Did You Know? If you experience sleep loss, the effect is cumulative and your body carries a sleep “debt.” A large debt may require several days of proper sleep cycles for your body to fully recover.

When in crewrest... make sure you’re actually getting enough rest!

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EMPLOYING CHECK 3 WITH OUR SOCIAL MEDIA HABITS

When we are at war, we strive to arrive at the point of battle with the best plan, training, awareness and weapons to dominate our adversary. America expects nothing less of the US Air Force 24/7/365. So why do our daily social media habits give potential adversaries what they need to defeat our desire to be safe and secure? When we post pictures that have GPS times and locations in the data, or let our phone track and update, in real time, our location for others to see, we put a target on our back that says I am here, come get me. It can also say, I am not home, so go there and visit my family.

Since the adversary may be a terrorist, a thief, or a deviant, we won’t know where they are coming from or what their overall intentions are. So take steps now to safeguard yourself and loved ones with three easy steps:

1. Review your Gear, mostly cell phones, but also our electronic accounts that provide hints as to our locations, habits and plans. Unselect location software for applications that don’t need to know where you are and don’t accept friend requests from people you don’t know. Also, take pictures with a camera that doesn’t have geographic information embedded in the data file.

2. Next, develop a Plan to recheck your efforts, because application updates and software changes regularly change your preferences without your consent. It will be a regular effort that you need to stay on top of.

3. Test your Skills regularly by encouraging your circle of family and friends to respect your efforts when they post items on their social media that lead back to you. Discuss with them why you are making the effort and they may decide to follow your leadership.

Those who mean to do you harm are very aggressive when it comes to gathering information on what you are doing. Make it harder on them, so that you have a better chance of noticing their surveillance if they come after you. If you are a hard target, they probably won’t bother. If you make it easy through your social media habits, you may have endangered the reasons you serve in the first place. In the airspace and on the battlefield, it is better to be the spotter than the target.
So I like movies—all types of movies really; but the ones with large explosions and fireballs the size of football fields, excite me the most. Even more so are the movies where the hero saves the day by stopping the ticking time bomb with only a few seconds to spare. That's drama at its best. Now as much as I love Hollywood, unfortunately it's portrayal of explosions, ticking time bombs, and what it takes to disarm them are usually both inaccurate and unrealistic.

Moreover, being in that environment and witnessing it first hand is something completely different—simply overwhelming. Fortunately for the Air Force, there is a team of highly trained individuals that are prepared to safe unexploded ordnance whenever called upon. Since its roots during WWII, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, or EOD, is all too familiar with the dangers surrounding unexploded ordnance, and it strives to understand what makes them tick and more importantly how to safely defuse them in order to save lives and protect resources.

While EOD covers a wide range of mission areas from rendering safe conventional, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, it was during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) when the acronym “IED,” or Improvised Explosive Device, became common military lingo and a household name. In fact, IEDs were the #1 cause of US fatalities during the two conflicts. In order to combat such a significant threat, Air Force (AF) EOD teams stepped up to fill the massive requirement for EOD forces on the ground and conducted over 55K missions in support of coalition and joint forces during OEF/OIF. This included finding and rendering safe a total of 19,946 IEDs.

While every one of these missions potentially saved a life, it unfortunately came at a cost with 20 AF EOD techs and a total of 132 joint services EOD techs making the ultimate sacrifice, with numerous more injured. However, through this unpredictable and hellish ordeal, EOD learned a great deal more about IED warfare, the enemy, as well as friendly Tools, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). It was necessary to quickly adapt to the rising IED threat, and the lessons learned will be capitalized on for years to come.

One of the lessons to highlight is EOD’s understanding and use of risk management. Many would consider EOD an inherently risky job. Ask anyone on the street if they’d like to disarm a bomb, IED, or any other explosive device and the answer would probably be a resounding “no.” However, why would anyone willingly do such a risky job? Explosives are unforgiving and the ramifications of failing are usually injury or death, and you only need to mess up once to learn this lesson the hard way. So how can EOD techs do it so successfully? Specialized training aside, the real answer is understanding the risks of the situation and knowing how to control them appropriately.

RISKY BUSINESS

BY MAJ. MATTHEW BORAWSKI

Photo by: Master Sgt. Jeremy Lock
Fundamentally, EOD technicians should be called Risk Managers. Most Airmen generally grasp the concept of risk management (RM). The basic understanding of RM is that it prevents bad things from happening. While that’s true, there is much more to RM. A great starting point is Air Force Pamphlet (AFPAM) 90-803, Risk Management Guidelines and Tools. It defines RM as "the systematic process of identifying hazards, assessing risk, making control decisions, implementing control decisions and supervising/reviewing the activity for effectiveness." This is an important characterization because it identifies the cyclical and continuous nature of RM. Consider again an EOD team leader conducting a counter-IED (C-IED) operation. For the EOD tech, making only one assessment of the risks on the battlefield may be useful, but it’s only the tip of the iceberg. EOD team leaders must continually make risk identifications, assessments, and control decisions because the environment is extremely fluid and new threats can pop up every minute.

Conducting RM in a combat environment
So how does EOD conduct RM in a combat environment? First, it’s important to understand the difference between "deliberate" and "real-time" risk management. In a safe environment with plenty of time to plan and execute an operation, deliberate RM should be conducted. AFPAM 90-803 provides numerous examples and models for deliberate RM use. However, in a combat environment when time isn’t on your side and things are constantly changing, sensible use of real-time RM is necessary.

The combining of these two concepts is how EOD succeeds. In an IED laden environment, or a base recovery after attack scenario, or even a nuclear weapon accident/incident, EOD teams perform tactical execution of real-time risk management, mitigating the risks as best as possible. However, this will always be reinforced by deliberate risk management planning in addition to specialized training. For instance, training in counter-IED operations will provide a general framework on C-IED procedures; however future responses can never be predicted and therefore trained in advance. The military as a whole understands this principle which is why it places a strong emphasis on training. Training allows us to ensure our processes are as sound as can be so when uncertainty comes into play, aka risk, we’re ready for it. This is exactly how EOD approaches its mission – build the framework for operating, then use RM to enable the greatest chance of success.

Five steps of Risk Management
As most are aware, the five generally accepted steps (cyclical steps) for conducting risk management, both deliberate and real-time, and outlined in AFPAM 90-803 are as follows:

1. Identify hazards
2. Assess hazards
3. Develop controls and make decisions
4. Implement Risk Controls
5. Supervise and Review

In order to further explain the general EOD thought process for each of the five RM steps, consider the following scenario from Afghanistan, which is based on real events.

"Intel reports that for the last three nights, several locals were seen digging and potentially tunneling under a main transportation route near the town of Ghazni. Instances of buried roadside IEDs have occurred in the past with deadly outcomes, killing US, coalition, and Afghan security partners. The local battlespace owner decides to dispatch an EOD team to the site after additional reports of wires being located near the dig site."

1. Identify hazards
2. Assess hazards
3. Develop controls and make decisions
4. Implement Risk Controls
5. Supervise and Review

Identify hazards
Identifying all the hazards is extremely important to an EOD team once arriving on the scene of a potential IED. In the team’s minds, everything is "out to kill them." Through the identification process, the EOD team may discover threats such as insurgents or triggermen mingled in with local pedestrians, secondary or tertiary IEDs near the team’s safe area, in-direct fire from a nearby town, sniper fire from the surrounding rooftops, and of course the possible IED buried beneath the road. As stated before, continuous hazard identification is essential.
Assess hazards
Simply put, assessing the hazards aims to match up the likelihood of an event occurring with the severity of the outcome. The past does not accurately indicate future probability; therefore, new assessments must always be made. In our scenario, understanding how the buried IED might function is critical. It could be command detonation, victim operated, or some other way such as multiple functioning methods. It all depends on the imagination of the bomb maker. So to the EOD team leader, anything is possible. The severity of the outcome is what’s important to the EOD team. The EOD team leader will consider damage and injuries if the IED detonates right now, impacts of the IED on the mission, and the potential effects of exposing the team in that environment. When we combine the probability and severity for an IED response in a place such as Afghanistan, it can translate into a significant or high risk operation based on a common risk matrix such as what’s in AFPAM 90-803.

Develop controls, make decisions, and implement risk controls
When risk assessments are extremely high or high, most organizations reconsider their way forward such as rejecting or avoiding the risk altogether. It’s important to note that RM seeks to create the optimum level of risk, not the lowest level of risk. Complete avoidance of an IED is sometimes possible, but oftentimes IEDs can’t be avoided because of mission necessity. Therefore, deciding how to control or mitigate the involved risks is the most important aspect of RM (risk reduction). The risks will always be numerous and the threat assessment always high, but controlling each of the risks and leveraging opportunities allows EOD to succeed at its mission to protect people and resources. This is where we earn our paycheck.

In our IED scenario, this is generally done by reducing the uncertainty in the environment. Some examples include safe area searches before starting any action against the IED; controlling access to the scene; ensuring forces assist with security; using protective measures such as bomb suits and other PPE; and above all, keeping as much distance from any suspect IED by conducting operations as remotely as possible. This means robotics, visual searches, and other remote procedures. Every inch further away from an explosive detonation will exponentially increase the odds of survival. Risk management through reduction/mitigation is the key to EOD’s success.

Supervise and review
It is important for risk decisions to be made at the appropriate level and supervised accordingly. For EOD, tactical risk control decisions are often made at the team leader level and not by leadership back at the base. The reason for this is because the eyes on the ground provide the best site picture on what risks are involved. Still, operational EOD leadership must provide parameters and boundaries for teams to make those decisions, as well as provide a method for seeking risk reduction approvals at the next level. An example of this might include taking action on an IED which will cause some collateral facility damage. This is never ideal, but it may be the only way to safely remove the IED threat. Finally, EOD leaders must hold accountable the actions taken by the team. Poor risk assessments or risk control decisions, if left unchecked, can lead to a culture of unnecessary risk acceptance and ultimately future failures. Instances of this could include taking action against a potential IED before ensuring the site is clear of all personnel. EOD leadership must ensure that safety practices and standards are upheld in every instance. When explosives are involved and lives are on the line, shortcuts will not be tolerated.

Even the riskiest job can be made safe
So why do I share all this? As previously stated, bomb disposal and rendering safe IEDs is inherently dangerous. However, through specialized training as well as deliberate and real-time risk management, risks are reduced and the job is made as safe as possible (never 100%). If we could somehow know every risk, we could theoretically control and reduce each one of them. Unfortunately, this will never be possible. Peter L. Bernstein, author of “Against the Gods: A Remarkable Story of Risk,” describes it best. He writes, “The recognition of risk management as a practical art rests on the simple cliché with the most profound consequences: when our world was created, nobody remembered to include certainty. We are never certain; we are always ignorant to some degree. Much of the information we have is either incorrect or incomplete.” Therefore, we must do the best we can with the information that we have. So what does the future hold? From an operational perspective, there may appear to be a decrease in IED activity since Air Force EOD’s departure from OIF and OEF. This is not the case. The dangers of IEDs and other explosive threats are not going away anytime soon. A scene like the one witnessed during the Boston Marathon bombing is a case in point. In the meantime, EOD technicians will continue their trade as risk managers, continually identifying and learning new enemy TTPs as well as the associated risks to friendly forces. Risk management is our success story. Without it, we would simply be cowboys hoping to “cut the right colored wire” in order to save the day, just like Hollywood thinks we do from all their movies.

Sources:
Aircraft Tire Heating

BY MR. PHIL MCCOLLUM

Aircraft tire heating can have a significant impact on tire performance, and can have safety implications as well, especially for hot weather operations. There are three primary causes of aircraft tire heating. Deflection (deformation) of the tire carcass while rolling generates significant heat from flexing of the tire sidewalls and compression and expansion of the rubber. Heat transfer from a high temperature source such as hot wheels and brakes heats up the tire. Finally, friction with the ground, from rolling resistance and braking maneuvers, heats up the rubber in the tire contact area and some of this heat is transferred to the interior of the tire. Hot weather operations will magnify these causes by raising the starting tire and pavement temperatures, and also reducing the ability of the tires to dissipate the generated heat.

Of these three causes of tire heating, deflection of the tire while rolling is probably the least recognized and of the most concern. Just as bending a paperclip back and forth will generate heat, the repeated flexing of the tire sidewall heats up the rubber. Aircraft tires, unlike automotive tires, are designed to operate with large deflections for relatively short durations during taxi, takeoff, and landing, with cooling periods in between operations. Deflection occurs primarily in the tire sidewall, and is a design feature to help the tire absorb bumps and handle turning maneuvers. The amount of heat generated by tire deflection is dependent on the ground speed during operations, distance traveled, and load and tire pressure which influence the magnitude of the deflection.

Heat transfer from the wheels and brakes is a significant cause of tire heating, with the magnitude dependent on the temperature and proximity of the heat source, and the exposure time. All brake applications will add heat to the tires, with the most heat generated by high speed maximum effort braking and less heat due to light braking, low speed, or short duration braking events. Ground friction during braking is high and causes tire heating. The ground friction due to rolling is much lower and is a minor contributor to tire heating.

Heating affects tire structural integrity in a couple of ways. The most obvious is that the higher temperature increases the tire pressure. More significantly, the internal heat causes the nylon cord layers to lose strength, and the tread to lose adhesion. Aircraft tire structural strength is substantially reduced by 250°F, generally considered the upper limit for safe tire operation. The failure mode is that the nylon layers begin to separate until the tire is no longer able to withstand the pressure, resulting in an explosive release of tire pressure in unpredictable directions.
Increased deflection for a given load which exacerbates operational tire heating. Furthermore, hot ambient temperatures reduce convective cooling since the temperature differential between the air and tire is smaller. Conversely, a cold temperature environment is favorable. High altitude also is a factor; usually ambient temperatures are reduced, which helps, but the lower air density at altitude means less cooling via convection. Winds help cool the tire by allowing air to dissipate heat.

Multiple operations in close succession, before the tires can cool down, can rapidly elevate tire temperatures. Rubber is a good insulator and resists heat transfer, as rubber wettability illustrates. Once heated due to normal heat deflection cycles, braking action, and proximity to the high temperature wheels and brakes. Other factors can contribute to tire temperature problems. Examples include under-inflated tires and usage of retread tires. Under-inflated tires increase tire deflection. However, operations below the rated tire pressure allow more tire contact area with the runway and can improve braking action. Thus they may be desirable as long as the impact on deflection is considered. Retread tires are quite common and are more at risk of heating problems than original tread tires. Retreads may have extra rubber on the carcass which causes more rapid heat buildup when the tire flexes under load. To help eliminate problems, before retreads, the tire retread process provides an opportunity to conduct non-destructive tire inspections to detect any internal tire heat damage caused by prior operations.

Potential Damage

Tire failure does occur while the aircraft is performing taxi operations, after the aircraft comes to a stop, or even after takeoff with the gear retracted. The delay of about 1.5 minutes for the tire to reach peak temperature means that the time of failure can be some time after a braking event. The damage due to explosive release of tire pressure can vary widely, depending on the location of the tire failure relative to surrounding structural components. Aircraft tire designers consider the potential for tire failure and can utilize separation of critical systems, judicious placement of items in the wheel well, and so on, to help reduce the damage if tire failure does occur. Nevertheless, destroyed tire debris can strike vulnerable areas such as hydraulic lines or fuel lines, and release of these fluids near an ignition source such as hot brakes can result in fire. The speed of the tire, the kinetic energy to the tires and as a result of high-speed motion the tire debris have a larger damage radius. Tire explosions after the aircraft comes to a stop could potentially be fatal to maintenance or ground personnel that approach the tire area before temperatures have decreased. Even if a tire explosion caused little damage, it could create an operational nuisance by blocking an active runway and spreading debris over the runway that could damage other aircraft.

Examples from Operations

Recent operational reports illustrate that aircraft tire heating problems represent a real concern. One example involves a business jet. The aircraft performed a normal taxi out to the runway and then experienced a slight operational problem during takeoff and returned for maintenance. Shortly thereafter, on the second takeoff roll, the tires overheated. Fortunately, damage was limited to the tires. In another example, a transport airport conducted a series of high speed taxi runs in close succession, with only light braking. Ambient temperature was above 100°F, raising the initial tire temperature and providing reduced air cooling benefit, but brake temperatures remained within the normal zone. Unfortunately, heat transfer from the brakes combined with the hot ambient temperature and the heat generated by the braking events caused the tires to reach a critical temperature. Tire explosions fractured hydraulic lines and the ensuing fire caused extensive damage to the landing gear and wheel well area of the aircraft.

Aircraft Systems

Internal tire temperature is not monitored on a real-time basis by aircraft systems. The brake temperature monitoring system (BTMS) temperature, available in most heavy aircraft but not typically available in fighters, does not represent tire heating. Even so, BTMS is certainly an indicator of the influence of brake temperature on tire temperature. The BTMS temperature sensor is remotely located away from the brake to help protect the sensor from the extremely high brake temperatures. BTMS does not measure the actual brake temperature, and it can take up to 1.5 minutes for the temperature sensor to reach a peak value. Aircrews must recognize this delay and the delayed impact on tire heating, especially if extensive ground taxi is required after a high energy braking event.

Aircraft wheels are often designed with system design-plugs that melt when the internal wheel temperature at the fuse-plug reaches a pre-determined design value. The fuse-plugs are a safety device designed to release pressure before brake heat reduces the strength of the wheel to a critical level resulting in a wheel/tire explosive failure. A melted fuse-plug results in a deflated tire. Thermal fuse-plug melting temperatures are usually set in the range of landing and rejected takeoff braking events. Ground taxi with light braking does not appreciably heat up the wheels or brakes and the thermal fuse-plugs do not reach the critical temperature during routine ground taxi operations. Thus the thermal fuse-plugs offer no protection for ground operations where high internal tire temperatures are caused by excessive taxiing.

Landing and braking during high temperatures is another scenario where the thermal fuse-plug melting temperature can be reached. Since it is undesirable to melt fuse-plugs and have deflated and potentially damaged tires after landing, operational procedures may require checking the landing touchdown speed versus the maximum allowable brake application speed that is predicted to result in melted fuse-plugs. This procedure may direct a delay braking to stay below the critical brake application speed.

Summary

Aircraft tire explosions can result in major damage. Extended ground taxi, or a combination of takeoff and landing events followed in close succession by extended ground taxi, are the scenarios that can cause the tires to overheat where little or no warning or protection is provided by aircraft systems. From an aircrew perspective, it is important to understand how ground operations, including takeoff, landing, and taxi affect tire heating and raise the internal temperature and pressure of the tires. The best practice to prevent tire heating problems is to avoid excessive taxi distance and high speed taxi during hot weather or high gross weight operations, and be aware of the time delay from braking events to peak tire temperatures. With proper awareness, aircrews can implement procedures to protect their tires, their aircraft, and themselves.
Here I was, an inexperienced copilot in the mighty B-1, on my first RED FLAG sortie. We had just pushed, performed our planned combat descent, and had leveled off heading west out of student gap. Vigilantly looking forward for those tricky aggressor pilots and thinking about our attacks and threat reactions to come, my crew was stunned as we performed a ridge crossing at 500 feet only to watch a 4-ship of NATO F-16s cross right beneath us, roll inverted, and pull to the surface and continue on their way. As the shock of the close pass set in, all I could think was “crazy Europeans, and welcome to RED FLAG.” RED FLAG has gone through many changes in its 40 years of existence. At its inception, it was an air-to-air exercise which attempted to give pilots the experience of their first 10 combat sorties in a realistic training environment. Over the years, multiple changes have been made to the tactical execution: the addition and focus of air-to-surface tactics, Suppression of Enemy Air Defense, Combat Search and Rescue, and now emerging capabilities in non-kinetics and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Today, RED FLAG is as much about exposure to advanced tactical and low operational integration as it is about those first 10 combat sorties. Tactics are not the only place that advancements have taken place in the exercise. Numerous safety rules have been incorporated into the exercises so that participants can survive the exercise and apply the lessons learned in actual combat.
In the initial RED FLAG, back in the mid-1970s, rules for conducting the exercise had not been developed. As the years moved on, training rules were put in place for aerial combat. These included altitude blocks, aircraft bubbles and maneuvering limits, and attack restrictions. All of these improvements were put in place in the name of safer aerial combat training. The USAF came to the realization that training for combat must incorporate rules to remove some of the risks inherent in highly demanding flying operations.

Today’s RED FLAG continues to evolve as more and more USAF capabilities are added to the exercise. RED FLAG participants can become task saturated as fighters and bombers vie for space while prosecuting targets, reactively targeting air-to-air and surface-to-air threats, while building the overall picture for command and control. This orchestrated effort comes on the backbone of a tactical plan put together the day prior by the overall mission commander and his package commanders. Mission planning is the first step in a safe RED FLAG mission.

The RED FLAG mission must include the essential deconfliction of assets in either space, time or both. The mission commander must ensure the routes to and from the target area are deconflicted to guarantee vertical and lateral separation of ingressing aircraft. In the current RED FLAG construct, the deconfliction process can present one of the biggest headaches for the mission commander. How does he/she ensure all strikers get to the target in the least time in order to limit blue exposure to red threats? Who is dropping live or inert ordnance and what are their attack restrictions? Who is the priority striker hitting the key targets? RED FLAG white force oversees the planning effort and enforces restrictions via the exercise Special Instructions to ensure appropriate deconfliction is planned for the ingressing aircraft, aircraft and weapons in the target area, and the aircraft egressing to the blue safe area.
Some of the safety/deconfliction measures utilized include the overall attack game plan. The mission commander must decide how the flow for the ingress and egress routings will be accomplished. Questions that must be answered include: Will there be geographic separation based on a Be-No (be no further than) line, or will there be a single ingress flow; how will ingressing aircraft effectively deconflict from aircraft egressing out of the target area? The deconfliction game plan can be very frustrating for all players involved. In the target area, time and distance buffered around the targets are required to ensure no aircraft or ground personnel will be affected by the falling bombs, weapons affects and aircraft target area maneuvering. This deconfliction is the starting point for a safe and effective RED FLAG.

The tactical portion of the RED FLAG mission is not the only thing that needs to be planned. The mission commander is also responsible for planning the aircraft launch, marshal and recovery. The mission commander must decide in what order the aircraft launch sequence will occur, who, when and where aircraft will be air-to-air refueled prior to and during the mission; the order and safe conduct of pushing aircraft, leaving their hold sanctuary altitudes for their planned ingress, as well as the overall recovery flow. This planning is critical, as there can be 70 plus aircraft marshaling, with aircraft at four different hold points and stacked from the surface to 40,000 feet. A well-organized and understood plan in both the tactical and non-tactical phases is one of the many keys to safe and successful mission execution.

Once the tactical portion of the mission is complete, the RED FLAG flyers still cannot relax. With so many aircraft trying to get back to Nellis, there are often more close passes in the RTB (return to base) phase than there are during the actual tactical portion of the mission. During RTB, blue participants are routed through choke points and a missed Air Traffic callout or a lost visual can quickly cause a dangerous situation to develop. In my time as a white force Operations Supervisor for the RED FLAG missions, I have seen near misses in the tanker track, deconfliction issues in holding, and improper recovery procedures, all of which created situations that needed to be debriefed. Issues that occur during the departure and recovery phases of the mission can often be attributed to complacency since the intense tactical flying has either not yet begun or has already been completed. Several of the worst recovery incidents have happened at night within five miles of Nellis. Tactically proficient and capable aviators can and will make mistakes. Unfortunately, many of the mistakes have happened when the participants let their guard down.

RED FLAG is a superb exercise! It has a fantastic safety record! It is an incredible learning experience for all participants! Safety of the participants is critical in order for the USAF and its joint and coalition partners to be able to put into practice the tactical lessons learned during the flight. Some have called RED FLAG deconfliction flag, but deconfliction is what mitigates the risk of conducting the world’s most realistic combat training exercise.
He then started both engines in the prescribed order, right engine first then the left engine. The ground maintenance personnel then proceeded to conduct maintenance checks. One of the maintenance checks failed which required troubleshooting inside of a panel directly in front of the right engine. The engine run crew chief was told to shut down the right engine to enable the troubleshooting. All ground technicians heard an engine shut down. However the left engine was still running. Ground technician #1 went to the right engine and proceeded to troubleshoot. Ground technician #2 intended to leak-check a component that was forward of the left engine. Under normal circumstances it is standard to shut the left engine down; however, when he heard an engine shutdown, he lost focus, and assumed it was the left engine.

Ground technician #2 used his hand to check the inlet of the left engine for suction, which indicates that it is still running. His hand was pulled towards the inlet and this startled him, causing him to drop a screwdriver into the inlet of the running engine. The end result was $1.4 million dollars in damages. Had the maintainer communicated his intentions of approaching the left engine instead of assuming that it was shut down, he may not have been startled. Maintaining focus and taking necessary time to perform tasks safely will ensure that as the Air Force gets leaner, it continues to get meaner.

**Where to Now?**

Two years ago, each wing weapons safety program in ACC received a thorough program management evaluation (PME) from our office. We sent two experienced weapons safety managers out for a week to “dig” up as much non-compliance “dirt” as we could. We spent a week with relatively inexperienced weapons safety managers (WSMs) who were anxious, but ready and willing to learn how to improve their program. We also spent the week training and educating (SAV) the WSMs and the WSMs trained and educated the WSMs. By the end of the week we had a page of notes, a better understanding of the challenges faced by the wing, and a mutual respect for one another. It was common to hear the WSMs state they “learned more in one week from our visit than they did in school.” Any write-ups were tracked to closure, thus the PME process created better programs which created a better mishap prevention culture in ACC. Today, with the advent of the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) and the Unit Evaluation Inspection (UEI) process led by the IG, the Commander’s Inspection Program has been placed in the driver’s seat for ensuring compliance of programs at the unit level. So how does our path ahead appear?

**Where to Now?**

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QUARTERLY AWARDS

Capt Michael R. Scott, 455 AEW, Bagram AF, Afghanistan. Capt Scott led the BAF BASH program expansion resulting in a 90 percent decrease in bird strikes and the effort to remove an immense bird population ensuring a swift return to normal runway operations during the year’s first severe BWC. Capt Scott led a senior leader’s weapons safety discussion on RPA bed-down options highlighting hazards to aircraft and personnel. Further, he provided vital risk management during the mission-critical upgrade of the emergency landing surface runway. He responded to two transient C-17 mishaps, an F-16 FOD mishap where he highlighted a degraded area of the ramp, and orchestrated an MQ-1 Class A Interim Safety Board where he led a five-member team to an austere Afghanistan location. Capt Scott remained the BAF flight safety authority and displayed astute leadership of 54 FSOs slashing the mishap rate by 42 percent and developing quarterly flight safety briefings applicable to BAF’s 35 aircraft variants.

Ground Safety

MSgt Bilma L. Romero, 25 AF, Lackland AFB, Texas. MSgt Romero oversaw/inspected ground safety and training for over 10K personnel in the 480 ISRW/70 ISRW. While inspecting, she ID’d a facility grounding system deficiency that posed threat to life and property. MSgt Romero assembled key personnel and led the team to analyze mishap probability/severity and develop comprehensive COAs for abatement. All repairs were made and the grounding system hazard/deficiency was eliminated—preserving the $800M weapon system. She directed three virtual inspections and analyzed 2,338 communicator items via MICT, facilitating the continuous evaluation process. MSgt Romero coordinated a 25 AF/IG to HQ ACC/SE WG where she led discussions on IG processes, new functional managers, NAF roles/responsibilities, and inspection schedules. MSgt Romero integrated safety topics into the JBSA Security Hill Top III and educated 92 senior enlisted leaders on local hazards and AF mishap trends.

Weapons Safety

Tsgt Lucas C. Long, 451 AEG, 455 AEW, Kandahar AF, Afghanistan. In his KAF WSM capacity, he instituted an AH-64 explosive storage inspection checklist, reducing the number of violations by 85 percent and stopping the inappropriate storage of fuel with explosives. In support of Operation Southern Surge, Tsgt Long authored the KAF F-16 hot pit refueling risk assessment and created compensatory measures precluding concurrent explosive operations and hot pit refueling. He also increased NEW at the alternate HCP to ensure uninterrupted munitions shipments throughout the operation. Tsgt Long authored the first CAPA Explosive Site Plan using NATO criteria, ensuring all pads and sited locations allow the maximum storage of munitions per Army regulatory guidance—personally placarding explosive limits ensuring first responders were aware of the explosive hazards present.

MONTHLY AWARDS

Aircrew Safety Awards of Distinction

Capts Paul Hesser and Myles McDowell, SrA Everett Bottass – 340 EARS, Al Udeid AB, Qatar (June 2015)

Crew of Snoop 71 – 343 RS, 55 WG, Offutt AFB, Neb. (July 2015)

Crew Chief Safety Awards of Distinction

A1C Robert A. Sheddd – 7 AMXS, 7 BW, Dyess AFB, Texas (May 2015)
A1C Kareem A. Harris – 325 AMXS, 325 FW, Tyndall AFB, Fla. (June 2015)
A1C Dax W. Kruger – 379 EAMXS, 379 AEW, Al Udeid AB, Qatar (July 2015)

Flight Line Safety Awards of Distinction

M3sgt Charles P. Bridges – 379 EAMXS, 379 AEW, Al Udeid, Qatar (June 2015)
SSgt Jason A. McElvy – 380 AEW, Al Dhafra AB, UAE (July 2015)

Ground Safety Awards of Distinction

SSgt Thomas D. Ellinger – 451 EAMXS, 451 AEG, Kandahar AF, Afghanistan (June 2015)
SrA Christopher S. Rexford – 379 EFS, 379 AEW, Al Udeid AB, Qatar (July 2015)

Pilot Safety Awards of Distinction

Capt Patrick J. Nolan – 14 EFS, 407 AEG, Muwaffaq Salti AB, Jordan (June 2015)
1Lt Benjamin S. Cable – 79 FS, 20 FW, Shaw AFB, S.C. (July 2015)

Unit Safety Awards of Distinction

VIPER Aircraft Maintenance Unit Specialist Section – 57 AMXS, 57 WG, Nellis AFB, Nev. (May 2015)
83rd Aircraft Maintenance Unit – 55 WG, Offutt AFB, Neb. (June 2015)
439th Air Expeditionary Advisory Squadron – 439 AEW, Kabul AF, Afghanistan (July 2015)

Weapons Safety Awards of Distinction

SSgt Jacklyn D. Hammock – 9 MOOS, 9 RW, Beale AFB, Calif. (June 2015)

2015 Fall Protection Awareness Focus

(4 – 15 May 2015)

In support of OSHA’s “National Safety Stand-Down—Prevent Falls in Construction” focus, the Air Force Safety Center asked that we all get involved—not just construction. Our task was to reach every military and civilian working for the USAF as well as those visiting Air Force installations. Everyone should be touched by some sort of communication regarding fall/protection/prevention during the time frame. ACC Ground Safety developed numerous items that were shared throughout the AF and all wings were asked to support this awareness focus. At the end of the focus, each SAF / DRU was required to send up a short synopsis from each wing identifying their top three units. ACC Ground Safety reviewed all responses and selected the “7 BW” and the “325 FW” as the best/most effective programs in support of the 2015 Fall Protection Awareness focus! Congratulations!!
File an ASAP Today!

Actual ASAP Submission. This event did not result in a mishap, but provides valuable information worthy of sharing.

The mission was an increased threat CAS scenario with STS combat controllers operating in a low-level zone. Due to the increased threat and radio transmission and LOS issues with the JTAC, a 1,500’ AGL hold southeast of their position with 3.5nm legs was required to maintain radio communications with the JTAC. This resulted in only 18’ wings-level time before a turn was needed to maintain airspace and keep outside the threat. At the end of our 75 minute vul time, the JTAC was passing the BDA. I initiated a turn at 1,500’ AGL, and 250 KIAS. After initiating the turn I went heads down to write a BDG which was an error on paper. This is where my poor decision to go heads down in the turn, lack of recency and subsequent slow cross check almost resulted in CFIT. After initiating a 70 degrees of bank turn and setting 2.5g’s I went heads down. I maintained the 2.5g’s which wasn’t enough to maintain level flight causing my flight path to start to drop well below the horizon. Upon looking outside (coninciding with the GCAS warning) I was in a 35 degree nose-low attitude. I performed a max performance recovery at 5.2g’s resulting in an over-g of the ECM pod, and bottoming out at 380’ AGL. After the recovery was initiated, I received the “recover” call from my IP which upon tape review would have been 2’ too late. I am unable to recap if the GCAS or looking outside on my own is what prompted me to recover the aircraft, and looking at the tape the recovery and GCAS warning were simultaneous. If I had recovered or delayed recovery one second later and allowed the nose to drop further, it would have been too late.

Following the recovery after taking a minute to evaluate what happened and why, we elected to continue the sortie.

Never go head’s down while turning in the low altitude environment. There were a lot of combined factors in this sortie that required extensive communication (JTAC’s first mission, my second low-altitude sortie in a year) combined with poor radio reception which led me to make a bad decision and write down information while turning. This is not a practice I have done in the past, and definitely will not continue in the future. It goes back to the basics of aviate, navigate, communicate, with a higher emphasis on aviating in the low altitude environment. An emphasis should also be placed on initiating the max recovery maneuver any time the GCAS warning is heard despite the frequent occurrence of erroneous warnings on a low altitude mission.

Do you have a lesson learned to share?
http://safety.masap.com

- ASAP—Aviation Safety Action Program
- It’s confidential and quick

The third quarter of FY15 has been rough for ACC Aviation Class A mishaps. In this quarter, we lost five RPAs, four MQ-1s and an MQ-9, of which four were performing operational missions in the AOR. Additionally, the RC-135 community experienced a fuselage fire and a bird strike that caused significant engine damage. Fortunately, good crew coordination and timely decision-making ensured minimal injuries. Continue to diligently focus on each mission and task at hand. In so doing, safe practices will permeate day-to-day operations. See a risk, submit an ASAP!

Ground Notes

Out of the nine fatalities suffered in FY15, eight have been the result of motorcycle accidents! ACC only suffered one motorcycle fatality in FY14. We, at ACC, are doing all we can to make education and training available to our Wings. We know many of you are doing what you can to stop this alarming trend. Now and always, we need each rider to take responsibility for themselves and do everything they can to prevent their fellow riders from being killed while riding a motorcycle. At least 50 percent of the fatalities are due to willful non-compliance. That’s to say, the rider was either drunk, speeding excessively, or operating their motorcycle illegally and in some cases a combination of two of the three. Please do all “YOU” can to help stop the negative trend and check Three in all you do!

We experienced five Class E events this quarter—a slight increase over past quarters. Three were Class E HAPs: a blank 5.56 round discharged in a lodging room (improper clearing); a Chaff/Flare module dropped while being downloaded from aircraft (crew communication); an AIM-120 dropped during a weapons loading operation (equipment failure). The two Class E property damage events were: a CATM-9 radome shattered during transport (compliancy), and a CATM-9 radome was discovered shattered after flight (unknown). Three of five incidents demonstrated inattention to detail and complacency. Trend analysis data revealed those actions caused the majority of incidents this fiscal year. So, put forth more effort to reduce these types of incidents.

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Can You Guess Who Checked Three?

Enjoy your FALL* ...

See you next spring** :)

LEGAL DISCLAIMER
* No actual cartoon characters or were injured in making this graphic. ACC Safety does not endorse slipping, tripping, or falling.
** Our next edition will actually return this winter.

What is Check Three you ask? Check 3 is a quick and easy method to assess any activity or event for possible hazards. The “Check 3” approach is assessing three areas referenced by the common acronym GPS. In this case, GPS is not referencing a navigation aid. Rather, GPS is: Gear - Plan - Skills.

This allows a quick review of your activity to highlight any issues or hazards. For instance, “G” (gear) may be your equipment, vehicle, or availability of drinking water. “P” (plan) may be the timeline, weather, sequence, and backup plans. “S” (skills) may be your rest level or overall experience level. If you see an issue or hazard in any of the areas, then adjust an area to mitigate the hazard, especially the plan. Check 3 allows you to have a quick mental method to assess any activity.

4 | CHOICES—THE GOOD, THE BAD ...
   by Tech. Sgt. Jason W. Smith,
   12 AF/SE, Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz.

8 | HALLOWEEN TIPS

9 | ESCAPE PLANNING

10 | AGGRESSIVE DRIVING ...
   by Mr. Rod Krause,
   5th BW/SEG, Minot AFB, N.D.

12 | GIVE ‘EM A BRAKE!
   by Master Sgt. Kimberly R. Young,

14 | RIDER’S RAP

15 | HUNTER’S HUDDLE
How do you articulate, in an article, that the choices a person makes can affect more than just themselves. The Air Force continually briefs us not to drink and drive, to wear our seat belts, follow TOs, and wear personal protective equipment ... both on- and off-duty. These same messages are continually repeated because preventable mishaps, stemming from a poor decision someone made, continue to affect the Air Force mission.

The poor choice a person makes is a main factor that kills people in preventable mishaps around the world every day. The choice a person makes to drive under the influence determines whether they, or in many cases the innocent person they hit, will live to see another day. Your decisions not only impact you and your career, but can also destroy the lives of the people around you. The next time you get into your vehicle and make the choice to not wear a seat belt, think about how your children, friends, parents or your spouse will have to deal with your injuries or possible death. How will your spouse feel on your next anniversary? What will your children wish for when they are blowing out the candles on their birthday cake?
Over a span of eight months (1 October 2014 to 22 July 2015), the AF has lost 24 lives in vehicle mishaps. Nine of those mishaps were off-duty in ACC. That means that at least 24 families and countless friends and coworkers had to grieve the loss of someone they loved or care about. It is time for all Airmen to start making the right choices.

What is the right choice you ask? Simply put, the right choice is the one that continues the mission and keeps you and others alive. Life is a choice—your own adventure book. There are never-ending crossroads where you have a right and wrong choice. Most of these decisions are simple and mundane where the wrong choice of wearing lime green crocks with your ABUs is not the end of the world. But sometimes, the wrong choice has the potential to prevent mission completion or even injure or kill you, a wingman, or a family member. The right choice can keep us flying high and you, your family, and teammates safe and sound.

Some advice to help you make the right choice: If you and some friends are planning to go out and have some drinks, establish a designated driver. If for some reason that plan does not work, call a taxi, a sober friend, or a supervisor to get you home safely. If you won’t be drinking, be the designated driver and make sure you help your fellow wingmen, friends, coworkers, or acquaintances that have been drinking get home safely—drive them, take their keys or get them into a cab. Insist, even when they tell you they’re fine and that they’ll be alright.

Putting on your seat belt should always be the first thing you do when getting in a vehicle either as a passenger or as the driver. Putting your seat belt on is always going to be the right choice. What can happen when we don’t wear our seat belts? Plenty! Try not to become a statistic—wear your seat belt at all times. Maybe this poem (penned by then Master Sgt. Duncan Munro—now retired) will help motivate you to always wear your seat belt.

Mirror, Mirror on the wall
Who’s the fairest of them all?
The one who lacks wisdom in haste
Or the one who’s smiling—teeth held with paste?
Mirror, Mirror, on the wall
Who’s the prettiest of them all?
Someday those stitches will go away
But those facial scars will forever stay.
Mirror, Mirror on the wall
If I could do it over, that day I’d recall,
And take a second to click my seat belt on
Now that face in the mirror I once knew is gone.

Another good choice to make is when you are driving a long distance for leave or TDY; plan to take breaks. Splitting the trip into multiple days and not departing for your trip after working a full day is the right choice. Would it not be smarter to just take one more day of leave rather than have your loved ones deal with your possible injury or death? When we lose just one Airman, we have lost too much and the effects are widespread. Make the right choice so you’re not the next statistic. “The Safety Briefings will continue until all preventable mishaps stop!”

Don’t Let A BAD CHOICE Put You Here!


OVER THE EDGE | SEPTEMBER - NOVEMBER 2015
Halloween Tips

Halloween is one of the most anticipated nights of the year for kids, but Safe Kids’ research shows some scary statistics on Halloween safety.

1/3 of parents talk to their kids annually about Halloween, although 3/4 report having Halloween safety fears.

On average, twice as many child pedestrians are killed while walking on Halloween compared to other days of the year.

Only 18% of parents use reflective tape on their children’s Halloween costumes.

12% of children five years of age or younger are permitted to trick-or-treat alone.

Escape Planning

Plan Ahead! If a fire breaks out in your home, you may have only a few minutes to get out safely once the smoke alarm sounds. Everyone needs to know what to do and where to go if there is a fire.

SAFETY TIPS

» MAKE a home escape plan. Draw a map of your home showing all doors and windows. Discuss the plan with everyone in your home.

» KNOW at least two ways out of every room, if possible. Make sure all doors and windows leading outside open easily.

» HAVE an outside meeting place (like a tree, light pole or mailbox) a safe distance from the home where everyone should meet.

» PRACTICE your home fire drill at night and during the day with everyone in your home, twice a year.

» PRACTICE using different ways out.

» TEACH children how to escape on their own in case you can’t help them.

» CLOSE doors behind you as you leave.

IF THE ALARM SOUNDS...

» If the smoke alarm sounds, GET OUT AND STAY OUT. Never go back inside for people or pets.

» If you have to escape through smoke, GET LOW AND GO under the smoke on your way out.

» CALL the fire department from outside your home.

FACTS

1. According to an NFPA survey, only one of every three American households have actually developed and practiced a home fire escape plan.

2. While 71% of Americans have an escape plan in case of a fire, only 47% of those have practiced it.

3. One-third of American households who made an estimate thought they would have at least 6 minutes before a fire in their home would become life-threatening. The time available is often less. And only 8% said their first thought on hearing a smoke alarm would be to get out!
Traffic is going nowhere fast, but the hotshot behind you just has to pass. As soon as there is enough room, he or she carelessly switches lanes, cutting you off. If you’re lucky, you may get a blink of the turn signal, but then again, maybe not.

Although many drivers on the road are reasonable people, there are inconsiderate drivers who have no concern for the safety of other drivers. The hot shot that is a couple of cars ahead and has risked an accident for a 40-foot advantage is just one example. To add insult to injury, his windows are down and the music is deafening even two car-lengths away. I see this every day, coming to and from work, on a somewhat busy four-lane divided highway where the speed limit is posted at 70 mph and traffic is referred to as the “Minot 500.” I ask myself and my coworkers... What’s the hurry?

Aggressive driving is not only rude; it’s downright dangerous and can sometimes be fatal. Drivers not only hurt others by being needlessly angered, they get dangerously aggressive in response. This is a vicious cycle that affects all drivers on the roadways.

Ethical behavior isn’t just about how you conduct yourself face-to-face, it should also be practiced while behind the wheel or whatever size and type of vehicle we drive. Being encased in three or four tons of metal doesn’t guarantee safety. We owe it to ourselves, family and all drivers around us to be ethical, safe, and cautious when behind the wheel of a vehicle at all times.

How can you avoid these types of drivers?

I’m glad you asked! First, avoid becoming an aggressive driver yourself. Keep your emotions in check. Don’t take your frustrations out on other drivers and plan ahead allowing enough time for delays. Stay focused on your own driving; keep alert and watch out for the unexpected. Yelling, honking your horn, and pounding on the steering wheel won’t make traffic move any faster.

Avoiding the dangers of aggressive drivers requires good defensive driving skills. Avoid creating an offensive situation. Don’t tailgate or flash your lights at another driver. If you are in the left lane and someone wants to pass, move over to the right and let the driver pass.

While you may be returning back to work after a summer break, or just out shopping around town... take your time, get the proper rest, and don’t drive aggressively. Staying safe is paramount! – Ed.
Here are a few examples of what can happen if you don’t follow the rules: On May 30, 2014 in Minnesota, a semi-truck illegally passed a stopped school bus, nearly killing a 13-year-old female student waiting alongside the highway. Cameras inside the bus captured the close call, which happened on Highway 23 near Paynesville and New London. The footage showed the semi blow past the stopped bus on the right side—lights flashing and stop arm down—and continued along the highway. Thankfully, neither the girl nor bus driver was injured.

Unfortunately, another young lady wasn’t so lucky in Cherokee County, S.C. Two weeks prior to the Minnesota incident, a vehicle did the same thing and blew past a school bus on the right. A 16-year-old girl couldn’t move fast enough to get out of the way of the vehicle and subsequently was struck. She was airlifted to a nearby Trauma facility where she was treated in the ICU. To make matters worse, the driver had a young child in the back seat riding along while she was driving recklessly. These are just two of many stories about improper/illegal passing of a school bus. Many drivers tend to rush and become extremely impatient when it comes to the loading and unloading of the school buses thus causing major mishaps and/or near misses. An old wise woman always told me that if you are rushing that’s a sure sign that maybe YOU should have left for your destination a little earlier.

Remember during this school year to slow down, give the kids a break, be responsible, and pay attention. Being late for a meeting or a ballgame is not worth putting a life at risk … yours or theirs!

BY MASTER SGT. KIMBERLY R. YOUNG

Driving is a privilege that we all must take seriously and with it comes an awesome responsibility not only to the people riding with you but those that you share the road with. For most drivers you have had the pleasure of sitting behind a stopped school bus, stop bar extended and red flashing lights on, as the kids either load up in the morning or depart in the afternoon. To be honest, it is nerve wrecking (to say the least), especially when one is pushed for time. No matter what your personal feeling is about stopping, it is unlawful to pass a stopped school bus on the left, right or from any direction—if the bus is displaying a stop sign and red flashing lights you don’t pass!

Passing a stopped school bus is a violation of traffic laws, which vary from state to state. Laws requiring motorists to stop in the vicinity of school buses are intended to prevent serious accidents involving children as they walk to and from the bus, often unpredictably. For example, Virginia law specifically states “You must stop for a stopped school bus with flashing red lights and an extended stop sign when you approach from any direction on a highway, private road or school driveway. Stop and remain stopped until all persons are clear and the bus moves again. You must also stop if the bus is loading or unloading passengers and the signals are not on. You do not have to stop if you are traveling in the opposite direction on a roadway with a median or barrier dividing the road and the bus is on the opposite side of the median or barrier.”

From 2003 to 2012, 174 school-age children died in school-transportation-related crashes, 55 were occupants of school transportation vehicles and 119 were pedestrians.

From 2005 to 2012, both 5 to 7 and 8 to 13 age groups each had 42 (35%) school-age pedestrians killed in school-transportation-related crashes.

From 2003 to 2012, there have been 1,353 people killed in school-transportation-related crashes—an average of 135 fatalities per year.

DID YOU KNOW:

The area 10 feet around a school bus is where children are in the most danger of being hit?

From 2005 to 2012, there were 1,353 people killed in school-transportation-related crashes—an average of 135 fatalities per year.


OVER THE EDGE | SEPTEMBER - NOVEMBER 2015 | 13
Lesson Learned: Just because you are a safety professional with several years of motorcycle experience and training, it can happen to you. When he teaches the BRC and BRC II classes, he instills that you need to “make yourself visible.” Was he visible? Yes, but did the driver see him? No ... he was distracted. Was it a cell phone? Maybe, maybe not. Was it something else? Could have been! Whatever it was, the driver was distracted and when he looked up, there Mr. Salinas was in his path of travel.

He’s recovering slowly ... just sore. His motorcycle of 14 years is in the shop. Will he continue to ride? He says, “Yes.” Whether on- or off-base, he always rides with all of his gear.