In this Winter edition of COMBAT EDGE, we present you with safety articles from your Vice Commander (Lt Gen Bill Rew), your ACC Director of Safety (Col Sid “Scroll” Mayeur), your ACC Chief of Flight Safety (Col AI Marshall); and the 36th Operations Group Commander at Andersen AB, Guam (Col Randy Kaufman)—over a century of combined leadership and risk management experience offering you vital takeaways on complacency, overconfidence, discipline, professionalism, and leadership. I hope you’ll enjoy the read, and stay safe out there in Air Combat Command!

General Gilmary M. Hostage III
Commander

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THE COMBAT EDGE
ISSN 1063-8970 (Published Quarterlies, plus on-and-off duty Ground and 4-wheel Private Motor Vehicle, and Weapons Class A mishaps. Clearly, leadership played pivotal roles in these successes, so this edition of COMBAT EDGE revolves around Leadership.

Recently, in a nationwide poll, the National Safety Council asked, “When it comes to safety, who is the harder ‘sell’: Management or workers?” Two-thirds responded that management was the harder sell. This can be attributed to a variety of reasons. First, some managers rarely leave their desks, so they don’t really know their risks and hazards. Others are more concerned about production, paying less attention to the benefits of possible investments in safety initiatives, equipment, or training. Lastly, some don’t fully understand their leadership role in mishap prevention. Fortunately, I don’t see this as a problem in Air Combat Command, but we can increase safety awareness at all levels.

My safety focus this year builds upon our ongoing foundation of leadership and commander involvement, which we must reinforce through discipline and professionalism. In today’s fiscally and resource-constrained operating environment, ACC Airmen must hold each other accountable. We must do what’s right, by the book, every time, both on- and off-duty. Commanders and supervisors are doing what they can to execute safety programs and training—giving ACC Airmen all available tools to minimize risk—but they can’t be everywhere all the time. Through discipline and professionalism, we assure our leaders that their efforts carry on even when they’re not present.

Raise your level of professionalism and the level of safety raises with it. Raising our level of discipline translates to higher quality training, tighter tech order discipline, and safer operations. Raising the level of personal accountability among Airmen elevates the health of our Wingman ethos and personal risk management culture.

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Gen Gilmary M. Hostage III
Commander
An experienced fighter pilot was attempting a night precision approach at his weather minimums in an F-16. He had not flown an instrument approach in actual weather in the preceding year. The low ceiling combined with a high setting on the runway approach lights likely contributed to his spatial disorientation and a poor instrument crosscheck. He impacted the ground at 120 degrees of bank on short final.

On a short range offensive air-to-air engagement, an F-15E departed controlled flight. The very experienced aircrew unsuccessfully continued to attempt to recover the aircraft until just before ground impact. Ejection was initiated well past the recommended out of control ejection altitude.

Recovering from a cold, an experienced fighter pilot self medicated and elected to fly a high aspect BFM sortie in the F-16. On the third engagement, he experienced a G-induced loss of consciousness and impacted the ground near vertical at 1.2 Mach.

An experienced fighter pilot departed in an F-16D on a cross-country sortie with luggage improperly stored in the empty back seat. An afterburner takeoff caused a briefcase to shift and lodge in the rear cockpit throttle quadrant locking the jet in full AB. After a poorly flown flameout pattern, the aircraft impacted the ground just short of the runway.
All involved pilots who were highly experienced in fighter aviation. All were at the top of their game tactically, but all made basic aviation errors. How could that have happened?

My father was my greatest influence in my personal approach to flight safety. He flew bombers from World War II through Vietnam and in the tensest moments of the Cold War. He survived flying in squadrons with virtually non-existent safety programs when our Air Force was just born with accompanying accident rates that would make us shudder today. He saw the introduction of technical orders like the Dash 1 that detailed an aircraft’s operating systems and procedures.

I particularly remember sitting on his lap as a child while he studied B-52 Emergency Procedures and the “bold face” instructions on what to do when quick actions were at hand. He would always tell me that the hashed red markings on the side of the pages of the Dash 1’s Section 3 (they were originally printed in red) represented all the blood shed by those who paid the ultimate price of an aircraft mishap. He flew almost his whole career; and while he knew more about the bomber’s operating systems and procedures.

When I graduated from UPT, I was in the first group of 2nd lieutenants to get the brand new F-16. My Dad said was a proud but concerned parent, knowing the safety risks of flying a single-seat, single-engine fighter. The F-16 was a revolutionary fighter aircraft for its day, but it had quite a high Class A rate in its early years. When I would come home, conversations between my Dad and I would frequently drift to flying and his stories about friends he had lost in training and in combat meant even more to me. I too was seeing many pilots, very good pilots, make fatal mistakes. A lot of our discussions centered on the bad attitudes that can get one in trouble in the flying business: complacency, “get-home-illts,” pressing minimum altitudes or separation distances, and overconfidence. As the last one, overconfidence, intrigued me. As a young single-seat fighter pilot, I knew I needed to be confident in my skills to fly the airplane as aggressively as the situation required. But how could too much confidence in my skills get me in trouble?

As a 2LT copilot in a B-26, my Dad’s experience and overconfident aircraft commander got too slow trying to climb over the top of a thunderstorm. He stalled the aircraft and put it into a flat spin. Only my Dad and one other crew member survived. Forty years later, when I was a 2LT, one of my best friends was an extremely talented pilot and arguably had some of the best “hands” in the squadron. But his overconfidence bordered on recklessness, and it eventually killed him. As a single-seat fighter pilot, I knew I needed to be sure of my ability to fly the airplane, but I was determined to not let myself get overconfident and put myself in an untenable situation.

Following my Dad’s advice, I strove to become an expert in my weapons system. I was soon a “patch-wearer” as a young captain and became my squadron’s weapons and tactics officer and one of the top instructor pilots. Having averaged over 300 flying hours a year, I was also one of the high-time Viper pilots in the Air Force, and I felt that, tactically, I was at the top of my game. At my third operational assignment, I was also one of the few rear cockpit IPs.

One night, I was asked to fly in the back seat of a young MQT pilot who was having trouble landing at night. After several poorly flown approaches by the front-seater, I elected to attempt a full-stop landing from the pit, something I had never done before at night. In the flare, I drifted towards the side of the runway and the scared LT yelled “go around.” Fortunately, my wounded pride didn’t kill both of us. Declaring emergency fuel, I pulled a closed and gave the plane back to the front seater on final when I was sure he had settled down. He flew a decent ILS approach to a full stop. We were alive, but it was quite the humiliating debrief for me.

How could I have allowed my overconfidence in the airplane to almost kill myself and another pilot? Tactically, I was at the top of my game, but I had transferred my confidence in my ability to “fight” my jet to my ability to “fly” the F-16 in all environments without the same level of dedication. Knowing how to get the most warfighting capability out of the F-16 in a variety of combat missions takes a lot of study and practice. But proficiency in basic “Airmanship 101” flying skills have been mandatory since the Wright Brothers’ days. You have to know how to fly your aircraft day and night in good and bad weather. You have to know your aircraft systems knowledge cold, and you have to know what to do in emergency situations. That proficiency takes a lot of study and practice—for young and old pilots. It doesn’t matter if you’re the best instructor in your unit; you need to be as knowledgeable of your aircraft’s technical Bible as you are with its tactical Bible, the MCM 3-1.

It’s a simple truth: Overconfidence in one’s flying ability can kill the experienced pilot just as easily as the most inexperienced one in the squadron.

There is one other common theme of the mishap stories above. I personally knew all those involved. They were my instructors, mentors, friends or squadron mates. All were highly experienced in fighters; they were all “patch-wearers,” and weapons school graduates; and most were acting WIC instructors at the time of their mishaps. All were incredibly gifted and talented aviators who tactically were at the top of their game, and all but one paid the ultimate price for a moment of overconfidence. In the Air Force, we’re all about “fly, fight and win!” You can’t WIN unless you know how to FIGHT your machine to the limit. But, first, foremost, and last you have to know how to FLY … with confidence, but never overconfidence.

Thanks Dad.
Earlier this year, I addressed my folks in the ACC Safety Directorate on the area of leadership and professionalism ... or at least how I approach those two areas, and why they are so particularly important for Safety professionals. I wanted them to know what makes me tick, how they can anticipate my methods when they bring me a problem ... how I go about turning the baby for a good examination. They insisted my story would be worthwhile if told in the pages of THE COMBAT EDGE.

I am a fighter WIZZO with 2,000 hours in the F-4G, E, and F Phantom, and I am credited with two kills against surface-to-air missile sites as a Wild Weasel EWO during Desert Storm. My call sign is “Scroll,” and that is a two-beer story—it'll cost two beers to get me to tell it.

Now, if you don’t know why aviators have clung to this tradition of using call signs, well, it’s pretty logical, really. You see, in combat missions the Air Tasking Order assigns a mission call sign to every fighter, but your call sign changes daily. In Desert Storm, we Wild Weasels were given beer call signs like Coors, Bud, Miller, Schlitz, or Lone Star.

On one daylight mission over Northern Iraq, while I was checking our wingman’s six, I saw an unknown fighter rolling in behind our wingman. I needed to tell him to break for the bogey. In that split second I couldn’t remember our flight call sign ... was it Corona or Coors? But it only took me half a heartbeat to key the mike and say, “Orca, break left, bogey left 7 o’clock 1 mile.” There was no doubt in Karl “Orca” Kuschner’s mind: Out of 50 pilots on that frequency I was talking specifically to him. Oh, and by the way, the “bogey” was an F-16 from another flight.

So Scroll is my call sign. I am currently the Director of Safety at Headquarters Air Combat Command. The 23 military and civilian members of my Directorate know they can call me Scroll, Colonel, or Sir. If I’m upset about something, they bloody well call me “Sir.” Otherwise they’re welcome to call me Scroll. The fact is they don’t often call me Scroll because of their sense of professionalism. And “professionalism” is the focus of our discussion.
The Oxford University School of Business defines “professionalism” as “an adherence to a set of values comprising statutory professional obligations, formally agreed codes of conduct, and the informal expectations of superiors and colleagues.” Now that certainly sounds like something Oxford University would write, but I can’t help but notice that Oxford links professionalism with integrity, insisting that they both relate to proper conduct in our work. Oxford goes on to call professionalism a “demonstrable awareness and application of the highest qualities and competencies in one’s vocation.”

OK, that was a mouthful, but does any of it sound familiar? I often heard the voice of Alistair Cooke saying, “A professional is someone who can do his best work when he doesn’t feel like it.”

My leaders and followers know that they can count on me to be there, locked and loaded, ready to go when I am needed. If it’s my turn to go, I’m all in. Aviation … especially tactical aviation … is extremely competitive, filled with Type-A personalities driven to succeed. In air combat, there are zero points for second place, so that “need to succeed” drives our early efforts. But as a tactical aviator, I soon learned that any gap in my own knowledge or capabilities could result in mission failure, even friendly losses. I soon sensed that I NEEDED my squadron mates to know their stuff, and they NEEDED me to be the best I could be. As some of you know, post-flight debriefs can get pretty bloody because, in the debrief, we hold each other accountable for our mistakes and learn the lessons hard. Sun Tzu reminds us, “The more you sweat in peace, the less you’ll bleed in war.”

“Excellence in all we do” means we are personally and professionally obligated to be the best we can be at whatever duty we have been assigned. If you are the squadron snacko, you want to be the best snacko that squadron has ever had. If you’re the Chief of Ground Safety and there are no MAJCOM/SEGs who will look up to you, you must be THAT good. In one of my early air-to-air rides when I could not get a radar contact no matter how hard I tried, my instructor pilot became so frustrated that he screamed at me in the jet … three times. Years later, I won the squadron’s air-to-air top gun trophies for long-range air combat tactics. It took my butt getting kicked, but it worked. As senior professionals, I’m happy to see we’re a little more self-motivated, but we must be held accountable by our peers. Excellence demands it. We can’t improve otherwise.

Then-Captain Mayeux with Captain Norm Howell, F-4G Wild Weasel Crew, on the ground at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey during Operation DESERT SHIELD. They had just killed their first Iraqi surface-to-air missile site.
At Holloman Air Force Base, N.M. in 2003 for the Phantom II Society Convention.

Colonel Mayeux with Brigadier General (ret.) Robin Olds, Fighter Pilot, Commander, former Air Force Chief of Safety, and mentor.

Frank Tyger said, “A professional always knows how to do it, when to do it, and does it as well as he can.” I say devotion to Integrity, Service, and Excellence molds an Airman and Safety Warrior of such professionalism that he or she can tell the difference between what’s legal by the book … and what’s right. One, I was the instructor/evaluator WIZZO flying with a German Air Force F-4 student pilot on his qualification course graduation ride in the White Sands Missile Range near Holloman Air Force Base. Our two-ship was defending a point target from low-level B-1 bomber attackers. This kid was doing great—he even flew a brilliant supersonic high-to-low transition attack straight to Aim-9 Sidewinder parameters, good tones, and valid shots, maintained visual on our leader, Lt Col Clyde “Collide” Bellinger … what a blast! After the kill, we egressed west, 500 feet off the deck hauling the mail at almost 600 knots indicated airspeed. We were really pumped, but then … My student snapped us through a full-deflection aileron roll at low altitude while belting out his version of “Yee-Hah, Jester’s dead!” A victory roll at 500 feet flying over 550 knots! In his momentary fit of unbridled exuberance, he nearly flew us into the ground.

By the time we were inverted, I asked him a simple and surprising question: “What did I do?” I could not believe my ears, but it was immediately clear that he had not connected published flight restrictions to his actions in that moment, and how that had endangered us both. I asked him a few questions straight from the ops and procedural manuals:

“What’s the minimum altitude for aerobatics?” After a moment, he let out a shocked gasp, and I knew he realized his mistake … “Five thousand feet AGL, sir.”

As I was taking a big breath to continue my fit, he asked a simple and surprising question: “What did I do?” I could not believe my ears, but it was immediately clear that he had not connected published flight restrictions to his actions in that moment, and how that had endangered us both. I asked him a few questions straight from the ops and procedural manuals:

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“Good. What is the minimum altitude for rolling maneuvers?” “Sir, that’s also 5,000 feet AGL.” His voice started to shake.

“What’s the maximum bank angle for low altitude maneuvering?” He responded, “Sir, 120 degrees.”

I thought about it for a moment. By the book, this kid had busted the ride … his GRADUATION ride. But this kid was one of the best young German pilots I had ever flown with. Busting him would be entirely proper … we should safe it up and go home now, but I decided to challenge him. I told him he had to fly a perfect ride from this point on—perfect shots, perfect formation, never lose sight of lead, pitch out at EXACTLY 5 seconds, perfect radio calls, and nail his approach speeds. If anything at all got my attention, he would bust this ride.

And he did it. He flew a perfect ride. Back on the ground I told the flight lead, flight commander, squadron Ops-O, and the commander. I told them of my challenge and how he rose to the occasion. They were convinced, and let me pass the kid … but only after we made him get up in front of the rest of the squadron to play his radar and audio tape and debrief the event. Then each member of his supervision publicly extracted their one pound ration of flesh. It was painful to watch.

Many of my fellow instructors said I should have busted him—that was the book answer. But I couldn’t let the book get in the way of doing the right thing. Today, I am told that student is an F-4 Weapons School graduate, an OberstLeutnant (Lieutenant Colonel) standing up and making a difference in NATO’s air war over Afghanistan.

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Colonel Scroll’s Six Rules

1. Know thy self—that way I know my capabilities, and I won’t make promises my directorate nor I can’t keep.

2. Take no credit, because it’s amazing what a humble officer can accomplish when they do not require credit for it.

3. Take no crap—stick up for yourself and your people.

4. Deliver. When we say we can do the job, we owe what we promised. And then, let absolutely NOTHING keep you from completing the task. As my old mentor Brig Gen Robin Olds told me, “Make it a dare: ‘Stop me!’”

5. Be nice. Repeat, BE NICE. Trust me—you’ll get much farther with people, even with your adversaries. You catch more flies with honey than with vinegar.

6. And have fun. If it isn’t fun, MAKE it fun. Want your Safety Team to WANT to return to work tomorrow.

Now you know a little more about me and the way I see things. I’m proud of you all, and privileged to be your Director. I’m Col Sid Mayeux, but today, you can call me Scroll. ⚡️
BY COL J. ALAN MARSHALL  
ACC Chief of Flight Safety  
PhD Candidate, Organizational Leadership

A young Director of Operations for a Flying Training Squadron suddenly found himself in charge. His Squadron Commander had received a short notice assignment months before his scheduled replacement would arrive on station and the Director of Operations was moved up to serve as the Squadron Commander until the new boss arrived. Being a newly pinned on Lieutenant Colonel, the recent Director of Operations/temporary Squadron Commander found himself in a challenging situation.

The squadron was manned with very senior and highly seasoned instructor pilots charged with training other highly experienced pilots in an exceptionally challenging aircraft for an extremely challenging mission. Although the new commander had graduated from the Academy and had held several leadership positions while flying Air Force aircraft for years, he had never really been given a model for leadership. Sure, he had heard many speeches and read many articles about leadership, but he recognized that these resources had mostly been descriptive rather than prescriptive. Leadership speeches and articles usually include a list of what leadership is rather than provide a model for how to implement effective leadership. Leadership traits such as judgment, dependability, initiative, decisiveness, tact, integrity, enthusiasm, bearing, courage, knowledge, loyalty, and endurance are frequently listed as requirements for effective leadership (Air University, 2011). However, although such lists are helpful for self assessment and accountability, the listed traits are usually so broad that it is difficult for an aspiring leader to translate the concepts into a specific plan of attack. The purpose of this article is to give young Air Force leaders at least one simple leadership model to augment their chosen list of leadership traits worthy of pursuit.

An easy place to start discussing the proposed model is to look at the pyramid shape of a standard organizational chart. The pointy top of the pyramid represents the “leader” of the organization. The expanding upper middle of the pyramid represents mid-level leaders who fit immediately below the leader. The lower middle of the pyramid is manned by more numerous supervisors and the bottom of the pyramid is filled out by followers or workers (see Figure 1). The implication of this pyramid shape is that the followers at the wide bottom of the pyramid support or “serve” the supervisors, who in turn serve branch or division leaders, who in turn serve the top leader. The standard pyramid organizational chart represents a leadership model where requests for training, resources and guidance flow up from the workers to the leader who directs action or provides guidance in an effort to accomplish the mission of the organization. The model proposed in this article turns this pyramid upside-down.
leaders and supervisors are responsible for knowing what the workers need and for informing leaders higher in the inverted pyramid when training, resources or guidance is lacking. This model is theoretically derived from Servant Leadership Theory (Greenleaf, 1977) and Path Goal Leadership Theory (House, 1971). In Servant Leadership Theory, the primary purpose of the leader is to serve the followers. In Path Goal Theory, the primary purpose of the leader is to remove obstacles and increase rewards for followers who achieve goals. However, the inverted pyramid model is different from servant leadership in that in Servant Leadership Theory, the leader places the interests of the follower above the interests of the organization, whereas in any military organization, the mission of the organization must always come first. The inverted pyramid model is different from Path Goal Theory in that path goal leadership is primarily transactional where the leader controls excess resources to increase follower rewards for goal achievement. Air Force leaders rarely have such excess resources.

Now, back to the example leader at the beginning of this article. How does the inverted pyramid model apply to him? Well, I was that leader. Recognizing the high experience, motivation and skill level of the squadron members communicated along the white space of the organization chart. And the vision and mission. Not only must squadron members communicate along the white space of the organization chart.

Figure 1.

Figure 2.
When I was a new pilot I used to read articles in this forum and say, “You’d have to be pretty stupid to get into that situation.” As I gained more experience and saw a few “interesting” things, I changed my viewpoint to “How, with all their training and experience, did they allow themselves to get into that position?” in the hope I could learn something from their experience. However, never in my years of flying had I experienced something worthy of mention. A few summers ago, that changed.

I had recently graduated from the B-1 initial qualification course at Dyess AFB as an aircraft commander and had just finished mission qualification training in my new squadron. Prior to transitioning to the B-1, I had spent 4 years flying B-52s at Fairchild AFB and 3 years as a T-38 Instructor Pilot at Reese AFB, so I had seen and experienced a few things. Being new to the squadron and wanting to get as much flying as possible, I wormed (squeaky wheel gets the oil) my way into a Nellis deployment for Red Flag as a right-seat pilot. I was teamed up with an experienced aircraft commander who was getting ready to go to the B-1 Flight Instructor Course the following month. We flew two sorties the first week of Red Flag as a two-ship-B-1 flight lead and were scheduled to fly on Friday during the afternoon push. Everything with the crew had been going great and we were starting to anticipate actions and responses from each other, not always an easy thing with four crewmembers—each devoted to his or her own task.

On this sortie, we were once again the flight lead for the two-ship B-1 formation. The Red Flag mission commander did an excellent job coordinating and briefing his plan and embedded us in the middle of the package for a low altitude attack, right where we like to be. The weather was clear and as such we decided to fly visual contour so we didn’t have to worry about terrain following maneuver limitations (45 degrees of bank). The push worked as planned and inbound
to the target we were still unopposed. We dropped our ordnance on time and on target, and then turned east to beat feet back to the safe line. We had planned to fly just north of prohibited airspeed, about .95 Mach, and maintain a 500-foot visual contour flight. As we were approaching a ridgeline just north of the container, we received a threat call from AWACS at our 6 o’clock near. The Defensive System Office (DSO) called a break turn to the right as we crossed the ridge. The pilot used the bank angle in the break to allow the nose to slice down on the grassy sides of the ridge to get us back in the dirt—too close to the dirt as we soon found out. We had about 3,000 feet to descend; as I noticed the bank increase to about 110 degrees of right bank I wasn’t concerned—we had been performing rolling ridge crossings all week. I had flown the bomb run and, as we had done all week, transferred aircraft control to the other pilot to fly the egress. As the pilot not flying, I had flown the bomb run and, as we had done all week, transferred aircraft control to the other pilot to fly the egress. As the pilot not flying, I turned to look back out front and got the scare of my life. We were still in 80 degrees of right bank and the rudder is your most effective flight control during high angle of attack flight. The plane responded immediately and we went from 80 degrees of right bank to 20 degrees of left bank in a heartbeat, or it felt that way to me. The other pilot turned our stall inhibit system off and the jet responded with a 4 to 6 G pull (3.0 Gs is the maximum allowed by the B-1 tech order). We bottomed out at approximately 50’ AGL. As all this was happening I remember seeing the three trees off our nose and thinking this is where we’re going to impact. I also remember apologizing to my wife, my son, and my unborn daughter for screwing up, as I really didn’t think we were going to get out of this situation. Fortunately, the aircraft did not impact the ground, otherwise I wouldn’t be writing this and four crewmembers would be just another controlled flight into terrain statistic. Once the aircraft pulled away from the ground things were incredibly quiet in the cockpit. The DSO and Offensive System Office (OSO) were so busy keeping us out of the restricted area and monitoring the threat they hadn’t noticed the aircraft parameters until the G onset for the pullout. By the time they recognized it we were safely away from the ground. I was trying to quell my initial reaction of “he just tried to kill me” and the pilot flying was trying to pull the seat cushion out of his posterior end. Recovery proved uneventful, but during post flight we discovered that a 2-foot section of the left horizontal stab was missing. My first reaction was “I knew we were low but I didn’t think we were that low!” I initially thought that the missing piece of the horizontal stab was due to the asymmetric Gs applied during the recovery. Our crew flew again on Monday but we were grounded for the remainder of Red Flag while the accident investigation took place. Cost of repair was about $50,000—a small price to pay for four crewmembers and a 287 million dollar aircraft, but a substantial loss nonetheless.

What did I learn from this? First, an intense refresher on the B-1 flight controls system. The B-1 flight control software will always give priority to pitch as opposed to roll commands. With our split horizontal tail the engineers thought pitch should have priority. Usually true, but when you’re in 80 degrees of bank all it’s going to do is give you a controlled descent into the ground, especially with a 3.0 G jet. Second, always look out for the crew—even if you have an experienced pilot flying the jet. Don’t let your attention waiver when you are low to the ground. Third, should I have second-guessed my ejection decision? In hindsight, “yes.” We saved the jet, but when running through the ejection numbers later, we discovered that had I pulled the handles only the OSO would have gotten out of the aircraft in time due to the programmed delays designed to ensure crewmember separation during the ejection sequence. Fourth, using the rudder in the B-1 is not a bad thing. At the time, the B-1 community was under the impression that using the rudder low level was against tech order guidance, which has since changed. All in all I’m now a little older and hopefully a little wiser, but I still hold on to my adage that it’s best to learn from others’ mistakes and that you should count on superior airmanship to save you from inferior judgment.

I initially reached for the ejection handles but decided we were out of our ejection envelope. Our only option was to recover the aircraft. This violated my first rule of instruction while I was a T-38 instructor. I constantly told my students that if they ever thought about getting out of the aircraft they should get out, NOW! Don’t second-guess yourself, because you probably just put yourself out of your ejection envelope thinking about it. In the time-space distortion regime I found myself in, I remember looking at the position of the flight controls and seeing that they were deflected full left and aft. I came on the controls and assisted in keeping the control stick full left and aft while kicking in full left rudder, a fallback to my B-52 days and T-38 instructor days where you a controlled descent into the ground. I was trying to quell my initial reaction of “he just tried to kill me” and the pilot flying was trying to pull the seat cushion out of his posterior end. Recovery proved uneventful, but during post flight we discovered that a 2-foot section of the left horizontal stab was missing. My first reaction was “I knew we were low but I didn’t think we were that low!” I initially thought that the missing piece of the horizontal stab was due to the asymmetric Gs applied during the recovery. Our crew flew again on Monday but we were grounded for the remainder of Red Flag while the accident investigation took place. Cost of repair was about $50,000—a small price to pay for four crewmembers and a 287 million dollar aircraft, but a substantial loss nonetheless.

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![Photo](https://afkm.wpafb.af.mil)

Photo by: SSgt Asten Almon
Aircrew Safety

CAPT NICK G. GARASIMOWICZ AND TSgt TONY J. HENDRICKS, 62 ERs, 451 AEW, KANDAHAR AB, AFGHANISTAN. MCE crew was waiting for an opportunity to descend for landing the MQ-1. They contacted the LRE and informed them the a/c had incorrectly linked near the weather. Three attempts were made to establish control—first two were unsuccessful resulting in down-link being lost after 15 to 30 seconds. They were able to land safely. Inspection revealed significant hail damage, rudder, nose cameras, wings, tails, engine inlet, and radiator all experienced extensive weather damage. (Oct 11)

CAPT MIKE J. EMERSON, CAPT TANNER T. HEIN, 333 FS, 4 FW, SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB NC. Capts Emerson and Hein were flying as the wingmen of a two-ship F-15E FTU Basic Course TR-3 mission in W-122, 100 nautical miles east of SJAFB. During a pirouette maneuver in the first engagement, the jet did not respond properly. Capt Emerson called a KIO and recovered the F-15E to fight a low and level flight. The crew expertly completed the controllability check with enough altitude to recover if the F-15E departed controlled flight. The superior skill and crew coordination of Captains Emerson and Hein successfully saved a $54 million national asset with no further damage. (Nov 11)

Crew Chief Safety

TSgt MICHAEL LINGEBELCH, 552 AMXS, 552 ACW, TINKER AFB OK. While inspecting the left wing of an E-3 AWACS in preparation for a standard training sortie, TSgt Lengbelch heard an unusual noise emanating from the left wing. He directed the inspection of the aircraft’s operating system gauges for any type of defect which would indicate a malfunction; moments later, the #1 spoiler actuator hydraulic “extend” line ruptured. His quick actions contained the spill preventing pollution of nearby storm water drains and preventing the hydraulic spooling of four main landing gear tires. (Oct 11)

SRA RYAN A. NIEMIC, 552 AMXS, 552 ACW, TINKER AFB OK. SRA Niemiec was performing a Basic Post-Flight/Preflight on an E-3 Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft. During this inspection, he was assigned to look over the upper left wing surface area for any obvious defects. On a second look, he discovered an inconsistency in the paint near the mid-span of the left wing. Upon further investigation, he determined the defect was the result of exfoliation or stress cracks. His actions directly resulted in the airworthiness of the $330M aircraft and the safety of the 26 crew members on board. (Nov 11)

Flight Line Safety

TSgt JAVAHRAH JOHNSON, 447 ACE, 321 AEW, SATHER AF, IRAQ. TSgt Johnson de-conflicted over 1.6K tactical requests in 169K square miles of airspace. He performed real-time coordination with eight ATC radar sectors and five control towers, ensuring the safety of over 17K commercial airlines transitioning Iraqi airways. He noticed a flight of two helicopters 7 miles north of the airport, not in communication with the tower, that changed their northbound heading to a southbound heading (directly into the ROZ and the line of fire of the phalanx cannon). He directed the EOC to “knock-it-off.” (Oct 11)

TSgt GREGORY H. BOWRON, 552 MXS, 552 ACW, TINKER AFB OK. TSgt Bowron was performing maintenance to a fuel line on a KC-10 E-3A refueling aircraft. During this check, he noticed a pressure drop on the fuel line. After days of reported discrepancies from his weapons expediter the a/c had gone lost-link near the weather. Three attempts were made to establish control—first two were unsuccessful resulting in down-link being lost after 15 to 30 seconds. They were able to land safely. Inspection revealed significant hail damage, rudder, nose cameras, wings, tails, engine inlet, and radiator all experienced extensive weather damage. (Oct 11)

TSgt DANA SAWYER, 763 MXS, 23 WG, MOODY AFB GA. After days of reported discrepancies from his weapons expediter the a/c had gone lost-link near the weather. Three attempts were made to establish control—first two were unsuccessful resulting in down-link being lost after 15 to 30 seconds. They were able to land safely. Inspection revealed significant hail damage, rudder, nose cameras, wings, tails, engine inlet, and radiator all experienced extensive weather damage. (Oct 11)

Weapons Safety

The crew coordination of Captains Emerson and Hein successfully saved a $54 million national asset with no further damage. (Nov 11)

Pilot Safety

CAPT BENJAMIN D. LINDSAY, 77 FS, 20 FW, SHAW AFB SC. Capt Lindsey received an ENG LUBE LOW PFL and immediately turned his F-16 towards Grosetto Airfield, attaining a 1:1 glide ratio to the airfield. During the approach, he noticed the oil pressure dropping below 15 psi (-1 limits). He activated the EPU expecting the oil pressure to be below 10 psi before touchdown. He landed the aircraft 1,110’ down, just past a raised approach end cable and stopped the aircraft uneventfully, taxied off the runway, and pointed the left wingtip into the wind in accordance with the Activated EPU procedures. (Oct 11)

CAPT DAVID T. MADSON, 85 TES, 53 WG, EGLIN AFB FL. Capt Madson was leading a two ship of F-16s during a close air support mission at night on Avon Park range supporting the 21st Special Tactics Squadron as a part exercise SWAMP DEALER. While orbiting overhead his aircraft engine RPM and thrust began to wildly fluctuate. The engine surged several more times before he moved the throttle to idle for the landing. He landed uneventfully on an airfield he had never seen before, with the assistance of night vision goggles, in nearly complete darkness, from an engine-out gliding profile. (Nov 11)

Unit Safety

46TH EXPEDITIONARY RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON, 332 AEW, JOINT BASE BALAD, IRAQ. In an effort to mitigate risks, the 46 ERs reviewed MQ-1B incidents and noted an over-confidence in the GLS for approaches in marginal weather conditions. Findings led engineers to redefine the GLS and its capabilities as stated in the MQ-1B T.O. Skilled airmanship and CRM were used to safely recover three aircraft with degraded navigational systems, two aircraft with propeller malfunctions, one aircraft with an impending throttle actuation failure, and one aircraft with an overheated primary control module. (Oct 11)

Ground Safety

CAPT LUTHER L. BROWN, 116 ACW, ROBINS AFB GA. Upon arriving at his duty location, Capt Brown noticed a strong, foul odor permeating the area. He identified the odor as a natural gas leak that was venting near the 116 LRS’s Hazmat Satellite Pharmacy, located approximately 60 yards from the HQ building and 50 yards from the 330 CTS Bldg. He assessed the situation and reported to the base Fire Department. The swift and decisive actions of Captain Brown prevented a potential catastrophic ground mishap that could have led to loss of life, injury, and significant property damage. (Oct 11)

TSgt DANTE D. REY, 347 OSS, 23 WG, MOODY AFB GA. TSgt Rey observed a fully-qualified parachute rigger incorrectly perform a step as the rigger re-packed a BA-18/22 Backstyle Parachute. Realizing that the incorrect procedure could increase the probability of a parachute deployment malfunction, he began a recall of all parachutes that the rigger had re-packed. TSgt Rey’s quick actions removed 71 potentially defective parachutes from service, both at home station and in two forward AORs and ensured that aircrew were flying with properly packed parachutes. (Nov 11)

Weapons Safety

TSgt DAN A. SAWYER, 763 MXS, 23 WG, NELLIS AFB NV. After days of reported discrepancies from his weapons experter the a/c had gone lost-link near the weather. Three attempts were made to establish control—first two were unsuccessful resulting in down-link being lost after 24 hours without any jammed guns or incidents. He participated in several wing training sessions with the fire response team on aircraft entrance and munitions safety procedures. His efforts resulted in 30 firefighters being familiarization trained on the specific munitions hazards associated with F-16 aircraft. His tireless dedication allowed the unit to generate 228 combat sorties, amassing 1,312 consecutive hours with zero weapons incidents. (Nov 11)
QUARTERLY AWARDS

Flight Safety
CAPT MARK J. SAAR, 552 ACW, TINKER AFB OK. Capt Saar tracked 44 incidents and investigated 37 Class Q/E mishaps to mitigate risk in the 552 ACW’s $9.6B in E-3 assets. He orchestrated the 552 ACW Safety Day through coordination with 17 agencies. He developed an SEF icing bible with responding impact to over 1,500 wing Airmen. Capt Saar’s trend analysis led him to ID a spike in bird strikes. He initiated an early Phase II with the host base SEF staff and realized a 66 percent reduction in strikes from FY10. Capt Saar developed an Innovative Risk Management program that was benchmarked by 12 AF/SOF. This plan became a model program to the other nine 12 AF wings. His added focus on program management led to the resolution and closure of three mishap recommendations with OPRs at the depot and command levels. Capt Saar also conducted a live aircraft scenario MARE for 26 base organizations and 72 + participants. Lessons from this exercise honed the 552d incident response capability and engineered a rewrite of the MRP. Capt Saar also recognized a critical deficiency in WG trained SE board presidents. He hosted and orchestrated the largest CONUS BPC road show, training 26 BPs and supporting three MACOMs. His efforts allowed Tinker AFB to immediately support two Class A boards. Capt Saar developed a uniquely effective SE grammar to communicate the lessons for 32 intricate mishaps to 16 squadrons. His improvements in Safety program management cut overdue investigations by 43 percent and dropped average SiB timeline from 26 to 25 days.

Ground Safety
MSGT TAMEISHA R. SMITH, 355 LRS, 355 FW, DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ. MSGT Smith developed an innovative tracking system that eliminated overdue AF Form 164 reports to Wing Ground Safety, significantly reducing the average cycle time from 7 days to one. Additionally, MSGT Smith created a supervisor safety training spreadsheet that tracked newly arrived squadron members that allowed the swift registration of personnel while cutting class wait time by 35 percent. An out-of-the-box thinker, MSGT Smith advocated to the QA Superintendent that 100 percent of LRS evaluators assume the roll of USRs. The training provided an additional 11 sets of USR trained “eyes on” mission accomplishment. Her focus on unit safety resulted in an increase of approximately 10 to 100 safety inspections per month. With 17 AFSCs represented, the briefings present different scenarios and perspectives in ground safety management to our squadron. Additionally, MSGT Smith took a nonproductive pre-existing Community of Practice site and transformed it into an easy to navigate, and ingeniously organized SharePoint site. This enabled all LRS members to see safety issues at-a-glance, thereby saving hours in research time. Finally, understanding the impact “personal experiences” have in driving home the results of non-compliance with safety guidelines, MSGT Smith has initiated actions to have military members who were injured on duty brief their experiences at Commanders’ Calls.

Weapons Safety
TSGT MICHAEL I. MURPHY, 380 AEW, AL DHAFRA AB, UAE. TSGT Murphy re-sited the entire 850K lbs Net Explosive Weight, 24 Potential Explosion Site Temporary Munitions Storage Area, and corrected explosive quantity-distance violations that presented a hazard to HN, USA and USAF resources and personnel. His new site plan safeguarded over 80 personnel and $410M worth of USAF assets and ensured explosive storage and handling was conducted in the safest possible manner. TSGT Murphy identified structures near the wing’s primary hot cargo pad that violated explosive safety criteria. His revised hot cargo pad site plan increased the wing’s explosive cargo capacity by 20 percent, and his new safety procedures safeguarded another 120 hazards E-3 flight line maintenance personnel. He trained 12 ADWSRs, investigated two Dell Sword incidents involving nuclear certified equipment, published two monthly wing safety newsletters, completed three squadron annual inspections, and at AFCENT/SEF request, inspected two wing geographically separated units for explosive safety criteria compliance. TSGT Murphy identified a suitable location and wrote a new Explosive Site Plan to store quick-response, flyaway munitions for SOCCENT’s Crisis Response Element Forces, thereby meeting CENTCOM’s mission requirement for SOCCENT to maintain a theater-wide response capability during and after the Iraq and Afghanistan draw down.

Mishap Statistics Scoreboard

Flight Notes
ACC experienced two Class A flight mishaps so far in FY12. The one rate-producing mishap involved an F-15C which departed controlled flight. The other mishap (non-rate producing), involved an MQ-9 that struck a power line during pattern operations. Overall, a better start to FY12 than FY11, but even a single preventable mishap is one too many.

Ground Notes
There have been three fatal mishaps since the beginning of the fiscal year. All have been PMV-4 wheel mishaps. In one unfortunate mishap, the operator lost control at high speed on a left-hand turn in the road. He entered a ditch and then struck a cement culvert. Three Airmen were fatalities and the fourth was seriously injured. In another mishap, an Airman was operating his ATV on a street when he struck a vehicle that was backing into traffic. The Airman was wearing all required PPE. In the last PMV mishap, an Airman, while on leave, was found behind the steering wheel of his vehicle in a ravine. We need to stem the tide of this preventable string of mishaps. Are the wingmen watching out for their fellow Airmen? We must work to prevent anymore additions to this list.

 Weapons Notes
Let’s start FY12 off with a bang! By continuing efforts to plan, prepare, and execute you can minimize explosive-related mishaps in ACC. This past quarter, we experienced two Class E HAPs and one Class C mishap. The contributing factors for all mishaps were related to technical order (TO) violations. Each of these mishaps could have been prevented by following technical guidance. Failing to plan and prepare prior to performing routine explosive operations will surely increase the possibility of a mishap. For FY12, let’s reverse all historical negative trends by being more vigilant when performing explosive operations. Remember, planning and preparation leads to mishap mitigation! Thanks for your hard work and continued efforts to keep ACC explosive operations mishap free.
They eventually made it up to the top of the mountain by paying $20 for a ride in a Chevy 3500.
My friends and I decided to go snowboarding one Saturday. The mountain was only an hour and a half away so we figured we would just leave early in the morning, snowboard all day, and return that night. No big deal right? Well the day before our trip, we were told that a blizzard was coming in that night and wouldn’t move off till the following afternoon. Others told us we should postpone our trip for the following weekend but we weren’t going to do that. We decided that we would stick with our original plan and head out first thing in the morning.

When we met up at the car, we saw that we were snowed in and had to dig out. Once we got out of the parking lot, we couldn’t believe how much snow was on the ground. There was at least 2 feet in some places and we were driving in a Volkswagen Jetta. It took us 45 minutes to reach the highway (usually only a 10 minute drive) and it was in rough shape. The majority of the highway was still covered in snow and every 100 feet or so there was a pine tree lying in the middle of the road. At this point, I started getting a little nervous, but my friend who was driving was confident in his abilities.

Three hours later, we finally made it to the base of the mountain. We then started the drive up the mountain to the lodge. As we were driving, we noticed cars had been abandoned on the side of the road. At that point, all of us were thinking whether the car could make it all the way up. We figured as long as we didn’t have to stop we would be good to go. Sure enough, 5 minutes later, we had to stop for a couple cars in front of us who had gotten stuck. After we helped push those cars to the side of the road, we attempted to keep going up the mountain. Unfortunately, due to the ice on the road we had no traction and started sliding everywhere. We then decided that there was no way we were going to make it up the mountain. We ended up turning the car around and headed back down to the base of the mountain. We eventually made it up to the top of the mountain by paying $20 for a ride in a Chevy 3500.

There are several takeaways from this trip. First, we never should have gone out on the roads during/after a blizzard. They were in terrible shape and if an emergency would have happened we would have been on our own for a while. Second, we had very little food and water in the car. If we would have gotten stuck somewhere we would have been in trouble. Lastly, we should have used common sense. We were young and had the mentality that nothing could stop us. This is a dangerous way of thinking and we were lucky nothing unfortunate happened.

Snowboard or Bust

By 1LT SCOTT D. HALL

In front of us who had gotten stuck. After we helped push those cars to the side of the road, we attempted to keep going up the mountain. Unfortunately, due to the ice on the road we had no traction and started sliding everywhere. We then decided that there was no way we were going to make it up the mountain. We ended up turning the car around and headed back down to the base of the mountain. We eventually made it up to the top of the mountain by paying $20 for a ride in a Chevy 3500.

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“COLD AND FLU SEASON!!!” Lt Sue groaned as she sat back in her chair and stared at the ceiling for a moment before sitting upright to take in the sight of “Rodney” a.k.a. “Bubble Boy.” “SSSHHHOOGG, AHHhhhh,” his voice trailed off as he took another breath before beginning. “Lt Sue,” Bubble Boy began, extending his hand out toward his office mate in a sweeping arc, “I'M, YOUR …”

Holding her hand up to cut him off, Lt Sue replied, “No Bubble Boy, not this year, I'm not putting up with it again, the suit is bad enough.” Looking hurt, his lower lip began to tremble as he shuffled along, his bubble suit rustling. Then suddenly he halted as his bubble caught the corner of his desk. Frantically, he examined the bubble before determining that it hadn’t been damaged and his air supply was still contaminant free. “I know it’s cold and flu season, but aren’t you being just a little paranoid?” Lt Sue remarked as she reached for the phone to make a call.

Looking just a little skeptical, Bubble Boy leaned forward and hissed, “That phone could be teeming with millions of nasty germs just waiting to bring you down; you should have cleaned it first. Besides, the proper term is Influenza—it’s a respiratory infection, hence the suit. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports that between 35—50 million Americans will catch “the flu” this season—I don’t plan on being one of them. Most people recover, but CDC estimates suggest that nearly 100,000 people are hospitalized and about 36,000 people die from the flu and its complications every year. Besides, flu season typically starts in November and runs through March. If I was so ‘paranoid’ as you suggest, I would have donned the suit before Halloween.” “It would make a great costume, but it might scare the children,” Lt Sue retorted.

By 10:00 o’clock, Lt Sue was able to block out the wheezing of the respirator and the crinkle of the suit as Bubble Boy shifted in his seat. “Staff meeting,” Lt Sue called out as she headed out the door, trying to stay one step ahead of Bubble Boy. Lt Sue grabbed a chair between two people to avoid having to sit next to him just as he (Bubble Boy) made his grand entrance.
“You two should sit together.” Lydia responded, offering her chair to Bubble Boy, who squeezed into the chair with a loud crinkly “plop.” Everyone turned to look at the two of them sitting at the end of the table and gave a wounded look of recognition. Lt Sue quickly scribbled “FLU SEASON, act normal, don’t engage him!” in large block letters and turned it to the assembled audience. They nodded in acknowledgement just as Capt Bob, the Executive Officer walked in, looked at Bubble Boy, and smirked, “Is it December already?”

“You know, you can get the flu if someone around you who has the flu coughs or sneezes, or by touching a surface (like a telephone or door knob) that has been contaminated by someone who has the flu. Flu viruses can pass through the air and can enter your body through your nose or mouth. If you’ve touched a contaminated surface, they can pass from your hand to your nose or mouth. Besides, you’re at the greatest risk of getting infected in highly populated areas, such as in crowded living conditions and in schools, AND IN MEETINGS LIKE THIS!!!” Bubble Boy scolded, his face turning a deep red, and then an odd shade of deep purple as he began to rise from the chair. He never made it though, as his body tilted to the left, and he slumped to the floor.

“What? The chairs are too tight, he just blocked his air inlet and passed out from a momentary lack of oxygen, he’ll be fine” Lt Sue reassured them. “This happens once or twice during flu season. He’ll wake up with a headache, convinced it’s the onset of the flu, and take the next few days of sick leave. He’s fine.”

“Right, then,” Capt Bob replied, not missing a beat, “let’s look at next week’s TMT Taskers …”

Germs are all around us and they take a high toll on the available workforce. Numerous workdays are lost each year due to colds, flu, and the like. Although there’s no known cure for the common cold, there are things we can do to protect ourselves. If you do come down with something, the best you can do for your office is to tell your supervisor who can send you home. Your odds of preventing the flu will increase if you get vaccinated each fall with a flu shot or by using the flu nasal spray vaccine. The nasal spray is approved for use only among healthy people between the ages of 2-49. The flu shot is approved for use among children over 6-months-old, healthy people, and even those with chronic medical conditions. The benefits of the vaccine, however, won’t take effect immediately. Keep your world as clean as possible. Using disinfectant wipes can reduce the number of germs and bacteria on office surfaces by up to 99.9 percent. I have watched co-worker after co-worker succumb to the sneezes and coughs of the latest office crud while I have remained virtually disease-free, even though I share some of the same workspaces. Don’t be your organization’s “Bubble Boy.” Cold and flu season doesn’t have to leave you gasping for air or taking extreme actions to protect yourself, starting with knowledge and a few simple precautions, you can avoid undue discomfort and lost work hours. What measures are you willing to take to preserve your ability to perform your job? As in other areas, all it takes is a few preventative actions to successfully combat the germ warfare we all face every day. It really is a critical part of making sure the mission gets accomplished!