time or what you took with you. Cold weather gloves, jackets and insulated flying boots combined with thermal underwear will keep you warm during a flight and can save your life in an emergency. In extreme cold weather, consider using a neoprene face mask. It not only protects against wind burn and frostbite, but it also keeps you from breathing in super-cooled air. Other items to consider carrying with you are a divert kit including mission planning forms, clothes, and a shaving kit. Don't forget extra money or your Government Travel Card. Carry it with you on every sortie. Refer to ACCI 11-301 for additional items and requirements.

While mission planning, take a good look at all of the approaches for your potential divert bases, and check for any applicable Notices To Airmen (NOTAMS). Ensure you understand the requirements to fly each approach, as well as the lighting and runway environments, and consider approach and landing procedures for low visibility landings. Consider the mission impact from snow and ice-covered taxi and runways, crosswinds and icing conditions for takeoff and landing. While prepping for the flight, discuss as a crew or flight procedures concerning landing on ice and slush-covered runways and the maximum crosswind for your aircraft weight and configuration. Consider fuel reserve requirements when choosing weather or emergency divert airfields, and always have a landing alternate designated on your filed flight plan, and several more in your "back pocket plan."

Crew Show

Anything can go wrong and everything takes longer during the winter months, so build in a time pad and allow extra time to do everything starting with your show time before the flight. Review the weather and request the temperature and dew point spread for both takeoff and landing, as it will impact your anti-ice procedures. While you are at the weather shop, request weather for a suitable takeoff and landing alternate (annotate takeoff alternates in the remarks section of the DD Form 175 Flight Plan). Prior to stepping to the jet, review taxi and runway conditions and snow removal efforts. Allow adequate time from notification to completion of aircraft snow removal/deicing operations, and check with the Supervisor of Flying (SOF) to ensure it has been completed before stepping to the jet.

Preflight

Once at the jet, ensure all snow, ice and frost are removed from wings, vertical fin, horizontal stabilizers, windscreen and around all pitot-static system probes and ports. Failure to remove snow from the fuselage before applying interior heat will result in ice re-freezing on the fuselage, causing drag and possible erratic airspeed indications if it forms around the pitot heads or static ports. Make sure all ice is removed from inside the engine inlets as ice can be ingested into the engine through the air inlet, creating a Foreign Object Damage (FOD) hazard and damage to the engine.

Engine and Air Ground Equipment (AGE) such as aircraft heaters and air carts are harder to start as the temperatures drop. At colder temperatures, starting times may exceed starter duty cycle limits or become impossible. During below zero temperatures, consider preheating the engine for 1 to 2 hours to increase starter performance and reliability. Once started, allow the engine to warm for a minute or two to allow the oil pressure to stabilize, (high oil pressure conditions may both be encountered on engine start in extremely cold weather, but should drop to normal pressure within 2 minutes) provided some indication of oil pressure is observed; up to 3.5 minutes may be allowed for the oil pressure to reach the minimum limit. During ground ops prior to taxi, ice build-up can form on the engine inlet components during extended ground operations at idle power settings even though the anti-ice is on. Periodic run-ups to a nominal 80 percent rpm for 10-20 seconds at 10 minute intervals can minimize ice buildups (B-52). There are usually warm-up times for instruments, flight controls, hydraulics, accessory cases, etc. Engines usually idle slower and are sluggish to respond until they warm up. Be familiar with your tech order operating limits before you call with a maintenance problem.

Taxi

Time is your greatest asset; give yourself and your formation plenty of time to get to the runway, and make sure all instruments have warmed up sufficiently to ensure normal operation. Check for sluggish instruments during taxi. Avoid taxi delays; identify potential snow and ice hazards early and resolve them. On ice and snow covered areas, taxi speed should be reduced and the normal interval between aircraft should be increased. Snow covered taxiways and runways present a variety of problems while taxiing. Taxiing through deep snow should be avoided as taxiing and steering are extremely difficult and frozen brakes and gear may result. On very slick surfaces, come to a complete stop prior to turning and monitor wind gusts and crosswinds as they can push you off of your taxi line. If taxi lines are not visible from the cockpit, plan to have them swept/unmarked and clearly visible. The Combat Edge
visible before taxi. Above all, if you don’t think it is safe to taxi, then DON’T.

**Takeoff**

As general rules of thumb, do not takeoff: until all ice and snow have been removed from the aircraft, under conditions of freezing rain or freezing drizzle (AFI 11-202V3, ACC SUP 1). If you have been taxiing under conditions conducive to icing, do a static run-up prior to takeoff to assure normal engine operation. Signs of engine icing could include loss of power, abnormal or slow RPM response to throttle movement, and indications of engine surge or stall. Takeoffs should also not be attempted when runways are covered by water and/or slush in excess of 0.3 inch depth. If an abort is attempted under such conditions, hydroplaning, which will cause severe control and braking losses, may occur at higher ground roll speeds. When taking off from a slushy or wet runway, consider leaving the gear down approximately 30 seconds without braking after takeoff to allow moisture to be blown from the gear. Gear retraction will take longer.

**Cruise**

Icing conditions which lead to the use of the engine, nacelle and scoops anti-icing system at altitudes above approximately 25,000 feet should be avoided if possible, and known or suspected icing conditions should be avoided (flight above 250 KIAS with the true Outside Air Temperature (OAT) below 32 degrees Fahrenheit (0 degrees Celsius) and visible moisture (rain, wet snow or fog with visibility 1 mile or less) present). Following are a couple of JP-8 fuel considerations during high level cruise: avoid flying at altitudes where the OAT gauge is within 8 degrees Celsius (14 degrees Fahrenheit) of fuel freezing temperature (JP-8 freezing temperature is -47 degrees Celsius (-53 degrees Fahrenheit). Additionally, due to its poor cold weather volatility, air restarts are more successful when attempted within 10 minutes of engine shutdown (before engine cool down). When flying at high altitudes (over 35,000 feet, and low OATs), JP-8 has a tendency to thicken and gel when OATs get low, especially in aircraft with wet wings. Consult your aircraft tech order, you may have an ops limit.

**Descent**

During night flights, an inadvertent encounter of icing conditions or unobserved ice build-up is more likely to occur. Therefore, whenever there is any indication or suspicion that icing conditions may exist, turn on the anti-icing when below 20,000 feet and the OAT gauge reads below 10 degrees Celsius. Check weather conditions as soon as entering the local traffic pattern and get updates on a regular basis for your primary and alternate landing base if the weather begins to deteriorate.

**Approach and Landing**

The approach and landing begins when you are approximately 20 to 30 minutes from your start descent point. Update the weather as soon as possible, compute landing data, and decide if you will continue the approach or set up an orbit and wait for conditions to improve. If you decide to wait, get an area clear of the runway, compute the maximum descent for the approach. Reference the Flight Information Handbook (FIH) Temperature Correction Chart when the temperature is below 0 degrees Celsius. Altitude corrections should be made to all approach altitudes inside the final approach fix to include decision heights, decision altitudes and minimum descent altitudes (at -35 Celsius with a Height Above Terrain (HAT) of 200 feet, you will have to add 50 feet to your published decision height on the approach plate). While flying practice approaches in deteriorating weather conditions, keep your divert fuel in mind. Don’t let the field get socked in with early morning fog or a decreasing ceiling when you no longer have enough fuel to get to your divert base.

When on approach and landing, long, flat, unbroken stretches of snow make depth perception difficult and the tendency to overestimate the aircraft altitude. Likewise, a runway with just the centerline cleared of snow will appear narrower, causing pilots to overestimate altitude, resulting in late flares to landing. Under low ceiling/visibility conditions, avoid the tendency to “duck under” while transitioning to a visual landing. If you attempt to establish a visual profile similar to the one you see on a normal approach with good visibility, you will tend to aim at a spot short of the runway. This will result in a high sink rate and may cause an undershoot or hard landing (AFMAN 11-217, page 135). With crosswinds and blowing snow, it is possible to have a blizzard on the runway and be completely unable to see it in the flare. On the approach, the weather will look good, but as you enter the flare, you will encounter whiteout conditions.

When landing with a crosswind or slippery runway, compute the maximum crosswind component for your weight and runway condition, and be aware of aircraft restrictions for touch and go landings. As with takeoff, care should be exercised when landing on water and/or slush in excess of 0.3 inches. Hydroplaning may occur which will cause severe control and braking loss. Treat the last 2,000 feet of the runway as if it were icy when wet. Slow down to a very slow speed before entering the area of the runway and start all turns at a very slow speed or from a stop. To avoid skidding, slow your speed well before reaching the end of the runway where the rubber deposits are heaviest.
you want to go where-
CAMPING?!

By Mr. Wally W. Eck, Langley AFB, Va.
I had been raining for 2 days, the wind had picked up, and a cold front was predicted. A group of young, inexperienced Boy Scouts wanted to go CAMPING! However, this camping trip was planned for the foothills of southern New Mexico in early December. I was invited on this scouting adventure by a friend who needed help with the trip.

Before I left the office that afternoon, I called the base Weather office and asked about the weather predictions for our proposed camping location. The answer was, "Sir, there is a cold front coming through the middle of New Mexico, and we expect some really harsh, icy and snowy conditions. We've been wrong before, but I wouldn't be taking boys out camping in potential weather like this."

About an hour later, I showed up at the meeting point to find the adult leaders discussing the weather conditions and the fate of the camping trip. All the adults were convinced they did not want to disappoint the boys and cancel the outing. Two previous camping trips had been cancelled due to military deployments and adverse weather conditions. The key adult leader stated: "There is no way we are canceling this trip — we are going."

I replied that there were always alternatives to every situation. I told them that I had called the Holloman Air Force Base Weather office prior to leaving work, and they indicated a really bad cold front was on its way. They predicted a huge ice storm with possible snow later in the evening. Most of these boys were 11- and 12-year-olds, so my recommendation was to plan an alternative camping adventure for that night, see what the weather conditions were the next day, and then make our final decision.

One vocal opponent of my suggestion said, "But some of the boys don't want that! They want to go camping tonight, not TOMORROW!!!" A second adult concurred. Two parents voiced concern, but were told that their input didn't count since they were not going on the trip.

I clarified that I hadn't said we should cancel the camping trip for that evening. I reiterated that I had just asked everyone to look at all of our options. I suggested going to the Community Center on the nearby military base and "camping" inside that facility for the night. The boys could play pool, ping-pong, board games, video games and watch movies on the wide-screen television. We could also set up some patrol competitions in the large ballroom. It would be fun and a different adventure for the boys.

One of the more vocal adults repeated, "Let's just go. Wally, you don't know for sure whether it will hail, ice-over or snow. Let's just go and react to the circumstances as they occur." "That's an option," I said, "However, it's not one I would recommend or participate in. I've been offered the Community Center on base for our use. That's the safe alternative and everyone should be able to live with it." Again, the same adult chattered, "What can possibly happen? So, we get a little snow — so what? Live and deal with it!"

I responded by explaining that New Mexico weather conditions near mountainous areas can change and quickly turn into a "bad and ugly" situation. Two facts greatly concerned me: The campers were young, inexperienced boys and the adults involved had limited back-country skills. I reminded everyone that this was an adult decision that involved the safety of their boys. After an extensive discussion, "everyone" decided it would be best to stay at the military Community Center for that evening.

The next morning we woke up to 8 inches of snow on the ground. The campsite location in the foothills had over 3 feet of snow along with icy conditions. The major highways were closed for 2 days and the 10-mile side road into the campsite was closed for over a week because of the amount of ice.

That morning was a wake-up call for all of the parents, adult leaders, and boys. Everyone was glad we had chosen the safer alternative. The boys had fun and learned a lot over the weekend. They played games most of the night, toured an F-117 aircraft, visited the "space" monkey farm, and cooked their meals outside in the snow. It was an experience they will never forget—and, more importantly, they were all safely returned to the care of their parents.

Editor's note: Wally Erick is a civil service employee who is a retired Air Force officer from the Morales, Welfare, Recreation and Services field. In Boy Scouting, Wally serves as a member of the local Council Executive Board and is a District Chairman and a Scoutmaster of a 70-boy scout troop. He has extensive back-country experience in backpacking, canoeing, and cycling.
Several inert munitions assets were delivered to the Conventional Maintenance element for scheduled processing and demilitarization. Upon initial visual inspection, A1C Reich noticed while performing routine maintenance on T-38 aircraft 64-3206, an egress maintenance team inadvertently fired an M-27 initiator. The M-27 initiator is connected to the forward cockpit internal canopy jettison handle. An investigation conducted by quality assurance and the wing Safety office determined all technical order procedures had been followed. The problem was isolated to the M-27 initiator having a pre-load on the firing sear, which prevented the maintenance safety pin from rendering the initiator safe. TSgt Deveraux, TSgt StAmand, SSgt Tenpenny and SSgt Faulk realized that serious injury, or even death, could occur if any of the four M-27 initiators in the T-38’s egress system were inadvertently fired due to a pre-load condition. The team immediately coordinated and performed a local One Time Inspection (OTI), and identified another T-38 as having the same condition. With explosive safety at the forefront, the four egress technicians coordinated with a team from HQ ACC and Ogden ALC to meet at Whiteman AFB to investigate the cause of the pre-load condition. The problem was isolated to an out-of-rig canopy jettison cable. No technical data procedures existed for rigging a canopy jettison cable, so the egress technicians worked side-by-side with the team from ACC and Ogden to author an Interim Operational Supplement (IOS) to Technical Order 1T-38A-2-2. The resulting IOS contained procedures on; properly rigging a canopy jettison handle, inspecting an M-27 initiator to identify a pre-load condition, and procedures to follow in order to correct a pre-load condition, if discovered. The egress technicians’ efforts resulted in 752 Air Force T-38s being inspected for a pre-load condition, improvement of Technical Order 1T-38A-2-2, and preventing potential injury or death to aircrew and maintenance personnel.

A1C Jason A. Reich, 2nd Munitions Sqdn., 2nd Bomb Wing, Barksdale AFB, Louisiana

509th Maint. Sqdn. Egress Section, 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman AFB, Missouri
Aapproximately 90 minutes into a Higher Headquarters Directed sortie as part of RIMPAC 04, the #1 generator of Havoc 21 tripped off, and the autopilot failed. Shortly after resetting the generator, the constant speed drive (CSD) overheat light illuminated. The crew decoupled the generator from its accessory drive IAW T.O. procedures. Thirty minutes later, the #1 generator CSD overheat light illuminated again. In accordance with T.O. guidance, the pilots shut down the #1 engine and established windmilling RPM by slowing to 205 KIAS and descending to 17,000 feet. With the #1 engine shut down, primary hydraulics for the left tip gear and left outboard spoilers were unavailable. The instructor pilot on board bisked up the pilots while they reviewed all applicable T.O. guidance. The radar navigator and navigator informed the pilots that the RIMPAC activity and air refueling would have to be slipped 3 hours. The pilot and copilot concluded that a 3-hour slip would put the aircraft 33,000 pounds below the minimum fuel reserve at the air refueling point. The crew agreed that a mission abort was the best option, and notified the Andersen AFB Supervisor of Flying (SOF) of their plan to return to Guam. The 36 EOG/CC agreed with the crew’s decision to abort the mission, and approved their return. After approximately 40 minutes, the #1 engine overheat light finally extinguished. With the autopilot inoperative, the pilots alternated flying duties during the 3-hour return trip to maximize pilot alertness for the U200L landing. Upon arrival at Andersen AFB, the crew burned down fuel to reach approximately 290,000 pounds for landing. The pilots extended the left tip gear using emergency procedures to ensure positive extension, and turned on the #1 hydraulic standby pump to provide pressure to operate the left outboard spoiler. The crew computed 7-engine landing data, confirmed the data with the Duty Instructor Pilot (DIP), and then flew a 7-engine approach to a full stop.

Capt Aaron D. Root, 1Lt Christopher Miller, Maj Timothy MacGinley, 1Lt Michael Gregston, 1Lt Alexander Christy, 1Lt Col Timothy Hansen, Capt Robert Billings, 96th and 11th Bomb Sqdns., 2nd Bomb Wing, Barksdale AFB, Louisiana

Sgt Canning developed a plan to control and reduce the Foreign Object Damage (FOD) potential at the engine test facility for both TF34 and F110 turbo fan engines. The previous FOD removal method of water washing was detrimental to the construction of the sound retardant baffles. Water was being absorbed by the basalt-wool sound retardant materiel, trapping the moisture and causing corrosion to the metal framing. In turn, the metal corrosion produced FOD at a rate greater than corrosion prevention measures could stop its progression. His creativity led to the requisition of a commercial leaf blower to remove FOD from the huge intake and cooling baffles of the “Hush Houses.” Sgt Canning also implemented a weekly plan to use a vacuum cleaner to extract any particles wedged in test bay floor expansion joint cracks. This area was previously missed by the water washing method. Since implementation of the new procedures, the potential for FOD has been virtually eliminated and no FOD incidents have occurred. Sgt Canning also implemented a run screen preservation plan that far exceeds technical order guidance. To protect the run screens fragile nylon/cotton material from dry rotting and tearing, the screens are changed out monthly versus the technical order recommendation of using them until they become unserviceable. Additionally, the screens are now stored inside and out of direct sunlight and weather to make them less susceptible to FOD being introduced from outside debris and premature dry rotting. TSgt Canning’s sound decisions and practical applications in every aspect of FOD awareness has virtually eliminated the FOD potential in the engine test facility. This has reduced the chance for a catastrophic engine failure resulting from FOD ingestion, thus preventing engine blade liberation and subsequent damage to multi-million dollar equipment and loss of life.

TSgt Thomas J. Canning, 20th Component Maint. Sqdn., 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw AFB, South Carolina
Lt Col Fenton was number two of a four-ship of F-15C Eagles on a combat training mission off the East Coast of Virginia. During the first engagement, his flight lead noticed vapor streaming from Col Fenton’s aircraft and a “knock-it-off” was called to end the engagement. As Col Fenton reduced the power to mid-range, he noticed the fuel flow on the right engine was twice as high as that on the left engine. In addition, the flight lead indicated that fuel was streaming from the right side of the centerline pylon. Col Fenton immediately turned direct to Langley and shut down the right engine to stop the fuel leak. The fuel flow decreased; however, fuel was still streaming from the aircraft. With no other options available to completely stop the streaming fuel, Col Fenton continued his recovery but elected to maintain his speed as long as possible to ensure landing prior to fuel starvation. As he entered the weather and slowed down for the instrument approach, the hydraulic system began cycling valves and reverting to backup systems due to the decay of windmilling RPM on the number two engine. The cycling hydraulics caused the flight control augmentation system (CAS) to drop off-line several times, placing increasing demands on Col Fenton under instrument flying conditions. Col Fenton executed a single-engine ILS to a perfect landing with field conditions of 700 foot ceilings and 2 miles of visibility. Upon inspection of the aircraft, maintenance discovered that the fuel leak originated from the fuel pump supplying fuel to the afterburner. The pump is held in place with three bolts, two of which had sheared off and the third had backed halfway out. Quick action, smart decisions, and expert flying skills enabled Lt Col Fenton to safely recover a crippled aircraft.

Lt Col Matthew R. Fenton, 71st Fighter Sqdn., 1st Fighter Wing, Langley AFB, Virginia

SrA Sager was tasked to accomplish a Pre-flight/Post-flight/Alert Pre-flight Inspection of an aircraft in preparation for a local training mission. During this inspection, SrA Sager discovered what he believed to be damage to the 4th stage Low Pressure Turbine blades (LPT). Immediately after this discovery he notified the flight line supervisor and expediter of this damage, which instantly grounded the aircraft. A further, more detailed borescope inspection revealed a considerable amount of damage had occurred affecting two, and possibly three blades. Because of his attention to detail, and technical experience, SrA Sager quite possibly prevented a catastrophic accident. SrA Sager’s concern and involvement make him highly deserving of this recognition. He is, and will continue to be, a role model for others.

SrA Matthew W. Sager, 119th Fighter Wing, Detachment 1, Langley AFB, Virginia
Sgt Grandstaff’s initiative, professionalism, and expertise were invaluable while deployed as the sole Air Force weapons safety manager for four bases in the Afghanistan Theater in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. He received kudos from the 9 AF/JUSCENTAF Chief of Safety during a Staff Assistance Visit (SAV) for his outstanding program management. He developed the first-ever weapons safety database, allowing the 455 AEW to track and trend inspections, mishap data, sited locations as well as open hazards. He conducted wet over 200 spot inspections on every facet of weapons safety which gave him the opportunity to identify several major safety violations within the Army’s Ammunition Supply Point (ASP). He then worked closely with the Army’s Quality Assurance Specialist (QASAS) and prepared risk assessments allowing Coalition Commanders the ability to mitigate the risk within the ASP. His risk mitigation skills came into play when he identified four previously unlicensed locations within Camp Cunningham. He identified the hazards and proposed a solution acceptable to both parties ensuring that the munitions sorted in the licensed locations were in accordance with strict Department of Defense guidelines. He coordinated with multiple coalition agencies to correct hot hung munitions procedures at Ragam Air Field allowing United States Forces and Coalition Forces’ aircraft to safely arm and depart together. SSgt Grandstaff’s outstanding work had a profound impact on the weapons safety program throughout the wing and had a direct impact on the wing’s ability to execute war on terrorism within the AOR.

SSgt Thomas B. Grandstaff, 355th Wing, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona

Sgt Patrick Seeley has distinguished himself as a Flight Safety NCO throughout the period of July - September 2004. During this time, he diligently worked to resolve BASH issues resulting from numerous aircraft strikes involving the Horned Lark within the confines of the Mountain Home AFB airfield. In cooperation with private contractors, Sgt Seeley developed a detailed research paper identifying the best airfield layout plan for a remote control cannon system to deter bird activity. Sgt Seeley conducted an ORM analysis and found that, although strikes were probable, there was virtually no risk of aircraft damage. The system was set aside in search of more effective means due to its low effect on larks and non-flocking birds, and excessive costs. After further investigation, Sgt Seeley observed that the larks appeared in more concentrated numbers during the period of time in the morning when the temperature warmed, and again during the period when the temperature dropped in the afternoon. He discovered that insects appeared on the concrete surfaces in high numbers during these periods and the larks were gathering to feed on the high concentration of insects. Sgt Seeley contacted several agencies within the Civil Engineering Squadron to research the feasibility of spraying pesticides to reduce the insect population, but excessive costs and short-term effects sidetracked this possibility. Sgt Seeley’s never quit attitude has now led to raising the issue to the NAF level, and he is arranging for a wildlife biologist to advise Mountain Home AFB on how to solve its lark problems on the airfield, while continuing to use pyrotechnics and various other scare tactics to remove the larks from the airfield during flight operations. Sgt Seeley’s proactive approach to flying safety did not end there; he has also put enormous efforts into the 366 FW flying safety inspection program. Sgt Seeley has worked diligently with all three squadron Flight Safety Officers (FSO) getting them on line with the first ever data based inspection tracking system. This system has enabled the wing Safety office to view squadron inspections as they are being input into the system. Sgt Seeley is the epitome of a dedicated 24/7 Airman. He spent endless hours coordinating a safety investigation board (SIB) at Kadena AB, Japan, for a mishap on a deployed 366 FW aircraft. When the SIB decided to bring the investigation back to Mountain Home AFB, Sgt Seeley spent three straight days over a holiday weekend building a 3X3 room. Sgt Seeley arranged transportation and billeting, met the board members upon arrival, set them up with computer clearances, and arranged for a recorder to join the SIB. Sgt Seeley’s get it done attitude is apparent in every thing he does.

TSgt Patrick R. Seeley, 366th Fighter Wing, Mt Home AFB, Idaho
Sgt Bryant has proven, sustained superior performance as a Ground Safety Professional in 12 AF/SEG. He served as 12 AF Chief of Ground Safety in the absence of the Chief of Ground Safety for 2 months. While maintaining day-to-day requirements, he willingly took on the additional workload. Sgt Bryant's efforts were an integral part in the success of the 12 AF decreasing PMV-4 mishaps by 15 percent, PMV-2 mishaps 50 percent, and property damage 71 percent. Sgt Bryant organized and taught a 10-hour Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA) General Industry certification course for 30 Air Force military and civilian personnel assigned at Davis-Monthan AFB. This increased safety awareness emphasized the importance of safety in industrial operations and saved the Air Force $12,000 in tuition costs. He is one of only three instructors that OSHA has certified to teach these courses in Southern Arizona. He was the first in the Air Force to provide management oversight of outsourced/contracted safety programs for USSOUTHAF. He reviewed the Statement of Work (SOW) and made critical recommendations to ensure it satisfied Air Force Instructions/Occupational and Health Standards. He ensures the contract companies are in compliance with contractual obligations through in-depth Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs) to all forward operating locations every 6 months. He provides Unit Safety Representative training to all DoD members deployed to Soto Cano, Honduras, and has been complimented by numerous Army personnel on the level of safety training they have received. When previous fatality briefings were conducted telephonically, Sgt Bryant initiated a Video Teleconference between a unit experiencing a fatality mishap and the 12 AF Commander in support of ACC-directed fatality briefings. The process now provides unit commanders valuable experience prior to briefing the ACC/GY. He developed a 12 AF trend analysis and provided timely information to units highlighting positive and negative trends. Analysis includes trends found during SAVs and ACC PME inspections. This valuable information provides senior leadership and Ground Safety staff data on where to focus their mishap prevention efforts. Sgt Bryant championed an initiative that established a mandatory briefing for spouses and military members with the purpose of reducing mishaps. This fresh approach takes the mishap reduction fight to the home front. Spouses and all active duty members acknowledge receipt of a briefing and the form is maintained in the member's official military record. The briefing outlines the member's safety responsibilities and commander's line of duty tool. The key high points are the member's responsibilities to adhere to motorcycle safety requirements, drinking and driving initiatives, and he highly encourages members to implement the ORM process in all activities to include high risk activity. The initiatives have support at the highest levels and will be tabled for discussion at the next PMV Mishap Reducer Task Force meeting. Sgt Bryant's dedication and accomplishments ensure 12 AF and its respective units maintain the highest level of operational capability through proactive risk management. Sgt Bryant is a true Air Force safety professional.
Yawn!
Man, am I beat.

Do this ever feel good.

TINY... IS THAT YOU?

Yep, been on this low carb diet folks been raving about.

Man!! What a dream!!

Tiny, I know that maintaining your proper weight is good, but take my word, it ain't for you.

What in Sam's hill was that all about?

Who knows.
## Mishap Statistics Scoreboard

### FY05 Aircraft
As of November 30, 2004

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As of November 30, 2004

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### FY05 Weapons
As of November 30, 2004

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### Aircraft Notes
It is likely ACC will log three Class As in November. First, MQ-1 crashed on final in the AOR on an FCF sortie. The other two were B-1s that sustained extensive damage but were not destroyed. One was landing gear damaged by a fire resulting from a brake failure during an aborted takeoff. The other was an airborne electrical malfunction in the aft electronics bay that likely killed multiple line replaceable units. Pay attention! If your wingman misses a few radio calls that he normally would catch, it might not be the best time to send him to the O-4 block for the last red air presentation... at night. Check yourself before you wreck yourself. Fly Safe!

### Ground Notes
ACC is off to a good start for FY06. After 2 months there has only been one Class A mishap. This is a 66 percent reduction from FY04. Unfortunately lack of seat belt use, along with alcohol use, as a contributing factor to this mishap. Class C mishaps are still on the rise. There have been over 60 for the month of Oct and the figure is still rising. In many cases, it is pure fortune that some of these Class C mishaps did not become Class As. We must continuously use the principles of PRM in our daily tasks.

### Weapons Notes
Following tech data is, without a doubt, ACC's number one weapons safety area of concern. Last year, over half of our mishaps were due to failure to follow tech data. This should be a no-brainer. We are required in almost every facet of the Air Force to follow AF guidance. Sounds easy, but we all know that it is not that simple. The challenge goes out to everyone to be conscious of the tech data and what the consequences are if you do not follow it. By reading and heeding, we will reduce our mishap rate by 50 percent.

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### Symbols for Mishap Aircraft

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### Legend

- **Class A - Permanent Total Disability:** Property Damage $1,000,000 or more
- **Class B - Permanent Partial Disability:** Property Damage between $300,000 and $1,000,000
- **Class C - Lost Workday:** Property Damage between $20,000 and $200,000
- **Non-rate Producing**
Don’t fear cold weather, respect it, prepare for it, and take appropriate precautions such as wearing your cold weather gear, staying aware of falling temperatures and wind chill conditions while working in extreme cold.

*Keep the mission going this winter, but do it smartly and without putting yourself or others at risk for cold weather injuries!*